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Is it possible for service organizations formed from protest movements to maintain 
their radical commitments, even when they partner with state agencies? Engaging with 
the social movements, civic engagement, and nonprofit sector literatures, I focus on 
the American prostitutes’ rights movement and the emergence from it of the California 
Prevention and Education Project (CAL-PEP) and the St James Infirmary (SJI) in the 
San Francisco Bay Area. As flagship nonprofit health service organizations, the SJI 
and CAL-PEP illustrate how a social movement’s radical impulses and claims-making 
capacities are both maintained and restricted when they are institutionalized into 
service provision organizations that seek to work with state agencies in an era of neo-
liberal politics. Based on participant-observational, interview-based and archival 
research, I contend that CAL-PEP and the SJI express their radical impulses within 
their organizations by maintaining prostitution as a legitimate occupational choice and 
involving sex workers in service provision and management. Granting agreements 
encouraging local, community-based health service provision and an emphasis on 
professional, credentialed service provision permit this expression of their radical 
impulses, even as charitable nonprofit tax status and granting agency requirements for 
data collection constrain their capacities to advocate for sex workers' rights beyond 
their organizations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
COYOTE’s DAUGHTERS: UNDERSTANDING MOVEMENT EVOLUTION, 
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMATION AND ENGAGEMENT WITH THE STATE 
Throughout American history prostitutes have been cast as either fallen and immoral 
women or, more recently, as victims “trafficked” into commercial sexual slavery1. 
This thesis tells a lesser-known story: in defiance of their social marginalization 
prostitutes have organized on their own behalf to assert their selfhood, to gain 
recognition of prostitution as work, freely chosen, and acknowledged as such under 
law. In the process, they have confronted extraordinarily complicated strategic 
situations involving complex compromises with authority.  Detailing this process 
traces the unusual path that has led to sex-worker activism and tells the story of how 
such organizing engages with state and societal practices that have for centuries 
treated prostitution as immoral, illegal, and increasingly as criminal. 
Beginning in the 1970s, a San Francisco organization known as COYOTE -- 
Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics-- made the radical claim that prostitution was neither 
immoral nor criminal but simply a legitimate occupation, like any other. COYOTE 
was, at the time and in subsequent years, the subject of both academic and more 
general attention. But its story trailed off. The following chapters pick up the trail, 
describing the efforts of sex worker self-organizing in these current times of neo-
liberalism’s devolution of welfare responsibility onto a network of privatized social 
service non-profit organizations (Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003).  
                                                
1 Throughout this thesis I will use the term “prostitute/prostitution” interchangeably with the broader 
term “sex work”. The latter term refers to the exchange of commercial sexual services for material 
compensation and covers a wide range of activities—some of which are legal in the United States—
such as dancing, pornography and phone sex. While these legal forms of sex work are certainly of 
interest to me, I am mainly interested in organizational efforts around prostitution, which is illegal in 
most of the United States. 
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What has evolved from the earlier radical efforts to assert the legitimacy of 
prostitution? What are the organizational choices that advocates of this radical 
challenge now confront? Can a radical politics be incorporated into the institutional 
environment of nonprofit service organizations? These are the questions that have 
shaped the story of COYOTE’s daughters.  
Studies of social movement organizing and social change typically predict two 
possible outcomes of the protest cycle of the l960s and l970s: either protest falls into 
abeyance, to be reignited in a future protest cycle (see for example Rupp & Taylor, 
1987; Tarrow, 1989), or the protest becomes institutionalized within the constrictions 
of organizational normality. Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1977), in their 
study of protest movements that erupted among lower-income groups, presciently 
predicted that once-radical protest movements of the 1960s would shift their focus to 
the creation of formal organizations, and that in the 1970s and 1980s much of the 
protest element would disappear. Extrapolating further, it might be predicted that 
formal organizations-- including those providing health and human services in last two 
decades-- would become preoccupied with providing social services no longer offered 
by the state and with seeking grants and contracts to sustain their existence, at the 
expense of pursuing broader social goals. 
The narrative here points to a third path. The organizational subjects of this 
study, the St. James Infirmary (SJI), and the California Prevention and Education 
Project (CAL-PEP), represent neither protest in abeyance nor organizational stasis. 
Rather, these two small prostitute-run health service nonprofit organizations suggest a 
political evolution that I will describe as radical institutionalization. Even as the goals 
of the movement are incorporated into the practices of these two formal organizations, 
and even as they are funded primarily by federal, state and local health authorities, the 
SJI and CAL-PEP have institutionalized a practice of health service delivery at direct 
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odds with the moral regime that regulates the practice of prostitution in America. 
Studying these organizations, then, explores the constraints on maintaining the once-
radical goals of a protest movement when they are institutionalized through service 
provision organizations, and the conditions under which they might circumvent these 
constraints in an era of neo-liberal politics.   
To introduce this study, this chapter first sketches the broad political landscape 
in which CAL-PEP and the SJI currently operate, defined by neo-liberalism and the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Next, it provides an overview of CAL-PEP and the SJI’s 
emergence and outlines the current state of prostitutes’ rights organizing by describing 
COYOTE’s daughters. This chapter turns, then, to a conceptual discussion of both the 
constraints and opportunities that shape the environment of nonprofits, looking 
specifically at two examples of organizations, Gay Men’s Health Crisis and the 
Women’s Health Clinics. These organizations have confronted similar challenges to 
those faced by both CAL-PEP and the SJI, and provide an important analytical guide 
to the terrain that nonprofits endeavoring to challenge existing politics must face. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of research methods and an outline of future 
chapters. 
Part I: Setting the Stage: Neo-liberalism, the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
The neo-liberal environment in which nonprofits operate has been shaped by a broad 
set of eighteenth and nineteenth century liberal principles that stress individual 
autonomy; the market as the mechanism to allocate goods and solve social problems; 
and the state as an impediment to both individual autonomy and market efficiency 
(Hackworth, 2005). Neo-liberalism as a term denotes new forms of political-economic 
governance premised on the extension of market relationships. In concrete policy 
terms, this has been marked by a shift from Keynesian welfarism towards an agenda 
favoring unfettered markets and the globalization of capital, where the government 
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focuses on implementing measures (such as social program retrenchment) to insure 
international competitiveness and economic efficiency (Larner, 2000).  
Neo-liberalism in America has been marked by a decline of the welfare state 
and liberal social movements, alongside an increased role for nonprofit organizations 
in health and social service delivery. Welfare state minimization has occurred more 
dramatically in the United States than in other industrialized nations because unlike 
other industrialized nations, the persistent American preoccupation with celebrating 
market forces and relative absence of restraints on private initiatives facilitated the 
development of a system of social welfare policy mandates that developed slowly and 
late and remain narrow, contentious and incomplete (Gronbjerg, 2001a, 2001b). It was 
not until the Great Depression brought about massive unemployment and poverty that 
Congress was forced to provide emergency relief for all sectors of the economy 
(Abramovitz, 2000). Initially, this relief was to be temporary, but the length and 
severity of the economic crisis forced Congress to acknowledge that the market 
economy and local charities could not provide for everyone, and if there was to be a 
modicum of political and economic stability in American society, the government 
would have to intervene (Abramovitz, 2000; Lowi, 1979). As a result, after 
considerable debate, Congress passed the Social Security Act in 1935, converting 
responsibility for social welfare to a federal program that replaced the sporadic system 
of highly varied relief programs (Abramovitz, 2000; Mink, 1998). The development of 
welfare programs continued into the 1950s (Smith, 2001), and as Jill Quadagno (1994) 
writes, President Johnson’s War on Poverty emerged as the upshot of a well-
intentioned (but poorly executed) effort to ameliorate these exclusions2.  
                                                
2 As a result, programs such as Medicaid and Medicare were added to the Social Security program in 
1965, and in 1974 OAA, AB and APTD were combined into a federalized income support program, 
entitled “Supplemental Security Income” (SSI) (Abramovitz, 2000).  
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However, by 1980, welfare state expansion slowed with the rise of neo-liberal 
politics3. The decline of social movement activism in of the 1960s and 1970s 
alongside the rise of the New Right facilitated Ronald Reagan’s election on a platform 
advocating a major retreat from government intervention in social policy and the 
economy, and an ideological opposition to social spending (Abramovitz, 2000; 
Eisenstein, 1994). Welfare policies across the board came under intense scrutiny to 
determine whether they should be reduced or replaced with private service providers 
(Pierson, 1994), followed by a steady decentralization of government support for 
social services as categorical grants from the federal government to states were 
replaced by block grants, which allowed the states and local governments to decide 
where the money should be spent (O'Neill, 2002). Reagan anticipated that with cuts to 
federal spending, state and local governments and private charities would pick up the 
slack.  
To the Reagan Administration and others on the Right who decried 
government involvement in the economy, nonprofit organizations offered flexibility 
and new ideas for delivering services, and they also were a means for bringing 
unaddressed problems to public attention (Berry & Arons, 2003; Salamon, 2003). But 
the role of nonprofits in welfare state service delivery was not unique to the Reagan 
Era: the War on Poverty also created community empowerment programs that 
incorporated local groups into the administration and development of anti-poverty 
programs4. But despite the Reagan administration’s rhetorical support for private 
initiatives and the non-profit provision of social services, during this Administration 
                                                
3 This was due to numerous factors, such as their maturation (social programs became an increasingly 
large portion of GNP); the slow economic growth that diminished revenues available to combat 
growing unemployment through social programs; and the oil shock of 1973 (Pierson, 1994, 2001). 
4 Many new nonprofit agencies that emerged were funded by grants from the WOP’s Office of 
Economic Opportunity. Soon, as Morgen writes, the nonprofit sector became the “theatre of operations 
for the enlarged welfare state” (2002, p.161) as the 1967 Social Security Act (Title IV-A) encouraged 
states to enter contracts with private agencies to provide services. 
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federal funds were never adequate to allow nonprofits to maximally provide services 
(Dobkin-Hall, 2001).  
Yet even with the contraction of the welfare state, from 1974 to 1995 federal 
support to nonprofits actually increased from $23 billion to $175 billion (Marwell, 
2004, p.269), and nonprofits became major players in the social welfare system 
(Rathgeb-Smith & Lipsky, 1993, 2001), finding themselves in direct competition for 
funds with public agencies like Medicare and Medicaid (Gronbjerg, 2001a, 2001b). 
Today the non-profit sector is a $500 billion per year industry, employs nearly 8.6 
million paid persons full-time and 7.2 million volunteers, and out-distances the 
employment in the largest private businesses in the country by a ratio of 12 to 1 
(Sokolowski & Salamon, 1999, pp.262-263). Non-profits include one-half of the 
nation’s colleges and hospitals, nearly two-thirds of all social service agencies, most 
civic associations, and almost all symphony orchestras (Sokolowski & Salamon, 1999, 
p.261) and they account for a range of organizations and a sizable portion of the 
nation’s economic activity. There are 1.8 million registered non-profit organizations 
with a combined annual revenue of $1 trillion, holding $2 trillion in assets (O'Neill, 
2002, p.xvii). 
As a result of state retrenchment and the subsequent shifting of social service 
delivery to the nonprofit sector, many marginalized and vulnerable populations have 
become dependent on nonprofits: as Jeffrey Berry & David Arons note in their study 
of the nonprofit sector, although not all nonprofits carry out functions of critical 
importance to government, a surprising number deliver services many ordinary 
Americans depend on, with 48 percent delivering health and human services (Berry & 
Arons, 2003, p.5). Since many of these nonprofits are highly dependent on state 
funding-- on average, 30.5 percent of nonprofits’ revenue is from government 
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(Sokolowski & Salamon, 1999, p.273)-- all of this raises questions whether nonprofits 
serving these populations might mobilize and advocate for them.  
This question is particularly important in light of data about the changing roles 
of organizations in political life. As scholars such as Robert Putnam (1995) have 
noted, although Americans have high rates of civic engagement, this has declined with 
memberships in civic organizations such as the Elks Lodge and the Kiwanis Clubs. 
And while scholars such as Theda Sckocpol (1996) argue that Putnam does not 
adequately consider many other forms of activity that foster civic engagement (such as 
taking part in feminist activism or being involved with professional organizations), 
Skocpol (2003) also documents a decline in recent years of large, membership-based 
voluntary organizations that engage in more broad-based advocacy, and their 
replacement by a proliferation of professionalized organizations that focus on specific 
slices of the population and are less likely to facilitate participation. It is against this 
backdrop of the declining role of civic and mass-based organization and the 
proliferation of nonprofit service organizations that this thesis addresses the vital 
question of how nonprofits fulfill their role as service providers and how this role 
shapes their engagement in the political process.  
The HIV/AIDS epidemic and the neo-liberal era 
CAL-PEP and the SJI-- the nonprofit organizational subjects of this thesis-- receive 
the majority of their funding for HIV/AIDS prevention, which has relied heavily on 
nonprofit service provision since the beginning of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The AIDS 
virus came to the Center’s for Disease Control’s (CDC) attention in 1981 when CDC 
officials began receiving requests for pentamidine from doctors in Los Angeles and 
New York who were treating gay male patients with pneumocytis carinii pneumonia 
(PCP), even though none of these patients had organ transplants, the major cause of 
PCP (Etheridge, 1992). The CDC soon began a surveillance program, asking health 
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departments to report cases of PCP and Kaposi’s Sarcoma (KS), a rare cancer also 
found commonly among AIDS patients, to the CDC. By 1982, when KS was detected 
in hemophiliacs and Haitian immigrants, it became clear that this virus (soon be 
known as HIV/AIDS) was not specific to the gay population.  
However, government agencies at the federal, state and local levels were slow 
to respond to the mounting prevention and care needs of those affected because, unlike 
other communicable diseases among urban populations, HIV/AIDS was seen as a 
disease of social pariahs that was associated with immoral conduct (Armstrong, 2002; 
I. Cohen & Elder, 1989; Penner, 1995). And so while the CDC labored to produce 
brochures and other educational material about the disease, they found their efforts 
constantly rebuffed by the Reagan Administration, which did not want to appear to be 
“encouraging” unmarried or homosexual sex in its appeals to the religious right 
(Silverman, 1992). 
Funding for federal health and social service agencies like the CDC was 
declining (Moore, 1998): the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 forced the 
CDC to cut its funding and staffing levels drastically (D'Emilio & Freedman, 1997; 
Moore, 1998). As a result, from June 1981 to June 1982, the CDC spent a mere $1 
million on AIDS research and prevention (compared with $9 million response to the 
much smaller problem of Legionnaires' disease) (Rimmerman, 1998, p.93). And in 
late 1982, while Congress allocated $2.6 million for the CDC's HIV/AIDS research, 
the Reagan administration claimed that the CDC did not need this money and opposed 
any congressional supplemental appropriations designed to fund the federal 
government’s AIDS policy efforts (Rimmerman, 1998, p.93). 
Although the social movements of the 1960s and early 1970s were long-over, 
activism initiated by the gay community convinced various governmental bodies to 
devote more resources to HIV/AIDS prevention activities to be undertaken by 
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nonprofit organizations. At the time-- in keeping with the broader trend implemented 
by Ronald Reagan to minimize and contract health and social service provision to 
nonprofits-- the CDC was interested in utilizing community-based responses to AIDS 
because they appeared to provide access to populations (such as intravenous drug 
users (IDU) and prostitutes) the CDC assumed were at highest risk for HIV/AIDS. As 
a result, when various levels of government began paying attention to HIV/AIDS, in 
the spirit of neo-liberal politics they relied initially on these local, grassroots 
organizations for service delivery because they appeared inexpensive and offered 
flexibility and new ideas for delivering information and services to persons with HIV 
(Berry & Arons, 2003; Salamon, 2003). And, as indirect measures seemed to indicate, 
these community-based efforts were beginning to successfully discourage unsafe 
sexual behaviors 5(M. Bailey, 1991; Wolitski, 2006). Consequently, by the mid-1980s, 
the relationship between community organizations and the CDC was largely 
reciprocal: the community organizations became laboratories, in a sense, for the CDC 
to observe and learn about different HIV prevention interventions 6(M. Bailey, 1991). 
By 1988, the CDC was delivering the bulk of their HIV/AIDS prevention services 
                                                
5 Of course, this approach was not unique to HIV/AIDS prevention: collaboration between government 
agencies and  community-based organizations (CBO) with access to hard-to-reach or stigmatized 
populations has been a public health tradition in the United States. Indeed, as early as 1937 then 
Surgeon General for the public Health Service declared that the best hope for eradicating syphilis lay in 
community-based voluntary organizations, and so federal and state leaders must offer concrete help to 
these organizations to help them with their efforts (M. Bailey, 1991). And since the 1970s, community-
level interventions have been useful in addressing other health issues, such as smoking cessation and 
control and prevention of coronary heart disease (CDC AIDS Community Demonstration Research 
Group, 1999). 
6 Initially most CDC-funded programs served white gay men, but in 1987 HIV/AIDS rates were 
increasing in Black and Hispanic populations, which led the CDC to allocate funds ($7.4 million) to 
local health departments to support CBOs representative of and working with racial minority 
populations. However, a lack of understanding of the real costs of providing services on the part of 
CBOs, combined with delays on the part of state and local governments, delayed the funding for many 
CBOs. Frustrated by these delays, minority organizations demanded direct funding from the CDC, and 
so avoid duplication and determine which minority CBOs would receive funding, eligible applicants 
were those in areas most effected by AIDS and whose governing body was comprised of more than 50 
percent racial and ethnic minority group members (M. Bailey, 1991). 
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through local, community-based nonprofit organizations7. Today, according to the 
CDC (2002), its Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention (DHAP) is in charge of reducing 
incidences of HIV infection and HIV-related illnesses and deaths, in collaboration 
with community, state and national partners8. Ten percent of the CDC’s $6 billion 
budget is for HIV/AIDS prevention, nearly 80 percent of which is distributed 
externally through cooperative agreements, grants, and contracts primarily to state and 
local agencies (CDC, 2008, see Detail Table p.1). The largest portion of these grants 
fund state, local and territorial health departments that often, in turn, subcontract 
service provision to nonprofit community organizations.  
Part II: COYOTE’s daughters and the prostitutes’ rights movement in the neo-
liberal era 
CAL-PEP and the SJI, formed in 1984 and 1999, respectively, incorporated as 
nonprofits and sought funds from various government agencies that considered 
community-based nonprofits the best vehicle for delivering HIV/AIDS prevention 
services. However, CAL-PEP and the SJI were also formed by sex workers active in 
COYOTE, illustrating the movement of activists from protest to nonprofit service 
provision, and raising questions whether and how they might maintain their 
commitment to more radical goals in the era of neo-liberal politics and the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. 
                                                
7 Today, the CDC has packaged these Demonstration Projects as evidence-based interventions, and the 
required materials and CBO training about how to use them are available through the CDC’s “Diffusion 
of Effective Behavioral Interventions” (DEBI) Project (Wolitski, 2006). Two DEBIs reflect the early 
HIV prevention efforts of sex workers, through Project AWARE (described below), to conduct peer 
outreach, namely SISTA (Sisters Informing Sisters on Topics about AIDS), which targets Black women 
and uses small group interventions to prevent HIV risk behavior by through culturally relevant 
activities, including group discussions, videos, and role-playing; and RAPP (Real AIDS Prevention 
Project), which targets women at risk, with activities including using peer networks for community 
outreach and engaging individuals in safer sex discussions. 
8 The Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention falls under the jurisdiction of the National Center for 
HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD and TB Prevention, which is one of four National Centers 
administered by the Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases. 
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Formed in 1973 by Margo St. James, a former prostitute, COYOTE’s mission 
was to decrease the stigma associated with prostitution and remove it from the 
purview of criminal laws. As a protest organization emerging on the tail end of the 
women’s and gay liberation movements, COYOTE was arguably poised to succeed 
with its own claims-making activities. COYOTE had difficulty recruiting members, 
raising financial resources and forming allies with other movements, and the advent of 
the AIDS epidemic in 1980 altered COYOTE’s political opportunities. When the 
disease was detected in the heterosexual population, medical authorities (namely the 
CDC) assumed prostitutes were a natural bridge for the disease and began to 
investigate. COYOTE members Gloria Lockett and Priscilla Alexander quickly 
recognized the organizational opportunities and health service exigencies the 
HIV/AIDS virus presented: to minimize the impact of HIV/AIDS on prostitutes’ 
physical health and their stigmatization, they would have to educate their peers about 
HIV/AIDS prevention. To do this, COYOTE members began to hand out condoms 
and information about HIV/AIDS prevention on the strolls. This grassroots effort was 
also political, demonstrating COYOTE’s belief that prostitutes were not sources of 
infection for the general population and, as workers, took responsibility for their own 
health and wellbeing. 
Soon COYOTE’s grassroots effort came to the attention of the mainstream 
health establishment. In 1984, Dr. Judith Cohen, who was leading the CDC’s San 
Francisco site study of AIDS transmission and prostitution through the Association for 
Women’s AIDS Research and Education (Project AWARE), approached COYOTE 
and asked them to participate in the study.  
The CDC realized that the clandestine nature of most prostitution made the 
population (like others initially impacted by the disease) difficult to reach by 
traditional public health channels, and so to gain this community’s trust and convince 
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them to engage in prevention activities, they would need to hire (technically) former 
prostitutes to act as outreach workers (Stoller, 1998, p.87).  Since COYOTE had been 
visible in the region and was knowledgeable about issues prostitutes faced, Cohen 
hoped COYOTE would help Project AWARE gain access to the prostitute population 
for the study. As the only group working to help prostitutes prevent HIV/AIDS, 
COYOTE was also eager to reach a larger segment of this population, and so Priscilla 
Alexander and Gloria Lockett agreed to join forces with Cohen and Project AWARE. 
The birth of CAL-PEP and the SJI 
Together, COYOTE and Project AWARE created the California Prostitutes’ 
Education Project (CAL-PEP’s original moniker), the first of this thesis’ case studies, 
which effectively formalized a grassroots response to a crisis (AIDS) by a radical 
protest group, and moved COYOTE’s politics—through CAL-PEP—into the growing 
and highly contested realm of private, nonprofit health service provision. By hiring 
sex workers from COYOTE’s active membership and training them about HIV/AIDS 
transmission and risk reduction, initially CAL-PEP was to be a one-time partnership 
between COYOTE and Project AWARE/CDC to help sex workers prevent 
HIV/AIDS. But the HIV/AIDS epidemic (and the sex worker community’s need for 
services) did not end with the CDC’s study9(J. Cohen, Derish, & Dorfman, 1994). 
Following its completion, CAL-PEP began to grow as an independent organization, 
obtaining its first grant from the City of San Francisco to continue its peer-to-peer 
HIV prevention work, and Lockett became the executive director.  
                                                
9 In the end, Project AWARE found that due to distrust of public health or other officials who might be 
associated with government or law enforcement, persons indigenous to the community studied (i.e. 
prostitutes) were able to gain access more readily to other sex workers, establish a rapport, and became 
role models for positive behavior change (Dorfman, 1992; Dorfman, Hennessy, Lev, & Reilly, 1988). 
This study contributed to the CDC study’s broader finding that HIV/AIDS infection rates for prostitutes 
were lower than for other risk groups. Overall, intravenous drug use was the major risk factor: 
HIV/AIDS infection in non-drug using prostitutes was either low or absent. 
 27 
As the demand for AIDS services increased, there was more space for sex 
workers to be involved in nonprofit health service provision (even if this was mainly 
regarding AIDS prevention and not prostitutes’ rights). Consequently, CAL-PEP 
continued to grow as an organization, independent of COYOTE, as many COYOTE 
members shifted their efforts to CAL-PEP’s work. As Nancy Stoller (1998) writes 
(and future chapters demonstrate), CAL-PEP’s growing prominence within the AIDS 
establishment soon diminished COYOTE’s viability as an independent, claims-
making organization focused mainly on achieving legal reforms, such as the 
decriminalization of prostitution.  
However, COYOTE’s ideals did not succumb to the fading of radical politics 
in the 1980s, and were maintained through the network of activists who remained 
supportive of prostitutes’ rights, even if they were no longer meeting regularly through 
COYOTE10. When the San Francisco Task Force on Prostitution was created in 1995 
to address concerns about street prostitution in neighborhoods such as the Tenderloin 
and the Mission (which were beginning to gentrify), numerous COYOTE affiliates, 
including Alexander, Leigh and Lockett, testified before the Taskforce. Indeed, after 
years of working for prostitutes’ rights and health and safety in the city, they had an 
impact, albeit a limited one: the Taskforce ultimately recommended that prostitution 
be made a low enforcement priority for the police, and that prostitute and community 
interests would be better served by the provision of more adequate health and social 
services in the city.  
                                                
10 Today, Carol Leigh’s Prostitute Education Network site, www.bayswan.org, lists a phone number and 
post office box address for the organization in San Francisco. However, this incarnation of COYOTE is 
primarily run by Leigh and exists mainly in name, no longer publishing newsletters, meeting on a 
regular basis or holding fundraising or membership drives. A COYOTE chapter in Los Angeles also has 
a website (http://www.coyotela.org/what_is.html) but it states that they no longer hold meetings, as 
“Previous support meetings were suspended when all the responsibility for meeting organization and 
member contacting fell on one individual and the other members did not contribute time or money to 
keep the meetings going.” 
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The Taskforce’s findings indicated to sex worker activists that the struggle for 
prostitutes’ rights would be better fought for and implemented in the realm of 
nonprofit health service provision, which ultimately contributed to the emergence of 
the St. James Infirmary (SJI) in 1999, the second organizational case study for this 
thesis. Although the Taskforce’s recommendation that prostitution become a low 
enforcement priority was never implemented, the Taskforce did attune city officials-- 
particularly in the San Francisco Department of Public Health (SFDPH)-- to more 
comprehensive means of dealing with sex worker health and safety. All of this made it 
increasingly clear to sex worker activists that their were potentially more opportunities 
to challenge the status quo and improve the conditions under which they lived and 
worked in the realm of health promotion rather than in legal reform. Consequently, in 
1999, when COYOTE activists discovered sex workers were having their blood drawn 
illegally in jails for syphilis testing, they mobilized quickly, deciding to work with the 
public health department as a route to eventually decriminalizing prostitution 
(Alexander, 1995a). Priscilla Alexander, Carol Leigh and Carol Stuart (another 
COYOTE member) presented Dr. Jeffrey Klausner, the newly appointed head of the 
SFDPH’s department of STI Prevention and Control (also known as City Clinic), with 
a plan developed by Alexander and her COYOTE/CAL-PEP colleagues for a clinic 
that would provide much needed services to the sex worker community and provide a 
site from which prostitution research would be conducted and disseminated.  
The St. James Infirmary opened on June 2, 1999, offering services after hours 
in the City Clinic offices (it moved to its own office space in 2002), and, like CAL-
PEP, has maintained COYOTE’s stance that sex workers are engaged in legitimate 
work, and are responsible for their own health and safety and that of their community. 
Although medical service providers (the medical director, on-staff doctor and nurses) 
without sex work histories worked (and continue to work) at the SJI, the clinic was 
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and continues to be staffed mainly by sex workers trained to offer medical services 
ranging from HIV/STI testing to holistic services (such as reiki and acupuncture). The 
majority of the SJI’s board of directors are current, former and transitioning sex 
workers.  
COYOTE’s Daughters 
With the ascendance of CAL-PEP and the SJI, then, have COYOTE’s protest politics 
been eclipsed by contemporary neo-liberal politics encouraging service provision over 
protest? This question is of particular importance in light of the fact that COYOTE 
spawned a number of different organizations, some of which elected paths of protest, 
explicitly eschewing service provision, while others made the choice to provide 
services both with and without a commitment to COYOTE’s original validation of sex 
work as legitimate work. As Table 1.1, “COYOTE’s Progeny” shows, COYOTE’s 
daughters can be categorized in a two-fold manner: by whether they maintained their 
commitment to COYOTE’s ideal of prostitutes’ rights, and by the activities they have 
engaged in.  
Table 1.1 “COYOTE’s Progeny” 
     Commitment to prostitutes’ rights 
(COYOTE’s ideal) 
           Accept prostitutes’ rights Reject prostitutes’ rights 
 
CAL-PEP (1984) 
SJI (1999) 
 
SAGE (1992) 
SWOP (2003) 
PONY (1993) 
DESIREE (2002) 
 
 
CATW ((1988) 
 
 
 
Ac
tiv
iti
es 
 
 
Service 
provision 
 
 
 
Advocacy 
for or 
against 
prostitutes’ 
rights 
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Within the realm of service provision, some organizational descendents of COYOTE 
have out-right rejected its ideals, holding to and implementing the (status quo) notion 
that prostitutes are victims of exploitation in need of rescue. Standing Against Global 
Exploitation (SAGE) is the most prominent of these organizations, and is devoted to 
helping women, men and transgendered individuals leave the commercial sex 
industry. SAGE was founded in 1992 by the late Norma Hotaling (Interview, 29 May 
2006), a former heroin addict and homeless street prostitute, who worked for 
COYOTE/CAL-PEP but left after working with a therapist who helped her understand 
issues of drug use, depression, post-traumatic stress, and suicidality11. As well, while 
working at CALPEP, she came across materials connecting participation in 
prostitution to sexual abuse, poverty, trauma and mental health issues12. Because she 
felt prostitutes should be aware of this information, she founded SAGE, which was 
and is largely a countermovement to the COYOTE-oriented prostitutes’ rights 
movement. SAGE is peer-run, hiring former sex workers to provide trauma recovery 
services, substance abuse treatment, vocational training, housing assistance and legal 
advocacy to other sex workers. Although Hotaling has stated (Interview, 29 May 
2006) that SAGE provides services to anyone in the sex industry-- regardless of 
whether they plan to leave-- they do not encourage or support prostitution as a 
legitimate occupational choice. SAGE is constantly active in anti-trafficking efforts at 
the state, local and federal levels, and because of this issues popularity with various 
state and federal administrations, they have generated extensive financial support for 
                                                
11 Norma Hotaling passed away in December 2008 from pancreatic cancer.  
12 This was mainly the work led by Melissa Farley, PhD, a research and clinical psychologist and 
CATW member. She established the Prostitution Research and Education (PRE) in 1995, which, 
according to its website (http://www.prostitutionresearch.com/about.html), is “a 501(c) 3 nonprofit 
organization that conducts research on prostitution, pornography and trafficking, and offers education 
and consultation ... PRE’s goal is to abolish the institution of prostitution while at the same time 
advocating for alternatives to trafficking and prostitution…” 
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their efforts. According to a SAGE representative (Interview, 18 May 2006), SAGE’s 
budget for 2007 was $2.1 million, eighty six percent of which is from government 
sources such as the local health department, and the federal Department of Justice. 
The emergence of Prostitutes of New York (PONY), the Desiree Alliance 
(DESIREE) and the Sex Workers Outreach Project (SWOP)-- which are most similar 
to COYOTE—demonstrate that protest politics were not abandoned with the 
ascendance of CAL-PEP and the SJI. Formed from the mid-1980s onward in different 
regions of the United States to advocate for sex workers’ rights, the largest, best know, 
and most “like” COYOTE of these organizations is SWOP, “a multi-state network of 
sex workers and advocates [that] address[es] locally and nationally the violence that 
sex workers experience because of their criminal status” (SWOP, 2007, p.1). 
According to their website (swopusa.org), SWOP’s first major action was to organize 
the first annual International Day to End Violence against Sex Workers in 2003 with a 
memorial for the victims of convicted prostitute murderer Gary Leon Ridgeway. In 
2004, SWOP’s most visible effort (which received coverage in the New York Times) 
was to spearheaded a ballot initiative (Measure Q) to decriminalize prostitution in 
Berkeley, CA by making it a low enforcement priority for the police (Marshall, 2004). 
Although Measure Q was defeated, in August 2008 SWOP was a key player in a 
coalition of activists who qualified to place a similar measure on the San Francisco 
ballot in November 2008 (which also failed). 
However, protest organizations have also arisen in COYOTE’s wake to 
actively oppose its ideals. The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), 
which was founded in 1988 by activists, academics and others who largely opposed 
COYOTE. By testifying before national congresses, parliaments, law reform 
commissions, and various United Nations bodies, the CATW’s goal is to promote 
women's human rights and, according to their website 
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(http://www.catwinternational.org/) “combat sexual exploitation in all its forms, 
especially prostitution and trafficking in women and children”. The CATW is 
arguably one of the most influential abolitionist (in that it seeks to eradicate 
prostitution altogether) organizations in the United States. CATW members have 
testified and provided research to numerous governmental officials arguing that all 
prostitution in and of itself is harmful to women; sex trafficking, from their 
perspective, is the worst patriarchal oppression. CATW was a major lobbying force 
behind the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), first passed in 2000 
and now in its fourth reauthorization (discussed in more detail in later chapters).  
The SJI and CAL-PEP are different from their “siblings” in two different 
ways. Unlike CATW and PONY, both the SJI and CAL-PEP focus on service 
provision in partnership with state and local health agencies. And unlike SAGE, they 
are in principle committed to maintaining COYOTE’s support for the choice to do sex 
work as work. It is both these differences that make the study of the St. James 
Infirmary and CAL-PEP so critical: Can such organizations both continue the 
commitment to this radical position on sex work even while taking on the service and 
“welfare work” that has been required of many nonprofit organizations in this neo-
liberal era?   
This has incurred criticism from other counterpart organizations. SWOP 
prostitutes’ rights activist Robyn Few argues that the SJI and CAL-PEP have 
surrendered their radicalism in service of securing the money necessary for 
organizational survival: 
 
“The SJI has so much potential but has never reached it out of fear of losing money... 
CALPEP is an organization that’s run by a black woman who has the same views as I 
do [about decriminalizing prostitution], but has a staff that probably thinks she is an 
abolitionist because this is what you have to do to work the system… [the SJI & 
CAL-PEP] shifted from activism to service provision because there was more money 
here, especially with AIDS. It’s all about money!... In short, we need to organize for 
law reform: fuck this service goddamn bullshit!” (Interview, Robyn Few, Founder of 
the Sex workers Outreach Project [SWOP], 20 October 2006) 
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Indeed, Few’s point is well-taken: health service provision can never fully mitigate 
against the effects of criminalization on sex workers’ health and safety. However, the 
SJI and CAL-PEP have managed to institutionalize COYOTE’s radical commitment 
to prostitutes’ rights and expose thousands of sex workers to this message through 
service provision. Indeed, this conjoining of service provision with radical political 
statements presents the key puzzle for this thesis: how is it that the adoption of a 
service-provision mission seems not to have eclipsed the radical agenda CAL-PEP and 
the SJI inherited from COYOTE, their parent organization, whose lifespan coincided 
with more radical times? The goal of this thesis is therefore to explore how CAL-PEP 
and the SJI’s focus on service, in relationship with the state, constrains their radical 
impulses, and detail the conditions under which they also circumvent these 
restrictions.  
Part II.Theorizing the implications: marginalized groups, organizations and state 
engagement  
Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward’s Poor People’s Movements (1977) provides 
a useful starting-point for considering how the radical goals of a protest movement are 
maintained and constrained when they become institutionalized into formal (service 
provision) organizations and receive funding from state sources. In their study of low-
income groups (the unemployed, industrial workers, civil rights and welfare rights 
movements), Piven and Cloward examine the evolution of radical protest movements, 
evaluating the transition many made towards the creation of formal, structured 
organizations. They argue that while it is assumed these organizations are a vehicle to 
power (because they permit the intelligent and strategic use of resources in political 
conflict and ensure the continuity of mobilization over time), in reality creating formal 
organizations hinders the power of the movement to compel concessions from elites.  
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To explain, they note that when large numbers of poor people are roused, 
developing and sustaining large organizations seems possible to organizers. Elites, 
when sensing this popular insurgency, often offer concessions to the organizations and 
even solicit their views and encourage them to air their grievances to formal bodies of 
the state. Although this may appear to be a victory for the insurgents (and their 
organizations), in reality the elites are not responding to the organizations and their 
demands but to the underlying force of insurgency. Since insurgency is short-lived, 
many of the organizations soon fade away; those that remain do so because they have 
become more useful to the elites controlling the resources their organizations depend 
on than they have to lower class groups they claim to represent. While they stress that 
efforts to build organizations are not always futile, Piven and Cloward conclude, 
“organizations endure by abandoning their oppositional politics” (1977, p.xxi).  
Piven and Cloward seem to predict a somewhat binary model of protest 
evolution: it either remains on “the streets” or moves towards formalized 
organizational structures. Table 1.1, above, however, seems to call for a more nuanced 
consideration of how movements evolve and the impacts of this evolution on their 
radical goals and ideological positioning. Indeed, in line with Piven and Cloward’s 
observations, COYOTE’s progeny moved to create formal organizations, but these 
were in no way unified in their commitment to COYOTE’s goals. Of these, CAL-PEP 
and the SJI, however, have maintained their commitment to COYOTE’s ideals, but 
they express this through their method of service provision, not street protest, and they 
have compelled resources from elites (state agencies) to do this. Piven and Cloward’s 
analysis raises questions whether CAL-PEP and the SJI’s focus has become 
maintaining the organization (which often depends on compelling concessions from 
the very elites the group’s members originally challenged) at the expense of making 
oppositional claims.      
 35 
For those nonprofits with radical social movement roots (such as CAL-PEP 
and the SJI), does this engagement with the state inhibit or compromise their radical 
impulses? As Sandra Morgen (1990; , 2002) cautions, even when state resources could 
be mobilized to further the goals of a movement, there is always a risk that a direct 
relationship with the state—as a funder, regulator or legal protector—could lead to 
“cooptation of the transformative change orientation and activities that energized 
social movement organizations” (2002, p.154). However, Morgen (2002, p.166) notes 
that cooptation is not always a fixed, linear process, and so she refers instead to the 
“dynamics of cooptation” whereby direct and indirect pressures by powerful state 
forces meet with accommodation and resistance by those seeking to maintain their 
oppositional organizations. 
Understanding co-optation as a dynamic process involving both 
accommodation and resistance provides a useful frame for exploring how COTOTE’s 
radical goals have been maintained and constrained through formal (service provision) 
organizations, even as they receive funding from state sources. In the neo-liberal era, it 
is easy to assume that as the welfare state has contracted, decentralized and shifted 
service provision to nonprofits (in many cases), even those nonprofits with radical 
roots would succumb to “not biting the hand that feeds them”. And indeed, there are 
powerful mechanisms at work constraining their radical impulses, and these merit 
specification; however, the analysis cannot end here. Specifying the conditions under 
which organizations might also circumvent cooptation and express their radical 
commitments allows for a more nuanced understanding of the political implications 
for nonprofits with radical roots when they intersect and engage with the state in the 
neo-liberal era. 
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Vectors of Political Constraint 
In this project, I identify two specific mechanisms—which will be termed vectors of 
political constraint—that have engaged CAL-PEP and the SJI in these dynamics of 
cooptation: (1) incorporation as charitable nonprofit organizations under section 501c3 
of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and (2) granting agency requirements for data 
collection and administration (these vectors will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
5). Given the growing role of charitable nonprofits in the welfare state (particularly in 
their work with marginalized populations), many in the health and human services 
field have come to resemble government agencies, providing a link between the 
government and those too poor, unskilled, or overwhelmed with problems of their own 
to organize and act politically (Berry & Arons, 2003). For sex workers—arguably one 
of the most marginalized populations—charitable nonprofits like CAL-PEP and the 
SJI could provide this critical link. However, as Berry and Arons (2003) write, there is 
little information about how charitable nonprofits succeed or fail to represent their 
constituents in the political process, and whether and how this is influenced by the 
laws and regulations governing nonprofits (Berry & Arons, 2003; Marwell, 2004). 
Understanding this is important because charitable nonprofits are the only type of 
“interest group” in America with a strong disincentive to lobby, as section 501c3 of 
the IRC severely restricts their ability to lobby or participate in political campaigns in 
exchange for their tax-exempt status (Berry & Arons, 2003).  
Not all charitable nonprofits encounter this vector of political constraint in the 
same way: larger, well-funded organizations are able to evade this restriction by, for 
example, registering under IRC section 501c4 and creating separate advocacy 
organizations. Although the nuances and details of how section 501c3 makes more 
traditional political action difficult will be discussed in more detail, it must be noted 
here that smaller organizations like CAL-PEP and the SJI, which have more difficulty 
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garnering support for their efforts and thus raising the funds for advocacy work, are far 
less able to resist this constraint. All of this raises questions about whether laws 
restricting lobbying (and other political activities) can depoliticize charitable 
nonprofits by severely diminishing the amount of lobbying and campaign work they 
might do.  
A second vector of political constraint CAL-PEP and the SJI confront is 
granting agency requirements for data collection. Although this constraint is (like 
charitable nonprofit status) not unique to CAL-PEP and the SJI, as organizations 
funded primarily for delivering AIDS prevention services, they face increased scrutiny 
by the CDC (and state and local health departments, by extension), particularly since 
the arrival of the Bush Administration in 2001. Consequently, as grant-seeking and 
compliance requirements have grown more complex, service provision and 
organizational management practices are often challenged. With respect to service 
provision, because the SJI and CAL-PEP work with populations in frequent contact 
with law enforcement, increased questioning for data collection might decrease their 
trust of CAL-PEP/the SJI and propensity to access services. And with regards to 
organizational management, as grant-writing and data collection requirements become 
more burdensome and complex, these organizations also face pressures to 
professionalize their staffs and devote more resources to these activities at the expense 
of service delivery and advocacy work that might help their constituency help 
themselves. 
Conditions of Circumvention 
These vectors of political constraint have potentially strong, co-optive effects on the 
radical impulses of CAL-PEP and the SJI. However, the experiences of feminist health 
clinics formed in the early 1970s and gay men’s organizations formed to serve victims 
of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s indicate that organizations developed by marginalized 
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people and offering services in a radical way can circumvent many of the pressures to 
avoid political work and even expand their radical commitments. Before explicating 
these conditions, it is important to note how feminist clinics and gay men’s HIV/AIDS 
prevention efforts represent provide a useful comparison to CAL-PEP and the SJI. 
Both have incorporated as nonprofits and obtained grants from state agencies, which 
has altered their original organizational structures, missions, and abilities to make 
claims on the state, and also detracted them from the broader struggles (for women’s 
reproductive rights, for example) from which they were born. Yet their stories are not 
ones of co-optation. By providing innovative and nonjudgmental health services, and 
involving populations considered incapable and/or unworthy of these in their 
organizational operations and service delivery (all the while using state money to do 
this), these organizations put into practice broader commitments to equality and 
empowerment, which is arguably a radical endeavor in and of itself. 
Various conditions created opportunities for these organizations to maintain 
their radical commitments, and two-- termed “localism” and “professionalism”— are 
of particular importance. “Localism” refers broadly to how the decentralized nature of 
the American (welfare) state has fostered the provision of social services by state and 
local-level agencies, particularly since the 1980s in the field of HIV/AIDS prevention. 
Indeed, as noted earlier, the American welfare state has centralized and expanded over 
time, but in comparison to other nations, the ideal of localized social service delivery 
has been reinforced, particularly within the neo-liberal era (Pierson, 2001). Various 
scholars of federalism (see for some examples Peterson, 1995; Volden, 2003) have 
discussed the costs and benefits of decentralized policy development and 
implementation (or “localism”, as described here). On the one hand, the costs of this 
method of policy development and delivery have been high, including (but not limited 
to) regional inequalities and inefficiency in the delivery and administration of 
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programs (Peterson, 1995). On the other hand, the benefits have included greater 
responsiveness to citizen needs, the ability to respond to heterogeneous preferences, 
and the possibility of learning from other jurisdictions (Volden, 2003). As well, and 
most relevant to this thesis, is that this has created opportunities for local innovation, 
particularly by under-served groups. 
The opportunities for local innovation are particularly apparent in the field of 
health service delivery, particularly with regards to HIV/AIDS. As noted above, the 
devolution of the welfare state has meant health and social service provision is 
increasingly funded by federal block grants to state and local governments, which in 
turn subcontract to local community-based organizations (CBO). Certainly, this has 
meant health service delivery in the United States has, overall (in comparison to other 
nations), been incomplete, regionally varied, and precariously funded; however, it has 
also provided opportunities for marginalized groups to create health service projects 
that meet their own community’s needs in ways state agencies may never be able to 
and, by extension, created a condition under which more radical projects could be 
continued.  
 Alongside localism, “professionalism” has created conditions under which 
marginalized groups can develop and maintain radical service projects, despite 
receiving funding for this from state sources. For the purposes of this discussion, 
professionalism is broadly defined, particularly in the medical services field, as the 
possession of a qualification or credential demonstrating the possession of a special 
form of knowledge used to serve others (Cruess, Cruess, & Johnston, 2000). 
Professionalism also can be understood administratively, as the demonstration of an 
individual and/or organizational ability to deliver services efficiently and effectively. 
In health service delivery, professionalism has been increasingly required of provider 
organizations for liability reasons (to ensure services are delivered safely and 
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consistently) and because (as noted above) the applications for and administration of 
grant agreements has become more complex.  
Initially, requirements for professionalism do not appear conducive to fostering 
the maintenance of radical commitments by an organization, as this often constrains 
organizational flexibility and creativity in service delivery, while also requiring a 
focus on more bureaucratic and administration-related activities. Moreover, as various 
scholars demonstrate, professionalism, particularly in the medical field, has long 
served as a mechanism of exclusion. Scholars such as Linda Gordon (2002), for 
example, document how midwives were often discredited and ignored by doctors for 
their lack of professional (medical school) training. The women’s health movement, as 
discussed below, was a response by women to such exclusions in an effort to seek 
control of and empowerment in their own health care (Ruzek & Becker, 1999). 
Professionalism, however, does not only foster exclusions: for stigmatized and 
marginalized groups, such as persons with AIDS and sex workers who have 
traditionally been ignored or spoken for by mainstream health institutions, it has in 
fact created conditions under which they might be involved in their own care. As 
subsequent chapters demonstrate, through contracts for HIV/AIDS prevention work, 
often all that is required by the granting agency for service delivery is a proper 
credential, such as a phlebotomist certificate for drawing blood for HIV/STI testing. 
This credential, ideally, supersedes value judgments about what the individual 
providing the service does in his or her spare time, therefore potentially allowing 
organizations serving (so-called) morally despised populations (like sex workers) to 
engage in the more radical project of involving them in service delivery. 
Feminist Health Clinics 
The emergence of feminist health clinics illustrates how localism (fostered by grants 
from state agencies to local organizations) has been able to create opportunities for 
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groups to not only maintain services, but also to avoid having to prioritize funding 
overall radical commitments. In the case of feminist health clinics, described below, a 
community’s need for women’s health services facilitated the creation of a unique 
health service and, through a grant from the state, an opportunity for a group to 
expand its commitment to feminist politics. Like CAL-PEP and the SJI, feminist 
clinics were grassroots service organizations that emerged from a radical social 
movement, namely the women’s health movement in the 1970s, where women 
organized for abortion rights, reproductive freedom, and equitable and comprehensive 
access to health care (Ruzek & Becker, 1999). By 1973 there were over 1,000 
women’s health projects in the United States, among them some 200 women-
controlled feminist health clinics (Morgen, 1995, pp.236-237). Unlike mainstream 
health clinics, Morgen (1995) writes, these were established to empower and educate 
women about their bodies and their health care options, thereby challenging the 
historical precedent of (male) doctor-asserted control over women’s bodies. The 
clinics emphasized lay involvement in care, offered accessible, affordable women-
centered services, and operated often as consensus-oriented collectives.  
Sandra Morgen’s study (1995, 2002) of the Women’s Health Center (WHC), 
located in the northeastern United States, provides an instructive case of how 
engagement with the state challenges the capacity of grassroots service organizations 
to maintain their radical, community-based impulses13. The WHC opened in 1972 and 
quickly grew by 1977 from a small volunteer health information and referral center 
housed in a church basement to an organization that employed six paid staff, hosted 
family planning and gynecology clinics, and offered counseling and referral services. 
The WHC stressed a feminist commitment to empowering women in their own health 
care, and it made decisions as a consensus-oriented collective. Initially, the WHC was 
                                                
13 WHC is a pseudonym Morgen used to protect the privacy of participants. 
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funded by a combination of fees for services, income from small-scale community 
fundraising events, and a few small subcontracts from the local Department of Social 
Services. However, as demand for services grew, and to attract a more working class 
and women of color to the staff, the WHC sought larger and more stable funding 
sources. As Morgen writes, a decision was made to “go for state money” (1995, p.172) 
and within the next two years, the WHC developed a closer and expanded relationship 
with various state agencies. However, this decision was not taken lightly (at the WHC 
or elsewhere): many of those involved with the WHC had been engaged in struggles 
for civil rights and women’s equality, and viewed the state as an agent of control over 
women. They knew there would be strings attached to this money, but it would allow 
them to provide expanded and diversified services (Morgen, 1990, 1995).  
Indeed, as Morgen documents, accepting state money also served as a 
mechanism of cooptation, constraining the WHC’s capacity to act as radical claims-
makers in a number of ways. In one example, it channeled their activities towards 
direct service provision and away from advocacy, organizing and community outreach 
by, for example, reimbursing the WHC on the basis of individual contacts, which 
pushed the WHC prioritize individual counseling over self-help empowerment. In 
another example, the series of small grants they received required separate proposals, 
budgets, billings and other forms of administration, which gradually institutionalized a 
division of labor among the staff and gave the director a more privileged relationship 
with the funding agencies. As well, the funding weakened the WHC’s oppositional 
character when, in 1978, the well-financed anti-abortion lobby in the state passed a bill 
that required organizations receiving money from the state to obtain a clinic license. 
After a long and costly battle, the WHC did obtain its license, but this also created a 
strong faction within the staff that “who believed it was best for the [WHC] not to take 
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public, political stands-- for abortion or for other issues that might ‘get them into 
trouble’” (1995, p.173). 
However, the WHC case also demonstrates that localism fosters conditions 
under which grassroots organizations might also use state funding for service 
provision and for revitalizing their radical commitments.  As Morgen (19995, 2002) 
writes, in the WCH’s case state funding also (unintentionally) provided an opportunity 
for the organization to reinvigorate and redefine its feminist work. Morgen provides 
the example of a grant from the state Department of Labor’s Comprehensive 
Employment Training Act (CETA) in the late 1970s, which provided funds to local 
agencies to run training projects for low-income women. The WHC successfully 
secured a $100,000 CETA grant to fund an ambitious survey project about the health 
needs and attitudes of low-income women in the community. Hiring for the project 
tripled the WHC’s staff and changed its composition to predominantly working class 
women, and one-third women of color, but it also nearly led to the organization’s 
demise by exposing the racism and class prejudice of the white and middle class staff. 
In response, however, women of color and working class women came together to 
raise their concerns, while the collective as a whole became charged about the 
growing concentration of power held by the director. In dealing with these issues, 
questions also arose as to whether and how external grants and funding (particularly to 
re-hire the CETA staff after the project) might compromise the WHC’s ideology and 
practice. All of this increased the political sophistication of the WHC staff, and in the 
end, they wrote and obtained grants, which allowed them to hire back most of the 
CETA staff. 
For the WHC, then, their strategy was (in hindsight) to take advantage of the 
flexibility and opportunity for innovation afforded by the state funding they received 
to both expand staffing and programming and counter cooptation by implementing a 
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redefined feminist commitment that incorporated an understanding of race and class 
differences among women. As Morgen (1995) concludes, although accepting state 
funds did compromise the WHC’s radical impulses to varying degrees (while also 
ensuring many of the women relied on the state for their livelihoods), the CETA funds 
“helped to shape the conflict and political struggle within the staff, and brought to the 
[WHC] strong proponents of an activist orientation, and a conception of feminism 
grounded in the experiences of women of color and poor women” (p.180). In so doing, 
the state resources underwrote the women’s efforts to revitalize and redefine feminism 
within their organization, making clear that the impact of state policies on gender 
practice and ideology cannot be assumed, and that “the contest over resources, 
meaning, and political power is more complicated than meets the eye” (1995, p.181). 
Gay Men’s Health Crisis 
The formation and growth of Gay Men’s Health Crisis (GMHC) illustrates how 
(requirements for) professionalism also create conditions under which historically 
excluded and stigmatized groups might develop and maintain radical projects, such as 
developing innovative HIV/AIDS/STI prevention programs for marginalized 
communities that are more likely wary of mainstream public health officials, while 
also engaging in the more radical project of involving these communities in the 
creation and delivery of their own health care. Similar to the women who formed the 
WHC and sex workers forming the SJI and CAL-PEP, gay men were also on the 
margins of the major health institutions of the United States, especially when it came 
to AIDS. As Suzanne Ouelette-Kobasa (1990) writes, in 1980 gay men began to feel 
powerless to fend off a seemingly disparate-yet-related array of illnesses in their 
midst14.   
                                                
14 By 1982 health and government officials named this “acquired immune deficiency syndrome” 
(AIDS) (Armstrong, 2002), and by 1983 AIDS’s viral cause, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
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 Gay men—particularly in the nation’s major city’s-- quickly realized that the 
only help for AIDS patients would come from their own community (I. Cohen & 
Elder, 1989). However, a localized group’s capacity to respond to a crisis on behalf of 
itself is often shaped by their access to resources, and unlike many women and/or sex 
workers, gay men had access to far more private resources. Although this did not 
preclude them from seeking state funds to enhance their local initiatives eventually, it 
did allow them to develop a highly innovative and largely independent service 
program. As Susan Chambre (1991) writes, GMHC’s founders were white, affluent 
and part of a social network of gay men with considerable financial means, business 
and organizational skills, who also had the ability to influence other gay men (and 
women) to get involved in their response to AIDS. Consequently, in New York in 
1981, when eight men gathered in writer Larry Kramer’s apartment to address the so-
called “gay cancer”, forming GMHC (the first and only public, private or volunteer 
organization to provide AIDS education and counseling to gay men in the city), they 
raised $6,000 that night and grew rapidly in the first three months as existing 
hospitals, welfare and social institutions initially failed to meet the needs of gay men 
with AIDS (Perrow & Guillen, 1990). By October 1982 they used their considerable 
resources to marshal a volunteer force of over 300 individuals and were training 50 
volunteers per month (Chambre, 1995; Perrow & Guillen, 1990). In 1983 they sold out 
17,000 seats at Madison Square Garden for a Ringling Brothers Circus fundraiser that 
raised $250,000 for GMHC and was the largest gay fundraising event at the time, in 
history (Shilts, 1988).  
These resources contributed to the development of a truly radical organization, 
where (similar to the SJI and CAL-PEP) gay men with AIDS were treated not as 
                                                                                                                                       
was also identified, and soon HIV/AIDS was identified among injection drug users (IDUs), female sex 
partners of IDU males and later infants born to infected women (Penner, 1995). 
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irresponsible individuals but non-judgmentally as individuals dealing with ongoing 
health issues. But like the WHC, GMHC also found its radical potential limited as it 
began to consider the degree and manner in which it would engage with various 
government agencies. Unlike the WHC, GMHC’s founders had little or no experience 
with overt discrimination, and were not the gay activists of the prior decade, having 
also few ideological suppositions or opinions about how organizations should be run 
15(Chambre, 1991; Ouelette-Kobasa, 1990); the exception here, however, was Larry 
Kramer, the only GMHC founder with an activist background who emerged as the 
divergent voice on GMHC (Shilts, 1988). By 1982, GMHC was providing virtually all 
of the services to persons with AIDS city public health organizations would normally 
provide to a population with any other disease, and Kramer encouraged GMHC to 
demand more services from the city. The majority of GMHC, however, disagreed with 
Kramer and sided with Paul Popham (GMHC’s first president), who believed GMHC 
needed to instead create a network of services for gay men during the epidemic. 
Kramer accused the GMHC board of being too timid with a city government that had 
yet to acknowledge the disease was an emergency (Shilts, 1988). He was dismissed 
from GMHC’s board in 1983, and charging that GMHC devoted most of its energies 
to service provision at the expense of political activism, he went on to form the AIDS 
Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP), which was devoted solely to political action 
(P. Cohen, 1998). 
To fund their service network more extensively, GMHC began to seek funding 
from state agencies, and demonstrating professionalism in this pursuit was a key part 
                                                
15 This was because, for the most part, gay men in New York were also far less open about their sexual 
orientation than men in San Francisco, where the gay community was able to associate, come out and 
establish itself as stakeholders in the city’s social and political life, and so in the face of the HIV/AIDS 
crisis, it was able to draw from this political base to develop and disseminate a model of community-
based service provision—in partnership with government-- that would meet the needs of the community 
in a non-judgmental manner. 
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of their strategy here. GMHC had to establish its credibility this way because it sought 
funds to involve and serve a stigmatized population confronting a disease no 
mainstream health officials cared to acknowledge or take seriously. Consequently, 
GMHC had to prove they were not the radical, disruptive group Kramer envisioned, 
but instead a professional group. This strategy was made especially apparent when 
GMHC representatives made a presentation to the US Conference of Mayors to obtain 
state funding for service provision. Here, influenced and assisted by their members 
with experience in business and management, they made an impressive presentation 
about HIV/AIDS and GMHC’s work with the epidemic, and their organizational goals 
(to establish seven new directorships). The presentation-- complete with flowcharts 
and neatly collated documents-- established that GMHC was highly professional 
organization committed to service provision, all of which showed conference 
attendees that GMHC had “the stuff of a sound organization” (Perrow & Guillen, 
1991, p.109).  
Creating an impression of professionalism allowed GMHC to successfully 
obtain state funding, which was used to expand their radical methods of health service 
delivery to members of the gay community struggling with HIV/AIDS. By 1984, 
government grants were one-third of the GMHC budget, and when New York State 
established the AIDS Institute to coordinate AIDS funding and programming, its first 
director was from GMHC. Today, GMHC has its own building on West 24th Street, in 
New York, and in 2007, GMHC reported $30,201,607 in support and revenue, $13.2 
million of which was from government contracts (its largest source) (GMHC, 2007, 
p.17). As a result, to meet immediate needs and keep pace with a burgeoning 
epidemic, expanding their budget (particularly with government sources) has helped 
GMHC broaden its mandate, providing services for a range of affected communities 
beyond gay (white) men, including on-site walk-in crisis intervention services; 
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services for women and families living with AIDS; legal services and client advocacy; 
substance abuse education; the Lesbian AIDS project, which provides peer support for 
lesbians and their families living with HIV/AIDS; and public policy advocacy and 
research for HIV/AIDS related issues. 
Accepting state funding and focusing predominantly on service provision has 
also meant that, over time, GMHC has grown to resemble less a grassroots service 
organization than, like the WHC, a professionalized and bureaucratic one as the 
numbers of clients, volunteers, grants and administrative requirements increased16. 
Volunteers were and are no longer expected to have direct contact with GMHC staff 
but instead communicate to those running GMHC through their team leaders 
(Ouelette-Kobasa, 1990). Therefore, like the WHC, GMHC has stood accused 
(Kramer, 1995) of abandoning its radical potential by focusing on service provision 
and relying on volunteer labor, detracting their energies from activism and relieving 
the government of its obligation to provide services (Ouelette-Kobasa, 1990) and find 
better treatments and even a cure (P. Cohen, 1998).  
Creating a more professionalized organization did not, however, preclude 
GMHC from making radical statements and challenging accepted norms of treatment 
by the mainstream health bureaucracy. In fact, the pursuit of a more radical project 
was enhanced by GMHC’s provision of space for and inclusion of a marginalized 
community, GMHC has been able to take resources from an entity (various 
government agencies) that once stigmatized (and arguably continues to stigmatize) a 
sexual minority and use these resources to gather and empower this very community. 
As Philip Kayal (1993) writes, by focusing on service provision when no other 
                                                
16 And it has done so to such a successful degree that it has even been written about in publications such 
as Management Review (Jacobs, 1990), which praised GMHC for its strong fiscal and employee 
management operations and high degrees of commitment and satisfaction amongst its employees and 
volunteers. 
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mainstream organization or agency was willing to do anything, GMHC created and 
fostered a “liberated zone” (1993, p.83) in which the work of nurturing and healing 
takes place. While Kayal acknowledges that GMHC’s focus on service provision has 
taken away from its work advocating for a treatment and cure, GMHC’s focus on 
service provision and the creation of a safe space for this was (and is) fundamentally 
political and radical, fostering human connections among a stigmatized, marginalized 
community endangered by a disease and empowering them through their involvement 
in the provision of services.  
Outside of the organization, GMHC has also continued to engage in claims-
making activities with various state agencies, even though these agencies fund them. 
Most notably, GMHC has maintained its commitment to advocacy through its Policy 
Department, which, according to their website (http://www.gmhc.org/policy.html) “is 
an aggressive advocate, at the city, state, and federal levels, for fair and effective HIV 
and AIDS-related policies.” Although they are also a charitable nonprofit, unlike 
WHC, their extensive resources have given them the capacity to create a separate 
advocacy organization under section 501c4 of the IRC, through which they have 
registered lobbyists who work at the state, local and federal levels to improve HIV 
prevention policies and funding, among other issues. They have also created a number 
of community action groups, such as the Women of Color Research Group, which 
provides information about how various AIDS policies have affected women of color; 
and the Prison Health Action Group, which discusses how various HIV/AIDS policies 
impact the lives of those recently released from or placed in incarceration facilities.  
And as such a large organization with a long track record in the prevention field, they 
have been quite influential: for example, in 2004 GMHC and HIV advocates in New 
York State were able to stop the Governor’s proposed elimination from Medicaid of 
the coverage of enteral supplements, the nutritional supports (known by their brad 
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names as Ensure, for example) that help persons with advanced HIV maintain health 
body weights (GMHC, 2004).  
Part IV. CAL-PEP, the SJI & radical possibilities  
As the experiences of feminist health clinics and GMHC indicate, engagement with 
the state often leads grassroots organizations to professionalize, shift their focus to 
service provision maintenance, and dampen their willingness to criticize elites and 
other power-holders. All of this, in turn, potentially diverts their efforts from broader 
struggles against sexism, homophobia, and welfare state devolution, which would, 
arguably, be of more benefit to their communities in the long run.  However, to 
describe organizational engagement with the state as merely co-optive is too reductive. 
As GMHC and the WHC’s experiences also indicate, state engagement is in fact a 
dynamic process, whereby localism and professionalism create conditions under 
which grassroots organizations circumvent cooptation and allow the maintenance of 
radical commitments through a form of service provision that provides space for 
marginalized, stigmatized populations. 
Methods 
To examine how CAL-PEP and the SJI have experienced the dynamics of cooptation, 
and how this has maintained and constrained their radical impulses, the arguments 
made in this chapter (and throughout the remaining chapters) are based on 6 months of 
multi-method qualitative research with the SJI and CAL-PEP. The pages below 
outline my methods of interviewee recruitment, interviewing, and archival research. 
Overall, the majority of my information was drawn from 121 semi-structured, open-
ended interviews (SOEI) with the staff and sex worker clients at the SJI and CAL-
PEP17, city government and other public officials, and activists engaged with sex 
                                                
17 Unless otherwise specified, throughout the remainder of this dissertation “clients” are the sex 
workers who use the services at the SJI and CAL-PEP, and not the paying clients of the sex workers), 
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worker issues from a variety of perspectives. As I will discuss in more detail below, I 
also conducted archival research (at the SJI and CAL-PEP, and at the city archives in 
both San Francisco and Oakland) and participatory/observational research (at the SJI 
and CAL-PEP) to gain a broader understanding of the contexts in which these groups 
operate, as well as their organizational strategies and methods of service delivery. 
Interviewee recruitment took many forms. For SJI and CAL-PEP staff 
interviews, I mainly requested interviews in person or through the phone or email. For 
interviews with public officials and activists, I also used mainly phone and email to 
request interviews. In both cases, though, I employed “snowball sampling,” where I 
asked those I interviewed to recommend others I might be interested in speaking with. 
Recruitment of SJI and CAL-PEP clients took a different form. Because many of these 
individuals were engaged in criminal activities (prostitution, as well as the use of 
illegal substances), establishing trust and confidentiality (described in more detail 
below) was paramount. I therefore took guidance from staff at each organization about 
how to recruit their clients. In both cases, clients had to be over 18 years of age and 
have exchanged sexual services for cash or other trade, and have used the services at 
either CAL-PEP or the SJI. As well, staff at both organizations recommended clients 
be compensated for their time, and so I offered CALPEP clients $20 in cash and SJI 
clients a $20 gift card from Walgreens (a drug and general store located throughout 
the city of San Francisco Bay Area).  
I interviewed twenty clients from each organization (40 in total)-- a number 
picked based on what my budget would allow. At the SJI, I posted a flier soliciting 
interviewees that gave my phone number and email address so clients could contact 
me to arrange an interview time18. Most interviews took place in a private room at the 
                                                                                                                                       
city government and other public officials, and activists engaged with sex worker issues from a variety 
of perspectives. 
18 See Appendix 1 for samples of recruitment fliers and consent forms. 
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SJI, while others took place in conference rooms at the public library or in coffee 
shops. While the SJI serves a fairly socio-economically diverse clientele of sex 
workers, the $20 incentive tended to attract more poor and disadvantaged sex workers 
(over one-half were transgendered), and therefore I cannot claim my sample is 
representative of the SJI’s clintele.  
At CAL-PEP recruitment took on a number of forms because many of CAL-
PEP’s services are offered out in the community as opposed to in-house, like at the 
SJI.  I recruited CAL-PEP clients through the organization’s caseworkers and outreach 
workers (who would refer qualified clients to me). These interviews took place at the 
CAL-PEP offices. I was also fortunate to join CAL-PEP’s outreach staff to recruit 
interviewees through their Mobile Outreach for Ex-Offenders (MORE) project. In this 
instance, we visited a particular area of Oakland, where CAL-PEP staff offered free 
HIV testing and education services to residents of the area through encounters on the 
street. When CAL-PEP staff had recruited enough clients for their HIV education 
lunch session, I was permitted to ask those at the lunch if they were interested in 
completing an interview. In these cases, interviews took place in the MORE program 
house or in the mobile outreach testing van. For all of my CAL-PEP client interviews, 
my interviewees were extremely disenfranchised African Americans, which is 
representative of the population CAL-PEP targets. 
In all interviews, I used SOEI techniques. According to Shulamit Reinharz 
(1992), SOEI uses loosely structured questions that permit more than “yes/no” 
answers, which allows for an exploration of people’s views of reality while permitting 
the researcher to generate theory by maximizing discovery and description through the 
production of non-standardized information.  
SOEI suited my project for a number of reasons. First, sex workers—especially 
prostitutes—are difficult research subjects to access due to the illegal nature of their 
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work. As a result, there is little data on their work and experiences in general, 
especially in the quantitative arena. Here, most quantitative demographic data 
(including that from the Bureau of Justice Statistics) has been criticized by scholars as 
being unrepresentative, as it is often based on information given by arrested/jailed 
prostitutes (Norton-Hawk, 2001). This group is comprised mainly of street workers, 
who represent less than 20 percent of working prostitutes, and are more likely to be 
women of color, have less education, and face the highest risks for abuse, such as 
exploitation by pimps and law enforcement officials, and drug and health-related 
problems (Weitzer, 1999).  
Therefore qualitative interviews were more useful when interviewing sex 
workers about their experiences with the SJI/CAL-PEP because they allow for a richer 
conversation, something not usually possible to do through basic social research 
survey methods (Reinharz, 1992). Although using SOEIs did not require long-term 
involvement in the research subjects’ lives, they were often one or two hours in length, 
and since I was often around the SJI and CAL-PEP, if needed I could revisit the 
research subjects to clarify anything they might have said. However, SOEIs with SJI 
and CAL-PEP were supplemented with the collection of basic data on clients’ 
demographic information, including their age, length of time in the sex industry, 
racial/ethnic identification, etc which was conducive to immediate quantification and 
is used to present a basic impression of the SJI and CAL-PEP clients I interviewed. 
Since I never asked for clients’ real names, they provided a pseudonym for me to use 
instead. 
Second, SEOI was also useful for decreasing power differentials between the 
interviewer and interviewee. A common concern raised about SOEI is that the 
research subjects can feel intimidated by the researcher, and mutual distrust can arise 
on the part of both parties regarding each others’ motives. Recognizing this potential 
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issue was important for this project, where interviews were conducted by a white, 
heterosexual woman with a post-graduate education. Although I had many interviews 
with others “like me” (government officials, academics, etc), clients I interviewed 
from each organization were, for the most part, poor, had little formal education, were 
persons of color, and were often sexual minorities who were doing (or had done) 
illegal work. However, because I was doing interviews through CAL-PEP and the SJI, 
where the clients interviewed obtained services, I was able to gain their trust more 
easily. And in all the interviews, clearly explaining the goals of the research and 
helped assure interviewees their confidentiality was protected. Interviewees were 
encouraged at any point to question me and refuse to answer certain questions. These 
steps helped to diminish power differentials that existed while also clarifying the 
motives for research. Moreover, the questions asked and the clarifications provided by 
the interviewees were also instructive, providing insight into their lives the decisions 
they have made. 
As noted above, I also used archival research to gather primary sources about 
the organizations and the state/local contexts in which they operated. This archival 
research in each city archive and through each organization-- combined with SOEI 
interviews with staff and other public officials and activists-- was essential because it 
located CAL-PEP and the SJI’s history and operations in their broader political-
economic contexts. I also volunteered with each organization, which constituted the 
participatory component of my research. With the SJI I completed an archiving project 
and helped them write a grant for a new computer through the National Minority 
AIDS Coalition. At CAL-PEP I also volunteered (and continue to do so) as a grant 
writer. While I will elaborate more on these experiences in the following chapters, I 
mention them now because they were an essential part of my research methods. First, 
it was important to me that I give something back to the communities that have been 
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so generous with me. And second, this allowed me to observe how these organizations 
operate and gain access to their archives as well. 
Chapter Outline 
The findings for this thesis are presented in the following five chapters. Chapter 2, 
“Setting the Context: prostitution laws and the political opportunity structure” draws 
from the social movements literature to analyze the political and legal context sex 
workers (activist and otherwise) live and work in today. Focusing on prostitution laws 
in the state of California and federally, and on their enforcement at the local level, this 
chapter demonstrates that political opportunities for COYOTE’s daughter’s opposing 
prostitutes’ rights have increased as prostitution laws have become more punitive, thus 
illuminating the oppositional statement CAL-PEP and the SJI are making by offering 
nonjudgmental services to sex workers. Chapter 3 “Or we’d be next: sex workers, 
innovation and compromise in the fight against HIV/AIDS,” turns to look specifically 
at CAL-PEP, and Chapter 4, “A Place of Our Own? Exploring the radical possibilities 
and political potential of the St. James Infirmary,” looks at the SJI. Drawing from six 
months of multi-method qualitative fieldwork described above, these chapters 
illustrate how these organizations’ encounters with the vectors of political constraint 
and conditions of circumvention have led them to engage in complex compromises 
with authorities in order to provide services to a marginalized community from a 
radically different perspective, while also struggling to maintain their commitment to 
sex worker rights. Chapter 5, “To serve and to advocate? Tax status, data collection 
and political advocacy by nonprofits in the AIDS services sector” draws from the 
literature regarding the relationship of civic organizations (particularly nonprofits) to 
the state to discuss broadly how the vectors of political constraint potentially limit 
nonprofits’ political capacities by restricting their lobbying and campaign activities, 
and detracting resources (particularly time and money) from their organizations, and 
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professionalizing their staffs. However, building on the notion (described above) that 
engagement with the state is dynamic and need not preclude political activity, this 
chapter also discusses the various strategies organizations like CAL-PEP and the SJI 
might employ to circumvent these constraints. Chapter 6, “Radical Institutionalization 
and the Future of Prostitutes’ Rights” returns to questions regarding political 
organizing and the maintenance of radical commitments when activists move from 
protest to service provision in the neo-liberal era. Re-stating the importance of radical 
institutionalization here, this chapter sketches guidelines for future study. Indeed, this 
is not a definitive model and/or check list, but it provides a suggestive frame for 
studying small, activist nonprofit organizations and their potential to engage in 
political life. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SETTING THE CONTEXT: PROSTITUTION LAWS AND THE POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE 
The California Prevention and Education Project (CAL-PEP) and the St. James 
Infirmary (SJI) emerged from the COYOTE-led prostitutes’ rights movement in the 
United States and provide services to sex workers, by sex workers, in partnership with 
state agencies. CAL-PEP and the SJI, as noted in Chapter One, present a puzzle about 
how this focus on service, in partnership with the state, has not eclipsed the radical 
agenda inherited from their foremother, COYOTE. To see how this is possible, this 
dissertation will focus on CAL-PEP and the SJI’s internal environments, considering 
the strategies and activities they use to maintain their commitment to prostitutes’ 
rights within their organizations. However, discussing the broader prostitution policy 
context in which CAL-PEP and the SJI operate is important for clarifying in later 
chapters the oppositional statement they are making through their internal operations. 
Therefore, this chapter takes a step back to analyze the broader external environment 
in which COYOTE’s daughter’s work and act politically today, focusing on 
prostitution policy in the United States, and California’s San Francisco Bay Area in 
particular.  
If one considers policy “an officially expressed intention backed by sanction” 
(Lowi, 1998, p.xiii), this chapter argues broadly that throughout American history 
prostitution policy in California (and nationally) has variously expressed anti-
prostitution sentiments and aimed to suppress (if not occasionally contain) 
prostitution. Yet even as prostitution policy enforcement has fluctuated over time and 
failed to eliminate prostitution (or the demand for it), groups espousing prostitutes’ 
rights have been unable to gain sufficient support for legal reforms, while groups 
opposing this have expanded their gains. This has even been the case in the neo-liberal 
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era, where one might expect prostitution to be viewed as an economic choice that 
might promote individual self-sufficiency.  
To elaborate this political-legal landscape, this chapter begins by tracing the 
evolution of prostitution policy in America to demonstrate how state and societal 
efforts to suppress prostitution have shaped the political environment for sex workers, 
particularly in California, where anti-prostitution sentiments were officially codified in 
the state’s Model Penal Code in 1961. This chapter continues by discussing how, with 
the ascent of neo-liberal politics alongside a social conservative emphasis hyper-
punitiveness in the late 1970s, state (and federal) prostitution policies were amended 
to increase and expand criminal penalties related to prostitution.  
Noting, however, that the letter of the law often differs from its enforcement, 
this chapter proceeds to demonstrate that as it “actually exists” (Hackworth, 2005, 
p.29), the enforcement of prostitution laws in the Bay Area has varied with local urban 
revitalization plans, changes in the location of prostitution, and as local officials have 
shifted their efforts to “end demand” for prostitution. Despite this variation in 
enforcement, however, the anti-prostitution sentiment remains strong in the neo-liberal 
era, favoring COYOTE’s daughters opposing prostitutes’ rights, while COYOTE’s 
daughters supporting this are constrained.  
Part I. The Political Opportunity Structure (POS): A Brief Overview 
Literature regarding the political opportunity structure (POS) provides a useful 
framework for understanding the broader political environment in which sex workers 
work and act politically. Defined broadly as the “consistent but not necessarily formal, 
permanent, or national dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to 
engage in contentious politics” (Tarrow, 1998p. 19), conceptualizing the POS is useful 
for considering how the contexts in which social movements are situated influence 
their emergence, development and mobilization and possibilities for influence (on 
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policy or other factors). In essence, the POS concept’s basic premise is “that 
exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of 
claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be 
exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy” 
(Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, p.1457).  And so, as Meyer (2004) writes, unlike past 
approaches to the study of social movements that considered them largely 
dysfunctional and irrational, or as a product of rationally motivated resource 
mobilization, the broader POS approach emphasizes that activists do not choose goals, 
strategies and tactics in a vacuum: agency can only be understood and evaluated by 
looking at the political context and the rules of the games in which those choices are 
made (that is, structure).  
Classic studies that brought the POS approach to light appeared first with Peter 
Eisinger (1973), who explained that some American cities experienced large amounts 
of rioting during late 1960s because of the “openness” of urban governments to more 
conventional means of making claims. Building on this, Charles Tilly (1978) traced 
the development of popular political movements in relation to state institutions to offer 
a more comprehensive theory and suggesting national comparisons by recognizing 
changes in opportunity over time. Tilly argued that opportunities would explain the 
more general process of choosing tactics from a spectrum of possibilities within a 
repertoire of contention19. However, it was Doug McAdam’s (1982) work on the 
American civil rights movement that became the exemplar of the POS approach. 
Examining broad factors that affect activists’ prospects for mobilizing a social 
                                                
19Tilly’s Popular Contention in Great Britain: 1758-1834 describes how a range of factors, including 
demographic and economic shifts, and the opening of political institutions, led to a shift from local, 
direct and particularistic political contention to toward longer term, national and routinized forms of 
politics to understand the ways protest enabled and then was channeled into less disruptive politics 
(Tilly, 1995). 
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movement, he showed that changes in demography, repression, migration and political 
economy created a political climate where African Americans could organize and 
claims about racial justice would be more readily received by at least some 
governmental institutions. McAdam therefore contended that activism by African 
Americans only emerged forcefully when external circumstances (such as the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education) provided sufficient 
openness to allow for mobilization.  
Indeed, the POS framework has been applied to a variety of social movements, 
but, as many authors have written, it must also be used with caution. Most notably, 
Gamson and Meyer (1996) write that the concept of the POS is at risk of becoming 
“the sponge that soaks up every aspect of a social movement’s political environment” 
(p.275), meaning there is no shortage of conceptual statements about what factors, 
exactly, constitute and provide political opportunities. The result is that analysts 
identify different factors as political opportunities depending on the sort of movement 
they address and questions they ask, accreting new variables they judge as significant 
to the case under study (Meyer 2004). Therefore the challenge for researchers is to 
identify which aspects of the external world affect the development of which social 
movements, and how (Meyer, 2004). Doing this, analysts argue, would provide a more 
careful, explicit conceptualization and specification of POS variables and models, and 
for a broader and more nuanced understanding of the relationships among institutional 
politics, protest and policy. Regardless, if one heeds these cautions, the POS 
framework, as Tarrow (1998) notes, remains very useful for answering questions such 
as why contentious politics seems to develop only in particular periods of history and 
why movements take different forms in different political environments.  
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Prostitutes and the POS 
The emergence of the American prostitutes rights movement tells a broader story 
about how movements of marginalized people have emerged within the last forty 
years to assert their legitimacy, challenge stigma, and evolve organizationally in the 
face of changing political opportunities20. As discussed variously below, the key 
features of the POS shaping the emergence and development of the prostitutes’ rights 
movement in the early 1970s included the presence and successes of other claims-
making minorities, stigma, access to allies and resources, and the advent of the AIDS 
epidemic.  
In the 1960s, as collective action developed around expanding definitions of 
civil and human rights (for example, the women’s and civil rights movements), groups 
outside of the purview of the major social movements of the era, comprised of 
“individuals who have been culturally defined and categorized, stigmatized, morally 
degraded and socially segregated by institutionally sanctioned exclusions…” (Kitsuse, 
1980 p.3) engaged in claims-making activities to gain state and societal recognition. 
These so-called “deviant groups” included gays and lesbians, prisoners and prostitutes, 
among others. Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics (COYOTE) was the world’s first and 
best-known prostitutes’ rights group (Jenness, 1993), emerging in the United States at 
the at the tail-end of the women’s and civil rights movements in San Francisco (a city 
that was increasingly responsive to claims from women and sexual minority groups 
such as gay men) to challenge local law enforcement practices towards prostitutes.  
                                                
20 Scholars have observed that we are increasingly living in a “movement society” where, since the 
1960s, social activism and organizing has become a very common part of the political process as a 
growing variety of groups engage in “social movements”, characterized as sustained challenges to 
power-holders by a disadvantaged population who live under the jurisdiction and influence of these 
power-holders (Tarrow, 1996, 1998; Tilly, 2004). Social movements theories have thus arisen to 
explain the emergence and activities of these movements. 
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COYOTE was founded in 1973 by Margo St. James. St. James became acutely 
aware of the stigma prostitutes faced in 1962, while living in San Francisco and 
working at an after-hours club (Interview, 25 October 2006). Her home on Grant 
Street became a gathering place when the club closed, and one night the police 
arrested her on the suspicion that she was operating a house of prostitution (Lutnick, 
2006). She was released on bail, took her college equivalency test, and enrolled at 
Lincoln Law School, successfully appealing her charge. However, lacking financial 
assistance, she left law school after one year and became a call girl, which is how she 
supported herself for the next four years (Interview, St. James, 26 October 2006). As 
Valerie Jenness writes (1993), by the early 1970s, St. James had moved on to other 
economic pursuits. At that time, she became involved with a small organization named 
Whores, Housewives and Others (WHO) (where “others” referred to lesbian and 
bisexual women), which was formed to provide community services to women and 
prostitutes. As a self-proclaimed “ex prostitute”, St. James obtained a $5,000 grant 
through WHO, from the Point Foundation at San Francisco’s Glide Memorial Church, 
to organize San Francisco’s first prostitutes’ union. Here St. James named and formed 
COYOTE. Shortly after, Playboy magazine contributed $1,000 to support COYOTE’s 
efforts. COYOTE’s mission was to reshape society’s understanding of prostitution 
from an immoral, criminal activity to a form of legitimate work, and ultimately to 
decriminalize prostitution. In so doing, it offered “a radical critique of popular views 
of prostitution by substituting a new ethic [that] affirm[ed] prostitutes’ behavior as 
sensible and moral” (Jenness, 1993, 4).  
Stigma and marginalization proved to be formidable, but not insurmountable, 
barriers to prostitutes’ organization and mobilization for legitimacy. St. James became 
“the main recruiter and coalition builder for COYOTE” (Jenness, 1993, p.43). 
Recruitment, as Jenness (1993) notes, was always difficult for COYOTE because by 
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associating with each other, prostitutes can be seen as conspiring or “pimping” and are 
vulnerable to arrest and prosecution. Despite such challenges, though, prostitutes, 
johns, and other interested parties were invited to join for a small membership fee, and 
key organizers came to the organization through involvement in feminist advocacy 
groups and personal experiences with prostitution. Among the most prominent, visible 
and active of these members were Carol Leigh, Priscilla Alexander and Gloria 
Lockett, who were also influential in forming the California Prevention and Education 
Project and the St. James Infirmary. Carol Leigh (Interview, 12 October 2006), an 
artist, sex worker and feminist activist in the San Francisco Bay Area, had worked in a 
massage parlor in the city, where she realized—contrary to what she had always 
understood through the media and her discussions with fellow social activists-- that 
prostitution was not an occupation only for the downtrodden. She went to a National 
Organization for Women (NOW) meeting in San Francisco with a paper bag on her 
head to demonstrate her impression of prostitutes’ place in the women’s movement 
and society at the time, where she met Margo St James and joined COYOTE. Priscilla 
Alexander (Interview, 18 July 2006), who was never a sex worker, also met Margo St 
James through friends in a feminist group. Alexander found her calling in COYOTE, 
editing their newspaper “COYOTE Howls”. Her research and writing skills would 
later prove invaluable for writing the grant applications that established CAL-PEP 
with Gloria Lockett, (Interview, 18 July 2006) who worked as a prostitute throughout 
California, Alaska and Nevada. When she and her co-workers were arrested for 
prostitution and conspiracy to promote prostitution, Lockett called Margo St. James—
the only person she had ever heard speak positively of prostitution. St. James went to 
court with them every day, and Lockett won her case and joined COYOTE (Interview, 
Gloria Lockett, 18 July 2006).  
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Despite barriers to organization, COYOTE managed to represent a 
marginalized and excluded constituency, making radical claims and waging sustained 
challenges to prevailing social mores. Valerie Jenness studied COYOTE from a 
framing/social-constructionist perspective21(1990; , 1993). Her work demonstrates 
how COYOTE operated as a social movement vying to determine the definition of a 
social problem associated with deviance and social control by capitalizing on the 
tactics, networks and political spaces created by other social movements, namely the 
gay and lesbian movement and the women’s movement (Jenness, 1993). They 
employed a repertoire of actions including public awareness campaigns, 
demonstrations and fundraising events, among other activities described below, that 
aimed to reshape the symbolic landscape of prostitution as a social problem by 
constructing it as a legitimate women’s and civil rights issue. These legitimization 
tactics included creating and promoting the term “sex work” (Leigh, 1997) to better 
emphasize that work in the sex industry was labor like any other, and a frank and well-
written newsletter, “COYOTE Howls” provided a simple and inexpensive way to 
communicate with their membership and the public, and made COYOTE the 
“information center of the world” about prostitution (Interview, Margo St James, 26 
October 2006). COYOTE was also visible through protests and the media. Using 
slogans in their publications and demonstrations such as “Hookers Unite: You have 
nothing to lose but cop harassment” and “My ass is mine” (cited in Jenness, 1993, 
p.49), COYOTE followed the lead of the gay community in the city, who had years 
earlier successfully organized to protest police harassment and the right to participate 
                                                
21 Theories in the social constructionist school (see for some pioneering examples Gusfield, 1989; 
Kitsuse, 1980; Spector & Kitsuse, 1973) hold that social problems are largely definitional and 
constructed by human actors. Here social movements emerge and evolve not primarily as a function of 
their ability to mobilize resources, but as a function of their ability to fashion shared understandings of 
their world and themselves to legitimate and motivate collection action. Therefore social movements 
are efforts to control the direction of social change by largely controlling society’s symbols and self-
understanding of social problems and conditions.  
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in private consensual sex. With slogans such as “The Trick is Not Getting Caught” 
(cited in Jenness, 1993, p.52), they demonstrated against the police practice of 
arresting prostitutes far more frequently than johns. COYOTE’s local actions soon 
came to the attention of the national news media, and St. James was a guest on such 
shows as “The Donahue Show”, where she spoke of the need to legitimize prostitution 
as work in order to end the stigma against women in the sex industry.  
COYOTE’s claims-making activities to reconstruct societal understandings of 
prostitution were affirmed and implemented to a degree by different political and 
professional groups (albeit mainly in the Bay Area). By the late 1970s, COYOTE’s 
campaigns had succeeded on many fronts. The San Francisco Barrister’s Club invited 
St. James to speak about prostitution law reform, and for COYOTE’s annual 
“Hooker’s Ball” (the organization’s major fundraising event from 1973 to 1979), they 
gained the solidarity and support of other workers in the city when, as Margo St. 
James (Interview, 26 October 2006) stated, “Even the fire department helped us hang 
banners” (Interview, 26 October). Other COYOTE achievements included improving 
arrest conditions for prostitutes and enhancing training and education for public 
defenders working for prostitutes (Jenness, 1993). COYOTE also provided crisis 
counseling, support groups, legal counseling, and testimony at government hearings; 
served as expert witnesses in trials; helped the police investigate crimes against 
prostitutes; and provided sensitivity training to government and other non-profit 
agencies who serve prostitutes (COYOTE, 2003). 
Despite being on the tail end of the liberal social movements of the era, 
COYOTE’s failure to make more substantive gains beyond the Bay Area (i.e. legal 
reform) indicated the limited success of their protest efforts, due in part to the fact that 
they were largely resource-poor. Scholars considering COYOTE’s emergence and 
achievements from the resource mobilization theoretical (RMT) perspective argue that 
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although COYOTE did work to reshape public understandings of prostitution (in the 
Bay Area, at least), their lack of moral, material and human resources impeded their 
achievement of any significant legal reforms 22(Mathieu, 2003; Weitzer, 1991; West, 
2000). Regarding human resources, COYOTE largely failed to gain the support of 
mainstream and influential feminist groups due to divisions among them about 
whether prostitution furthered women’s experiences of sexual violence and 
subordination. As a result, there was never the same broad feminist organization and 
mobilization regarding American prostitution law reform as there was around access 
to abortion and birth control 23(Hobson, 1987). And compared to the gay community 
(particularly white gay men), COYOTE’s lack of financial resources (and sympathetic 
allies) contributed to their fragility over time (Mathieu, 2003).  
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1, the advent of the AIDS epidemic not 
only heightened the stigma of prostitutes (thereby diminishing public support for 
prostitutes’ rights), but resulted in the government’s creation of incentives for 
community-based nonprofit AIDS service provision, all of which led to the birth of 
COYOTE’s progeny, including CAL-PEP and the SJI. But the goal of this chapter is 
not to discuss the aspects of the POS influencing the prostitutes’ rights movement’s 
emergence and mobilization. Instead, this chapter will consider how broader social, 
political and economic factors shape the context in which COYOTE’s daughters work 
today, and in so doing hold to the key insight of the POS literature: namely that 
activists’ prospects for advancing particular claims, mobilizing supporters, and 
                                                
22 RMT (for the pioneering example, see Zald & McCarthy, 1977) holds that while there have always 
been discontented people in society, what has changed over time are the resources to mobilize and 
sustain movement politics (in industrial societies). Social movements (especially in the post-1960s era) 
thus consist increasingly of formalized organizations because as society has become wealthier, more 
resources are available to movements, and the movement organizations most able to sustain themselves 
are those best able to access resources. 
23 This is not necessarily surprising, given, as some authors have noted, the failure of the American 
feminist movement to advocate for the privacy (and other) rights of poor women (see for example 
Mink, 1998; Mink, 1999 on poor women and welfare reform) 
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affecting influence are context-dependent (Meyer, 2004). And so this chapter specifies 
and describes two key features of the broader POS-- the criminalization of prostitution 
and the rise of neo-liberal politics—and how they interact to constrain political 
opportunities for those advocating for and supporting sex workers’ rights.  
PART II. Suppressing prostitution: a long-standing feature of the POS 
Suppression and/or containment has long defined state and societal responses to 
prostitution in the United States, shaping the political environment in which sex 
workers live, work and act politically. Before prostitution grew more visible with the 
expansion of the nation’s economy and urban areas, David Pivar (1973) writes that 
during the colonial period the nation lacked any large, federal administrative and 
regulatory capacity, and so prostitution was policed locally, usually by the churches. 
Formal legal attention was not paid to prostitution until later in the industrial era when 
politicians and social reformers grew more concerned that it threatened families and 
the broader social order. Therefore, as Rosen (1982) writes, the gradual growth of 
prostitution was integrally linked to the broader societal changes in women’s lives and 
in the family as the deeply agrarian and religious colonies became more 
commercialized and secular, and the population grew and became more mobile. Yet 
even as prostitution became more visible throughout America, Barbara Meil-Hobson 
(1987) writes that early, localized responses to prostitution laid the groundwork for 
later responses to it as an immoral crime: by casting prostitutes simultaneously as 
victims, seducers and sinners, these responses constructed prostitution not simply as a 
form of labor, but as an activity that determined one’s status in life, meriting both 
punishment and rescue of the individual involved.  
 The dominance of anti-prostitution perspectives is exemplified by the short-
lived political and public tolerance for prostitution in California, particularly in San 
Francisco. Stimulated by the Gold Rush, prostitution was long a part of the San 
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Francisco Bay Area’s history. Although madams and prostitutes took an active part in 
the city’s early social life at this time, this golden age of prostitution came to an end in 
the mid 1850s when gold-seekers deciding to stay in California sent for their families, 
increasing the number of “respectable women” in the city. Consequently, tolerance of 
prostitution diminished, beginning a long period where growing concerns about 
declining (female) morality, disease, property values and crime were associated with 
prostitution (Leigh, 1996; Mullen, 1993). The first evidence of this suppression 
appeared in the 1860s and 1870s, when local jurisdictions created special laws aimed 
at Chinese prostitutes and brothel owners (Meil-Hobson, 1987). At this time, as Asian 
immigration to the city increased, prostitution districts were often designated based on 
growing racism. The first wave of legislation addressing prostitution came from a 
committee meeting to discuss moving Chinese prostitutes to uninhabited streets, 
resulting in Ordinance 546 “To Suppress Houses of Ill Fame Within City Limits” 
(1854), and later, in 1866, the “Order to Remove Chinese Women of Ill Fame from 
Certain Limits of the City” (Leigh, 1996).  
 At this time, however, many city leaders also conceded that it would be 
impossible to eradicate prostitution, and, for pragmatic reasons, a brief moment when 
policies to contain prostitution were developed and employed. In 1870 the city 
designated special “red light” districts subject to revision by city officials (Leigh, 
1996), which would make it easier to supervise and monitor the prostitutes; however, 
this moment of regulatory containment was short-lived. In response to concerns from 
middle class women’s groups and other social reformers, the state of California soon 
passed laws that would make it difficult to operate the red light districts: sections 266h 
and 266i were added to the California Penal Code in 1872 banning pimping and 
pandering, respectively. Section 315 of the California Penal Code, which prohibited 
“keeping a house of ill fame,” was enacted in 1892.  
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 By 1900, Americans began to exhibit the most widespread concern about 
prostitution as immigration increased and the nation grew more urban and 
industrialized. In response to the social and economic changes of the era, Americans 
employed the state for the first time for, among other things, “trust busting” growing 
American business interests, regulating and rationalizing an increasingly racially and 
ethnically pluralistic nation, and for legislating morality (Luker, 1998). At this time 
the social purity movement began to grow, mounting vigorous campaigns for legal 
reform that would enforce a single standard of moral purity for men and women 
(Abramson, Pinkerton, & Huppin, 2003; Morse, 1997). As a result, from 1900 to 
1920, the most broad and coherent effort to eliminate prostitution in American history 
was waged: new laws were written by social reformers to eradicate prostitution and 
institutionalized through an array of enforcement mechanisms (the closing of red-light 
districts in almost every major American city, special courts, and new penal 
institutions for women, among others). Fearing immigrant vulnerability to and 
perpetuation of the prostitution industry, reformers also focused on providing various 
social services to young, working class/immigrant women to prevent them from 
entering (and furthering) the prostitution industry. Progressive reformers’ zeal also 
sparked federal interest in prostitution for the first time, specifically regarding the 
“white slave trade,” which (allegedly) involved the rampant movement of women 
across state lines for the purposes of prostitution. This federal interest culminated in 
1911 with the passage of the Mann Act by Congress, which forbid the transportation of 
women across state lines for immoral purposes (Brandt, 1987). Taken together, these 
local and federal reform measures served to firmly cast prostitution in America as an 
immoral, criminal activity that was largely responsible for the spread of disease and 
broken families, and one that also victimized women by forcing them into the (sex) 
slave trade (Connelly, 1980; Meil-Hobson, 1987). 
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 National efforts to suppress prostitution were clearly reflected in California, 
particularly in the San Francisco Bay area. Here, similar to the rest of the nation, a 
brief window of toleration was over-shadowed by political favor for suppressing 
prostitution. In response to the demands of the prominent physician Dr. Julius 
Rosenstirn, who advocated a supervisory approach to prostitution, the San Francisco 
Board of Health opened a clinic in 1911, which effectively legalized prostitution in the 
city by forcing all prostitutes to confine themselves to a district and submit to regular 
medical exams (Rosenstirn, 1913; Shumsky & Springer, 1981). But political 
opportunities for expanding this legal regulation of prostitution were brief (Kerr, 1994; 
Shumsky & Springer, 1981, 82). The clinic system soon came under strong attack by 
doctors who did not believe it lessened the spread of venereal diseases; by social 
reformers and religious leaders, who saw the system as encouraging immorality; and, 
most significantly, by businessmen eager to rebuild the city after the 1906 earthquake 
and bring the Panama Pacific International Exposition to the city in 1915. Bowing to 
these pressures, the mayor ordered the removal of the officers who detailed the clinic, 
which essentially ended its operation. This event was paralleled by the state’s passage 
of the Red Light Abatement Act (1913), which declared brothels a public nuisance and 
allowed citizens to sue owners for maintaining them24. Although the law was 
challenged by property owners, the state supreme court upheld the law in 1917 (Kerr, 
1994).  
Despite a general sense of optimism in the nation and the expansion of rights 
for various minorities nation-wide, political opportunities for implementing tolerant 
                                                
24 Historically, the participation in and regulation of prostitution in Oakland followed very similar 
patterns to that in San Francisco. Up until 1890, prostitutes were part of city life and were generally 
appreciated, until more women began to follow their husbands to Oakland and a modified Victorian 
culture influenced the city, leading to the creation of segregated districts for prostitutes until 1914, when 
they were shut down by the passage of the Red Light Abatement Act. 
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approaches to prostitution did not increase during the post-war era25. Instead, for the 
first time anti-prostitution sentiments were codified in California officially in 1961 
under the rubric of disorderly conduct laws (Section 647 of the California Model Penal 
Code) (Jennings, 1976; Meil-Hobson, 1987). As enacted in 1961, Section 647 read 
“Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of a misdemeanor”, 
stating in subsection (b) that these acts include “solicit[ing] or engag[ing] in 
prostitution”. As Anne Jennings (1976) writes, contemporary commentaries on the 
enactment of section 647(b) offer little guidance about the legislative purposes behind 
the criminalization of prostitution and solicitation, especially since the state of 
California removed all criminal penalties from adult consensual sexual behavior in a 
non-commercial context shortly before section 647(b) was enacted. However, the 
drafters of the Model Penal Code advanced several reasons for retaining criminal 
penalties for prostitution and solicitation. They believed this would prevent the spread 
of venereal disease; prevent crimes associated with prostitution; decrease official 
corruption; and protect family and society from the deleterious effects of 
commercialized sex 26(Jennings, 1976).   
By the late 1960s, the political context changed, becoming more open to 
claims by marginalized groups. Sexual liberalism becoming the dominant ethos of the 
era and advances were made regarding women’s (and other groups’) rights nation-
wide. But according to Meil-Hobson (1987), feminists at this time were deeply 
divided between those who viewed prostitution as reinforcing the (sexual) 
subordination of women in society (see for example Mackinnon, 1983, 1987; 
                                                
25 In San Francisco, for example, although toleration policies were explored after World War II by 
incumbent mayor Elmer Robinson, he was defeated by a candidate appealing to female voters with an 
anti-prostitution stance (Leigh, 1997). 
26 In 1965, likely in response to growing concerns about the emerging gay rights movements in the 
state, section 647 was amended and subdivision (b) inserted a sentence reading, “As used in this 
subdivision, ‘prostitution’ includes any lewd act by persons of the same sex for money or other 
consideration” (Westlaw), but the words “of the same sex” were removed in deleted in 1969. 
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Mackinnon, 1989), and those who argued that prostitution was a legitimate sexual and 
work choice, especially given the limited range of economic options for women (see 
for example Thompson, 2000).  
Despite the open political context of the 1960s and 1970s, prostitution 
remained firmly in the jurisdiction of criminal law, reflecting the nation’s long-
standing anti-prostitution perspective. In California in 1971, the only known attempt 
to repeal section 647(b) was initiated by state Assemblyman Leroy Greene of 
Sacramento, who introduced a bill to legalize prostitution. Although the majority of 
Greene’s legislative activity during his 36 years in office dealt with education and 
school facilities, he introduced this bill when a poll showed there was support for it: in 
a representative sample of the state’s residents by the California Poll, 50 percent of 
respondents thought this proposal was a “good idea”, and in another poll (albeit one 
conducted by Greene), 69 percent said they favored his proposal (Jennings, 1976, 
p.1250). However, his bill never passed, and instead, various amendments to section 
647 (b) and other prostitution-related statutes occurred during this era (mainly through 
court decisions, discussed below).  
Reflecting the broader social desires of era for civil rights and equality, the 
first of these amendments stipulated prostitution laws be gender neutral; however, they 
ultimately expanded criminalization (at least on paper) by applying prostitution laws 
to males and pimps. In 1969 the state’s law against pimping (Section 266, described 
above) was amended to include both men and women. According to Westlaw27, a 1969 
amendment made Section 266 apply to "Any person," instead of "Any male person;" 
                                                
27 Much of this discussion will draw from the texts of the laws and historical notes provided by 
Westlaw, the online legal research service for legal and law related materials, which provides the texts 
of the law, as well as information about their amendments, relevant court cases, and historical 
information. 
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referred to "another person," instead of "a female person;" substituted "such person" 
for "her," and omitted a paragraph which read: 
 
"Any female person referred to in this section is a competent witness in any 
prosecution hereunder to testify for or against the accused as to any transaction or as 
to any conversation with the accused or by him with another person or persons in her 
presence, notwithstanding her having married the accused before or after the violation 
of any of the provisions of this section, whether called as a witness during the 
existence of the marriage or after its dissolution." 
 
Regarding pandering, nearly identical amendments were made to subsection 266i: a 
1969 amendment substituted "another person” where the section read "a female 
person". Amendments were also made to increase and specify the severity of 
sentences for a pandering conviction.  
Section 315 of the CA Penal code, which prohibits keeping a house of ill fame, 
was challenged next in 1974 on the grounds that it was not gender neutral (but to date 
remains one of the few prostitution-related statutes that is not gender neutral). 
Although Section 315 refers to every “person who keeps a house of ill-fame” in its 
prohibition, the case of People v. Municipal Court, City and County of San Francisco 
(1974) established that the character of the house and those in it is determined by the 
conduct of the women therein28. In 1976 and 1977, two other cases also came before 
the state Supreme Court that, while keeping prostitution criminalized, also clarified the 
law was gender neutral. In Leffel v. Municipal Court of Fresno (1976), the authoring 
judge reiterated the suppressive and moralistic motivation behind the law, stating the 
                                                
28 In this case the defendants were charged for violating various Penal Code sections relating to 
prostitution. They filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the charges, alleging their trial or conviction would 
be the result of discriminatory enforcement of the law, based on information they had that the San 
Francisco DA enforced prostitution statutes against women but not against adult male homosexuals for 
similar violations in bathhouses or male escort services. The appeals court affirmed that the trial court 
was correct in requiring the prosecution to release statistical information regarding number of arrests, 
prosecutions or investigations of bathhouses and escort services and any statements of 
interdepartmental memoranda which might exist regarding enforcement policy. However, reflecting the 
strength of gay men’s political organizing San Francisco, the text of the law has never been changed to 
consider that men (gay or otherwise) might also occupy a house in such a way to give it a reputation as 
a house of prostitution.  
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“Legislative purpose in proscribing soliciting for prostitution is to eliminate 
prostitution and its intended evils; hence, subjecting the customer to prosecution will 
further the legislative purpose”. However, the judge did clarify that the law applied to 
clients (men) as well as prostitutes:  
 
“Interpreting subd. (b) of this section defining disorderly conduct as including every 
person who solicits any act of prostitution to apply to the customer as well as the 
prostitute did not deprive defendant customer of due process since not only does this 
section itself give fair notice that customers are included but judicial interpretation of 
this section to include the customer was reasonably foreseeable.” ("Leffel v. 
Municipal Court of Fresno County", 1976) 
Gender neutrality in the law was reinforced again in People v. Superior Court of 
Alameda County (1977), where the decision stated “This section providing that ‘Every 
person who solicits or who engages in any act of prostitution’ is guilty of disorderly 
conduct, was fair on its face and impartial in appearance and was clearly designed to 
punish specific acts without reference to sex of perpetrator” ("People v. Superior 
Court of Alameda County", 1977). With gender neutrality, however, also came the 
clarification that a female’s presence in a certain area (or simply being out alone at 
night) did not indicate intent to commit prostitution: In re White (1979) found that 
“Mere presence at a particular place, without more, does not amount to solicitation; 
nor, without more, is waving to a passing vehicle, nodding to a passing stranger, or 
standing on a street corner in a miniskirt” ("In re White", 1979). By 1986, reflecting 
these case law developments, section 647 (b) was amended by Statutes1986, c. 1276 
to read that anyone is guilty of a misdemeanor 
 
“b) Who solicits or who agrees to engage in or who engages in any act of prostitution. 
A person agrees to engage in an act of prostitution when, with specific intent to so 
engage, he or she manifests an acceptance of an offer or solicitation to so engage, 
regardless of whether the offer or solicitation was made by a person who also 
possessed the specific intent to engage in prostitution. No agreement to engage in an 
act of prostitution shall constitute a violation of this subdivision unless some act, in 
addition to the agreement, is done within this state in furtherance of the commission 
of an act of prostitution by the person agreeing to engage in that act. As used in this 
subdivision, "prostitution" includes any lewd act between persons for money or other 
consideration.”  
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This wording remains to the same to this day. While the prohibition of prostitution is 
now stated in gender-neutral terms, Section 647(b) continues to communicate that 
prostitution is not legitimate work but an immoral activity that merits criminal 
punishment.  
Part III. Neo-liberalism and prostitution policy 
The political climate in which prostitutes work and act politically began to change in 
the 1980s with the rise of neo-liberal politics: at this time, as discussed below, despite 
the neo-liberal emphasis on individual self-sufficiency and minimal state involvement 
in society and the economy, prostitution laws were amended to be more punitive 
(although enforcement varied), reflecting the continued presence of social 
conservatism in this era. Before discussing this evolution nationally and in the state of 
California, however, this section first discusses neo-liberalism (defined in Chapter 
One) and its relation to crime policy in the United States (Chapter 5 focuses in more 
depth on the neo-liberal trends towards social service provision by private/nonprofit 
entities).     
 Neo-liberal politics gained momentum in the early 1970s, escalating when 
Ronald Regan was elected on a platform that advocated major retreat from 
government activism and intervention in social policy and the economy. However, as 
Hackworth (2005) argues, neo-liberal retrenchment has been a highly contingent 
process tending toward destruction but also creation. The so-called “destructive” 
aspect is exemplified by how welfare policies across the board came under intense 
scrutiny to determine whether they should be cut as much as possible or replaced with 
private service providers (Pierson, 1994), particularly those in the nonprofit sector 
(Salamon, 2001a). Changes in welfare programming in the United States provide one 
of the most telling examples of this retrenchment. Welfare, via Aid to Dependent 
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Children, has never been universal and adequate, but instead has been means-tested 
and crisis-interventionary, serving as a check on the growing demands for these 
welfare measures and services (L. Gordon, 1995; Mink, 1998; Ursel, 1992). In 1996, 
welfare was minimized further when President Bill Clinton signed the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, changing welfare in the 
United States from a federal, statutory entitlement to a state-administered, needs-
demonstrated program called “Temporary Assistance to Needy Families” (TANF). 
TANF was discussed in gender-neutral terms as a program that would “end welfare as 
we know it” by imposing strict time limits and work requirements on welfare 
recipients. But as numerous authors (Abramovitz, 2000; Mink, 1998; Smith, 2002) 
have noted, welfare cuts primarily impact women. Since the passage of TANF, 
welfare programs in many US states have grown more coercive and invasive of 
women’s privacy, and even moreso they fail to offer monetary benefits meet their 
needs and those of their children. Overall, the result has been that as social programs 
have been cut, services once available to the poor or those who fell on hard times 
became the private responsibilities of individuals and/or nonprofit service providers 
(Cossman, 2002). 
However, what one might call the destruction of the welfare apparatus has 
happened alongside the “creation” of an increasingly punitive (indeed, “hyper-
punitive”) approach to crime, demonstrating, as Larner argues (2002), that the neo-
liberal emphasis on less government has not meant there is less governance. Here, 
while neo-liberalism problematizes the state and is concerned with limiting it by 
invoking individual choice, it also involves the state by strengthening its coercive 
powers to enforce the individualization of social responsibility (Brodie, 1997). In 
many cases, as the following pages demonstrate, this has resulted in the heightened 
policing of individuals, particularly those living and working on the streets. Therefore, 
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as Herbert and Brown (2006) argue, one must view the neo-liberal state as different 
rather than smaller, as state power is restructured through an expansion of the criminal 
justice apparatus (as opposed to the social welfare system).  
To illustrate, until the 1970s, when welfare state development was peaking, 
authors such as Marc Mauer (1999) and later Henry Ruth & Kevin Reitz (2003) wrote 
that the stronger economy, combined with the increased desire for social change, 
created a political climate receptive to less punitive solutions to poverty and crime, 
hence the focus on rehabilitation-oriented programs during this period. However, the 
economic downturn and resulting strains on the welfare state that made the public so 
receptive to Reagan’s conservative agenda also increased favor for his similarly 
socially conservative approach to crime. As a result, similar to income support 
programs, rehabilitative programs were similarly characterized as drains on resources. 
In their place, more punitive approaches such as the “War on Drugs” and mandatory 
sentencing, combined with cuts to legal services for the poor, became the favored 
means of dealing with poverty and crime, all of which increased incarceration rates in 
the United States to record levels (Beckett, 1997; Wacquant, 2002).  
Prostitution laws under neo-liberalism 
The remainder of this section will demonstrate that prostitution has remained in the 
jurisdiction of criminal law with the rise of neo-liberal politics, although the 
enforcement of these laws has fluctuated. Given the neo-liberal emphasis on 
individual responsibility, one might argue that women engaged in the exchange of 
sexual services for cash or other trade be considered rational economic agents who 
should not be criminalized for their efforts at self-sufficiency, especially since the 
reduction in welfare programming under neo-liberalism might provide an impetus to 
enter prostitution. Various authors (Edin & Lein, 1997) have written that since any 
income earned along with welfare benefits can reduce the total TANF payout, many 
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women must turn to the informal economy  to meet their needs and those of their 
child/ren. In Chapter 6, entitled “Survival Strategies”, they demonstrate in a number of 
their case studies that women have exchanged sex for cash, food or other necessities in 
the face of restricted welfare benefits, risking criminal penalties, physical harm, and 
further stigmatization.  
Yet despite the potential for recognizing prostitution as legitimate work in the 
law under neo-liberalism, prostitution laws have been passed at the state and federal 
levels that further marginalize prostitute identity by linking it to both victimization and 
criminality.  At the state level, the advent of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s rapidly 
accelerated the criminalization of prostitution. Similar to the disease panics of the 
Progressive Era, women working as prostitutes became an easy and obvious target for 
the spread of this newly discovered disease. Across the United States, in the spirit of 
neo-liberalism—emphasizing individual punishment as opposed to broader social 
solutions (like comprehensive health care for sex workers and job training, for 
example)-- legislators passed numerous laws that targeted prostitutes as transmitters of 
HIV. As Zita Lazzarini (2004, pp.181-182) writes, between 1988 and 1996, twenty 
four states passed legislation criminalizing HIV transmission generally or through 
some form of specific behavior, including spitting, donating blood, or sexual 
intercourse. But she adds that fifteen states also passed statutes concerning acts that 
are already crimes (such as prostitution, rape, and assaulting a peace officer), which 
punish the perpetrator separately or more severely when the perpetrator knows he or 
she is HIV-positive. Specifically, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, Georgia, Utah, 
Florida, Tennessee, Colorado, Oklahoma, South Carolina and California enacted 
enhancement statutes that would increase the severity of charges against prostitutes 
from a misdemeanor to a felony if the prostitute knows she has (or is known to have) 
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HIV (Wolf & Vezina, 2004, p.856). Yet in spite of this “moral panic”29, it appears as if 
these felony prostitution laws are rarely enforced, with the exception of California, 
where, as John Mitchell (2002, p.3) writes, has had 216 prosecutions under its law. 
Along with the passage of the AIDS-related prostitution laws nationwide, in 
California state prostitution laws were re-written to be more punitive. A 1982 
amendment to Section 266i (pandering) increased the sentence for a pandering 
conviction from 2 to 4 years to 3 to 6 years, and where the victim of pandering was 
under the age of 16, the 1982 amendment provided a sentence of up to eight years. 
The possibility for parole (in cases of both pimping and pandering) was removed in 
1983. Two cases-- People v. Almodovar (1987) and People v. Dell (1991)-- challenged 
the validity of the state’s pimping and pandering laws, but the decisions here upheld 
and reinforced the punishments for these crimes, broadening the scope of prostitution 
laws by showing that words-- without the actual act of prostitution-- can be construed 
to prove the occurrence of pimping and pandering30. Indeed, the outcomes in both 
Almodovar and Dell reflected public sentiments that, in the age of AIDS, prostitution 
should be further criminalized 
                                                
29 A moral panic occurs when “[a] condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become 
defined as a threat to societal values and its interests… sometimes the panic passes over and is 
forgotten…at other times, it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such 
changes as those in legal and social policy…”(S. Cohen, 2002, p.1) 
30 In Almodovar, the defendant (Norma Jean Almodovar), a former civilian traffic officer for the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD), wrote a book "From Cop to Call Girl," describing her exploits 
with the police department and further escapades as a prostitute. Her friend (another LAPD traffic cop, 
Judy Isgro), alleged that Almodovar asked Isgro to work as an escort when she told her about the book. 
Isgro informed a superior at the LAPD of the situation and assisted the detectives in an investigation of 
Almodovar. Although the actual physical acts of pimping and pandering never took place, Isgro’s 
conversations with Almodovar (some of which were wire-tapped) were used as evidence to convict 
Almodovar of pandering, for which she served 72 days in custody.  Dell further expanded the definition 
of pimping and pandering. In this case, women working for an escort service told undercover officers 
what services they would perform and what they would cost. Although they never performed the 
services, the appellant—the agency owner—was convicted of one count of pimping and two counts of 
pandering. On appeal, the appellant contended that the testimony of the police officers regarding the 
escorts' statements about the sex acts they would perform for the fee was inadmissible hearsay. The 
court concluded, however, that the testimony of police officers was not "hearsay," and was admissible 
in prosecution for pimping and pandering as evidence of "verbal acts" or "operative facts" of crime of 
prostitution 
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Prostitution laws were also amended by the California state legislature to 
increase penalties for sex workers on the streets. One major example here was Section 
653.22 of the Penal Code, to which Section 4 was added by statute in 1995 to prohibit 
loitering for the purposes of prostitution31. Property concerns drove the addition of this 
section to the Penal Code: the historical notes in Westlaw state "Section 4 of this act is 
enacted for the purpose of assisting local law enforcement in controlling prostitution-
related activities and to minimize the adverse effect these activities have upon local 
communities.” The statute proceeds to list 5 circumstances that constitute evidence of 
loitering32; however, these activities are not all that define what constitutes loitering. 
The statute states further that    
 
(c) The list of circumstances set forth in subdivision (b) is not exclusive.  The 
circumstances set forth in subdivision (b) should be considered particularly salient if 
they occur in an area that is 
known for prostitution activity.  Any other relevant circumstances may be considered 
in determining whether a person has the requisite intent (italics added). Moreover, no 
one circumstance or combination of circumstances is in itself determinative of intent.  
Intent must be determined based on an evaluation of the particular circumstances of 
each case 
Although five specific actions are outlined in subsection (b), the non-exclusivity of 
this list, as well as the statement in subdivision (c), above, clearly indicate that the 
major goal of the law was to enhance the capacity of law enforcement officials to 
                                                
31 This section states that (a) “It is unlawful for any person to loiter in any public place with the 
intent to commit prostitution. This intent is evidenced by acting in a manner and under 
circumstances which openly demonstrate the purpose of inducing, enticing, or 
soliciting prostitution, or procuring another to commit prostitution.” 
 
32 Stating in subsection (b) “Among the circumstances that may be considered in determining whether a 
person loiters with the intent to commit prostitution are that the person: (1) Repeatedly beckons to, 
stops, engages in conversations with, or attempts to stop or engage in conversations with passersby, 
indicative of soliciting for prostitution. (2) Repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles by 
hailing the drivers, waving arms, or making any other bodily gestures, or engages or attempts to engage 
the drivers or passengers of the motor vehicles in conversation, indicative of soliciting for prostitution. 
(3) Has been convicted of violating this section, subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 647, or any other 
offense relating to or involving prostitution, within five years of the arrest under this section.   (4) 
Circles an area in a motor vehicle and repeatedly beckons to, contacts, or attempts to contact or stop 
pedestrians or other motorists, indicative of soliciting for prostitution. (5) Has engaged, within six 
months prior to the arrest under this section, in any behavior described in this subdivision, with the 
exception of paragraph (3), or in any other behavior indicative of prostitution activity.” 
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arrest street-based sex workers. To little avail, sex workers in San Francisco did 
protest loitering bylaws in the city, but no other California cities have witnessed 
similar protests.  
Even though Section 653.22 broadens the definition of loitering, which 
potentially encroaches on freedom of association, there has only been one challenge to 
the law, and it was unsuccessful. In People v. Pulliam (1998), the jury found Sherrie 
Lynn Pulliam (Pulliam) guilty of loitering in a public place with intent to commit an 
act of prostitution in violation of Penal Code section 653.22. Pulliam's sole contention 
on appeal was that section 653.22 was unconstitutional because it is vague and 
overbroad. The court determined, however, that First Amendment (free speech) 
protections did not apply because the conduct is reasonably prohibited33. As a result, 
Section 653.23, which prohibits supervising or otherwise aiding a prostitute, was 
added by statute in 1998 to reinforce section 653.22, stating  
 
(a) It is unlawful for any person to do either of the following: (1) Direct, supervise, 
recruit, or otherwise aid another person in the commission of a violation of 
subdivision (b) of Section 647 or subdivision (a) of Section 653.22. (2) Collect or 
receive all or part of the proceeds earned from an act or acts of prostitution committed 
by another person in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 647. 
Like Section 653.22, it then lists nine possible (but not exclusive) actions that might 
constitute supervising or aiding. To date, there have not been any cases that challenge 
this law on any grounds (namely that it limits one’s freedom of association), nor have 
there been any legislative amendments. 
                                                
33 The court stated that “Criminal laws penalize conduct. If the conduct is permissibly prohibited under 
the state and federal Constitutions, the fact that the conduct may peripherally involve speech or 
association does not cloak it with constitutional protections that invalidate the criminal statute 
prohibiting the conduct…Because section 653.22 criminalizes the conduct of loitering with intent to 
commit prostitution, which may constitutionally be prohibited, and does not on its face prohibit "a 
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct," section 653.22 is not overbroad.” ("People v. 
Pulliam", 1998) 
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Federal laws 
Alongside these state-level developments, federal interest in prostitution (particularly 
regarding human trafficking) has increased, further reinforcing anti-prostitution 
sentiments. Of course, federal interest in prostitution and human trafficking is not a 
recent phenomenon: as noted above, Congress passed the Mann Act in 1911 
forbidding the transportation of women across state lines for immoral purposes 
(Brandt, 1987). More recent attention to the issue emerged in the 1970s when 
feminists began to express concerns about the social impacts of reconstruction and 
development in the Southeast Asia region in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Sex 
tourism, mail order brides, militarized prostitution, and coercions and violence in the 
movement and employment of women to more affluent regions for work in the leisure 
and sex industries were the major focus of study under the rubric of sex trafficking at 
the time (Kempadoo, 2005). Attention to sex trafficking intensified in the mid-1980s 
as media attention to the plight of trafficked victims told stories of Latin American and 
Asian women illegally trafficked to work in brothels in Western Europe, among others 
(Gozdziak & Collett, 2005; Sonderlund, 2005). By 1985, the issue was integral to the 
international women’s movement, becoming part of the United Nation’s Fora on 
Women, and a key interest of women’s organizations and networks world-wide 
(Kempadoo, 2005).  
 Similar to the prostitution debates of the 1960s and 1970s (described above), 
perspectives on how to combat trafficking have in no way been unified, particularly 
among a number of COYOTE’s daughters discussed in Chapter One. On one side are 
the abolitionists, led mainly by scholars and activists (for some prominent examples, 
see K. Barry, 1984; K. Barry, 1996; Farley et al., 2003; Hughes & Raymond, 2001; 
Jeffreys, 1997, 1999) who argue that all prostitution in and of itself is harmful to 
women and a result of male domination, and therefore sex trafficking is the worst 
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patriarchal oppression of women. The most influential abolitionist organization in the 
United States is COYOTE’s daughter, the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women 
(CATW)34. Other prominent abolitionist organizations include Equality Now, the 
Protection Project, and (as noted briefly in the previous chapter) Standing Against 
Globalization (SAGE) (Weitzer, 2005, 2007).  
On the other side of the debate are sex worker rights advocates who more 
closely resemble COYOTE and include scholars, activists and sex workers (many 
from the global south) who advocate that prostitution is another form of work. They 
believe that although many women are indeed coerced and violated in the sex trade, 
their situations vary according ethnic, racial, social and economic contexts. From this 
perspective, the sex industry is just one of many labor sites requiring unskilled or 
semi-skilled labor; what distinguishes trafficking from prostitution (or any other form 
of labor) is coercion and the conditions under which women (and men) enter into 
labor. As opposed to condemning prostitution as an economic option, they advocate 
sex worker empowerment through harm reduction via the provision of condoms, 
counseling and other support services (Gozdziak & Collett, 2005; Weitzer, 2007). 
Groups adhering to this view include the Network of Sex Work Projects (NSWP), a 
coalition of forty international groups, the Sex Workers Outreach Project (SWOP, 
discussed in Chapter One), the Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women, and 
the Sex Workers Project in New York.  
                                                
34 According to their website, “The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) is a non-
governmental organization that promotes women's human rights. It works internationally to combat 
sexual exploitation in all its forms, especially prostitution and trafficking in women and children, in 
particular girls.  CATW … serves as an umbrella that coordinates and takes direction from its regional 
organizations and networks in its work against sexual exploitation and in support of women's human 
rights … bring[ing] international attention to all forms of sexual exploitation, including prostitution, 
pornography, sex tourism, and mail order bride selling…[by] training teachers, professionals, police, 
governmental authorities and the public about the harm of sexual exploitation and ways to resist and 
combat it… and testify[ing] before national congresses, parliaments, law reform commissions, regional 
and UN committees and commissions, and hold[ing] Category II Consultative Status with the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).” (http://www.catwinternational.org/) 
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Abolitionists and sex worker rights advocates have never been equally 
positioned to influence public and governmental understandings of sex trafficking and 
prostitution, and political opportunities for abolitionists anti-prostitution advocates 
have increased since the George W. Bush Administration adopted anti-trafficking as a 
key humanitarian initiative in the post 9/11 period (Sonderlund, 2005). By joining 
forces with religious and social conservatives (who already had the ear of the Bush 
Administration on many other issues), they were able to convince Congress to pass the 
federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act  (TVPA) in 2000 ("Victims of Trafficking 
and Violence Protection Act of 2000", 2000), which was reauthorized in 2003, 2005 
and 2007.   
Reflecting neo-liberal trends towards hyper-punitiveness, the TVPA focused 
on combating trafficking by expanding police powers, despite the existence of laws 
prohibiting kidnapping, peonage and other forms of forced labor. As stated in Section 
102: Purposes and Findings, 
 
“(14) Existing legislation and law enforcement in the United States and other 
countries are inadequate to deter trafficking and bring traffickers to justice, failing to 
reflect the gravity of the offenses involved. No comprehensive law exists in the 
United States that penalizes the range of offenses involved in the trafficking scheme. 
Instead, even the most brutal instances of trafficking in the sex industry are often 
punished under laws that also apply to lesser offenses, so that traffickers typically 
escape deserved punishment.”  
To mete out these harsher punishments, Sec.111 “Actions against significant 
traffickers in persons” and Sec.112 “Strengthening prosecution and punishment of 
traffickers” amends Chapter 77 of Title 18, United States Code, to increase penalties 
for a person found guilty (of trafficking resulting in forced labor, peonage, slavery, 
involuntary servitude, sex trafficking of children or unlawful conduct with respect to 
documents in furtherance of trafficking) from 10 years in prison to 20 years-to-life in 
prison.  
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Because the 2000 TVPA (and its subsequent re-authorizations) gave law 
enforcement primary jurisdiction over determining who qualifies as a victim, it kept 
sex trafficking (and issues of prostitution more generally) in the realm of the criminal 
justice system (as opposed to treating it as social welfare or economic issue). This is 
most apparent in the TVPA’s provisions for non-US citizens. Under Section 1513 
(a)(2), the TVPA (2000) “create[s] a new nonimmigrant visa classification that will 
strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect, investigate, and prosecute 
cases of domestic violence, sexual assault, trafficking of aliens, and other crimes 
described in section 101(a)(15)(U)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
committed against aliens”. However, according to Sec 107 (b)(E), to qualify for a visa 
(called the “T-visa”) individuals defined as victims of severe trafficking must 
cooperate with law enforcement35.  As a result, unless law enforcement determines that 
those apprehended are victims of trafficking and are willing to work with law 
enforcement, they are not eligible for status or services. This has been criticized by 
many (Chapkis, 2005; Kempadoo, 2005) for putting women at risk for experiencing 
criminal penalties if they do not cooperate with law enforcement for fear of 
encountering their trafficker. Moreover, although Section 107c1C states protections 
should be provided to the women and their families, this assistance and protection is 
obtained while the women are in custody, therefore reinforcing that victims of (sex) 
                                                
35“(i) IN GENERAL- Subject to clause (ii), the certification referred to in subparagraph (C) [which 
defines victims of severe trafficking] is a certification by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
after consultation with the Attorney General, that the person referred to in subparagraph (C)(ii)(II)— 
(I) is willing to assist in every reasonable way in the investigation and prosecution of severe forms of 
trafficking in persons; and 
(II)(aa) has made a bona fide application for a visa under section 101(a)(15)(T) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, as added by subsection (e), that has not been denied; or 
(bb) is a person whose continued presence in the United States the Attorney General is ensuring in order 
to effectuate prosecution of traffickers in persons. 
(ii) PERIOD OF EFFECTIVENESS- A certification referred to in subparagraph (C), with respect to a 
person described in clause (i)(II)(bb), shall be effective only for so long as the Attorney General 
determines that the continued presence of such person is necessary to effectuate prosecution of 
traffickers in persons.” 
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trafficking are both victims and criminals 36. Overall, while forcing individuals into 
labor of any sort is morally reprehensible, as critics have noted the approach to human 
trafficking under neo-liberalism focuses too heavily on individuals at the expense of 
minimizing the social and economic conditions (poverty, lack of employment, etc) that 
often create incentives for women to encounter traffickers and become engaged in 
forced labor, sexual or otherwise (Sonderlund, 2005) 
Alongside the TVPA, the creation of federal anti-prostitution initiatives has 
been plentiful (despite the trend towards social program devolution in the past 
decade). Overall, since 2001, the Bush Administration spent an average of $100 
million per year to fight trafficking domestically and internationally (Sonderlund, 
2005, p.67), providing more than $295 million to support anti-trafficking programs in 
more than 120 countries (U.S Department of State, 2005, p.1). However, the 2003 
TVPA made clear that none of these funds will be used to promote the legalization or 
practice of prostitution, or to implement any program through any organization that 
has not stated in a grant application or agreement that it does not promote or support 
prostitution37.  The effect of these actions has been to conflate all forms of prostitution 
                                                
36 According to SEC. 107 PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING (c) 
TRAFFICKING VICTIM REGULATIONS- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall promulgate regulations for law 
enforcement personnel, immigration officials, and Department of State officials to implement the 
following: 
(1) PROTECTIONS WHILE IN CUSTODY- Victims of severe forms of trafficking, while in the 
custody of the Federal Government and to the extent practicable, shall-- 
(A) not be detained in facilities inappropriate to their status as crime victims; 
(B) receive necessary medical care and other assistance; and 
(C) be provided protection if a victim's safety is at risk or if there is danger of additional harm by 
recapture of the victim by a trafficker, including-- 
(i) taking measures to protect trafficked persons and their family members from intimidation and threats 
of reprisals and reprisals from traffickers and their associates; and 
(ii) ensuring that the names and identifying information of trafficked persons and their family members 
are not disclosed to the public. 
(2) ACCESS TO INFORMATION- Victims of severe forms of trafficking shall have access to 
information about their rights and translation services. 
37 This is apparent in Section 7 “Authorization of Appropriations; Related Matters” in the 2003 TVPA, 
which added the following new subsection to the 2000 Act: 
“(g) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS- 
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with sex trafficking by emphasizing that any support for legal or decriminalized 
prostitution is as morally reprehensible as supporting sex trafficking.  
Yet despite the attention paid to sex trafficking, the actual implementation of 
federal prostitution and trafficking policies has been another matter: to date, the 
federal government has only identified 1,362 victims of human trafficking (brought 
into the US) since 2000, causing Steven Wagner, the former head of the Department 
of Health and Human Services anti-trafficking program (which distributes a portion of 
the anti-trafficking funds to community groups assisting victims) to declare that “those 
funds were wasted. Many of the organizations that received grants didn’t really have 
to do anything. They were available to help victims. There weren’t any victims” (cited 
in Markon, 2007, p.1).  
Despite these outcomes, federal anti-trafficking efforts have expanded political 
opportunities for anti-prostitution activists, who have managed to embed themselves 
in the federal policy process and further reinforce the anti-prostitution status quo. Sex 
worker rights activists critical of the Bush Administration’s approach (or supportive of 
non-criminalizing approaches to prostitution in general), however, are further 
marginalized and branded by abolitionists (see for example Hughes, 2003) as rejecting 
victims’ experiences in prostitution and being tacit accomplices, more broadly, in the 
exploitation of women. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
(1) RESTRICTION ON PROGRAMS- No funds made available to carry out this division, or any 
amendment made by this division, may be used to promote, support, or advocate the legalization or 
practice of prostitution. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed to preclude assistance 
designed to promote the purposes of this Act by ameliorating the suffering of, or health risks to, victims 
while they are being trafficked or after they are out of the situation that resulted from such victims 
being trafficked” 
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Part IV: Political opportunities for prostitutes in California and the San Francisco 
Bay Area 
 
Given the development of state and federal anti-prostitution policies in the neo-liberal 
era, this chapter turns now to consider their actual enforcement at the local level, 
specifically in the San Francisco Bay Area cities of Oakland and San Francisco, where 
CAL-PEP and the SJI, respectively, are located. This consideration is important 
because, as Theodore & Brenner (2002a) write, local areas are increasingly viewed as 
key institutional arenas for a wide range of policy experiments and political strategies. 
Therefore, they advocate for an analysis of neo-liberalism as “actually existing” to 
emphasize its contextual embeddedness insofar as it has been produced within 
historical, national, regional and local contexts. Such a consideration is important 
because the retrenchment of national welfare regimes and national intergovernmental 
systems has imposed new fiscal constraints on cities and their suburbs. Consequently, 
as Hubbard (2004) writes, as urban governors have sought to revitalize cities in face of 
deindustrialization and the flight of high income earners from their cores, cities have 
become institutional laboratories for a variety of neo-liberal experiments such as 
workfare and property redevelopment, but also social control, policing and 
surveillance (Brenner & Theodore, 2002a, 2002b) to remove, in a sense, the 
populations left behind by deindustrialization. Specifically regarding prostitution, as 
Hubbard (2004) writes, the desire to purify urban spaces for capitalist growth has 
meant prostitutes have faced removal from these spaces by local governments aiming 
to attract more “respectable” populations, hence the emergence of punitive policies 
designed to exclude sex workers from gentrifying city centers38.    
                                                
38 One of the most highly publicized examples here (albeit one that was not employed in the Bay Area) 
is the “broken windows” strategy, employed under the Giuliani Administration in New York City. 
Based on the argument that neighborhoods that fail to fix broken windows display a lack of informal 
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Therefore, considering the evolution and implementation of prostitution 
policies through this lens of actually existing neo-liberalism provides a useful frame 
for discussing how prostitution policies have evolved and been enforced in the Bay 
Area. The following pages demonstrate that although the enforcement of prostitution 
laws has fluctuated here with urban redevelopment efforts, changes in the location of 
prostitution, and efforts to end demand for prostitution, even the nation’s supposedly 
most sexually liberal region remains largely hostile to non-criminalizing approaches to 
prostitution. Moreover, these pages demonstrate the despite changes to the state’s 
prostitutions laws, described previously, that aim to make them gender neutral, their 
enforcement has been highly gendered, whereby that women continue to be arrested 
more frequently than men. 
Oakland 
Similar to other regions in the nation, the state of California—and the Bay Area in 
particular-- underwent an economic transition in the 1970s that increased favor for 
neo-liberal politics and policy. Most notably, in 1978 voters in suburban areas such as 
Alameda County (in the Bay Area) grew increasingly hostile to the increases in 
property taxes spent on social services in less wealthy (urban) parts of the region, such 
as Oakland. By taking advantage of the newly built freeways and lower taxes in 
outlying areas in the late 1960s, numerous industries left Oakland, leading to a severe 
economic downturn. With anti-tax sentiment increasing throughout the state, voters 
passed Proposition 13, further limiting the capacity of city governments to raise taxes 
and causing cuts to services and layoffs in many city jobs (Self, 2003b). In the 1980s, 
defense base closings also had a negative impact on the Bay Area, contributing to a 
loss of 12,000 military jobs and 6,000 civilian jobs (Rhomberg, 2004, p.188). Because 
                                                                                                                                       
social control, and thereby unwittingly invite criminals into their midst, the policy was used to justify 
aggressive policing in NYC in 1990s, particularly in Times Square and among poor communities of 
color (Herbert & Brown, 2006). 
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of increasing poverty in the region, participation in the street-based economy—namely 
in the drug and sex trades—increased, and as Bowser and Hill show, crime rates in the 
city exploded: by 1972 Oakland had 28,712 serious crimes (more than double that in 
the past five years), growing to 44,678 by 1983 (Bowser & Hill, 2007, p.133).  
During this time, the policing of street prostitution also increased. According to 
an officer with the Oakland Police Department’s (OPD) vice-squad (Interview, 22 
November 2006), although the vice-squad is “pro-active” about prostitution 
(conducting under-cover operations to arrest prostitutes’ and johns, for example), 
prostitution-related activity by the police has largely been “complaint-driven”, 
meaning the police will respond to complaints from residents about prostitutes 
loitering in front of a business, for example. This has been the case since the late 
1970s when news coverage of the issue focused on how citizens in East and West 
Oakland were beginning to patrol the neighborhoods themselves to remove prostitutes 
from the area, claiming the police would not let prostitutes loiter in the nicer (and 
whiter) areas like Lake Merritt. These complaints lead to a police crackdown on 
prostitution in these areas of Oakland ("City Plans Prostitution Crackdown", 1978; 
Hogan, 1978; , "Ired citizens ask hookers be sent off", 1978) 
Since then, as the following Figure 2.1, “Prostitution Arrests in Oakland, 1980-
2007” illustrates, prostitution arrests in Oakland have fluctuated over time39 (Nance, 
                                                
39 Figures 1 and 2 (below) are based on data obtained from the California State Department of Justice. 
Through it’s Office of the Attorney General website (http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/pubs.php), the State of 
California allows the public to search for various crime data statewide and in specific counties and 
cities. For prostitution, the State collects and publishes here the total reported misdemeanor (CA Penal 
Code Section 647(b)) arrests, noting that these are under-reported, often by 30 percent. This is because 
the state replies on reports from the local police departments, which often only report the arrest as one 
for prostitution if it is the only charge or the most serious charge in an arrest for multiple offences.  
Since the Attorney General’s website only publishes this data back to the 1998, Linda Nance, in the 
Special Request Unit of the state’s Criminal Justice Statistics Center, compiled data for me back to 
1980 (which is as far back as they go) for prostitution arrests in California (statewide), Oakland, and 
San Francisco. This data was also broken down by age, sex, and race/ethnicity. Please note that the 
information was sent to me in a series of charts, and I have compiled it to create Figures 1 and 2. For 
questions about this data, and to request other data, please also contact Linda Nance at 
DOJ.SJSC@doj.ca.gov or 916-227-3509. 
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2009), and, as discussed below, this has mainly been in response to resident and/or re-
development concerns.  
  
Figure 2.1: Prostitution Arrests in Oakland, CA: 1980-2007 
Source: Linda Nance, California State Department of Justice 2009 
As Figure 2.1 demonstrates, prostitution arrests rose from 135 in 1980, to 1,141 in 
1984. Although arrest numbers fluctuated in the following years, between 1985 and 
1995, there were an average of 511 prostitution arrests per year, and these arrests were 
highly gendered: the ratio of females (prostitutes) arrested to males (clients) averaging 
two-to-one (Nance, 2009, see macro tables 1985-1995) 
This increase in arrests in the 1990s is explained in part by the “economic tidal 
wave” in the Bay Area that began in the early 1990s, originating in Silicon Valley and 
affecting all parts of this massive and varied metropolitan area (Kennedy & Leonard, 
2001, p.42). In an effort to attract capital, the region became home to a variety of neo-
liberal experiments such as property redevelopment and policing (Brenner & 
Theodore, 2002a, 2002b). With the War on Poverty long over, local governments in 
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Oakland aimed to revive their inner cores by attracting private investment through a 
combination of incentives and increased policing. Consequently, in Oakland, spending 
on police services increased from $70.28 million on 1986 to $194 million in 2006, 
while the city’s budget for human services (public health, social programs, etc) 
increased from $6.83 million to only $50.9 million in the same time period (City of 
Oakland, 2007, p.1).  
As Figure 2.1 shows, the largest increase in prostitution arrests occurred 
between 1996 and 2000, when efforts to redevelop Oakland by attracting private 
capital were also peaking. To attract developers, Oakland’s downtown core needed to 
be free of street-based populations, and so policing increased. As Figure 2.1, above, 
demonstrates, prostitution arrests in Oakland spiked sharply during this period to an 
average of 1,197 arrests between 1996 and 1999. These arrests were fuelled in part by 
the 1998 election of Edmund Brown, who was elected as mayor on a platform that 
would further this redevelopment agenda through his “10 K Program”, which aspired 
to increase Oakland’s downtown population by 10,000 by bringing people from the 
suburbs (Brookings Institute, 2003, p.47).  
However, the results of these economic development efforts have been mixed. 
According to Oakland’s Community and Economic Development Agency (CEDA, 
2003), Bay Area poverty remains concentrated in Oakland. The city spends 55 percent 
of Alameda County’s assisted housing budget because, according to Rick Edwards 
(Email correspondence, 9 June 2007), an official with the Alameda County Social 
Services Agency, Oakland also has 40 percent of the city’s public assistance cases40. 
Furthermore, although the downtown core acquired a convention center and hotel, 
                                                
40 This includes California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids (CalWORKs, formerly 
AFDC), Refugee Cash Assistance, Food Stamps, Medi-Cal, In-Home Supportive Services, Adoptions, 
Foster Care, Employment Programs, and General Assistance/General Relief, all of which are processed 
by the local county welfare department40. Oakland public schools have been inadequately funded to 
serve the increasingly poor, immigrant and non-white populations in the city. 
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high crime and unemployment rates did not ease private capital’s reluctance to locate 
in the city: Jack London Square, which was meant to be a dining and entertainment 
district, had difficulty attracting investors, and the Oakland Raiders left for LA in the 
1990s, despite the construction of a new coliseum for the team. However, numerous 
condominium developments have arisen in the downtown core, which—while not 
exactly bustling—lacks much of the visible prostitution that existed before the sweeps 
of the 1990s. 
 Consequently, prostitution arrest patterns have changed in recent years: as 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates, prostitution arrests have declined from their peak of 1,338 in 
1997 to a low of 194 in 2008. As the following pages discuss, this can be attributed to 
law enforcement shifting their efforts towards “end demand” initiatives and efforts to 
connect prostitutes to social services. The “end demand” policies seek to suppress 
prostitution through a by-law that allows the police to seize the vehicles of those 
suspected of dealing drugs or soliciting prostitutes from cars (Staff reporter, 2000), 
and the use of billboards to shame men who have solicited prostitutes (Herron-
Zemora, 2005; Staff reporter, 2005). However, according to the OPD vice officer 
(Interview, 22 November 2006), these policies to target johns have not been put into 
practice very often because “they have come under attack as being too punitive and 
are currently being challenged, so the police are not doing this sort of sting” as often. 
Consequently, as Figure 2.1 demonstrates, although the numbers have declined, the 
number of prostitutes (females) arrested continues to out-number those of men.  
The decline in arrests can also be explained by the growing view among the 
OPD that prostitutes are victims: prostitutes are not punished to the full extent of the 
law, and are often connected to programs that help them exit prostitution. The OPD 
vice officer stated (Interview, 22 November 2006) “prostitutes usually don’t serve jail 
time”. Instead, when a prostitute is arrested and then cited for a misdemeanor 
 94 
(meaning she has to appear in court), she will often “plead out” to a lesser charge and 
is given “SOAP”—Stay Out of Area Probation—which is specifically for prostitutes 
and requires them to agree with their parole office that they will stay out of certain 
high prostitution areas. If they violate their SOAP, they can be arrested again for this 
violation. Furthermore, he added that the Oakland police Department has developed 
partnerships with a multi-layered network of advocacy groups that work with women 
experiencing abuse (such as Bay Area Women Against Rape, Scotlan House, and C-
Care,) who they have on call and on site when prostitutes are arrested. According to 
the officer (Interview, 22 November 2006), “the theory here is that immediate 
intervention—especially if it’s a first time arrest—is more likely to be taken [by the 
prostitute] if it’s offered right there on site.” However, in the spirit of neo-liberal 
hyper-punitiveness, it is important to note that access to these services is through 
arrest, with the goal being to help women exit the trade, as opposed to work more 
safely. All of this demonstrates that efforts to suppress prostitution continue in the 
neo-liberal era, even if this no longer done solely by placing prostitutes in jail. 
San Francisco 
With its reputation as a wealthy and progressive city, one might think San Francisco 
has been somewhat immune to these “actually existing” neo-liberal crime and 
economic policy trends: with an annual budget of $6 billion per year and a population 
of only 750,000 (City and County of San Francisco, 2007, p.10), the city exceeds even 
New York City in per capita spending with an annual budget of $59.0 billion and 
population of 8 million (Budget, 2008, p.1). Along with a progressive reputation for 
service provision, San Francisco’s history of gay, lesbian and prostitutes’ rights 
activism has enhanced its reputation as the nation’s most (sexually) liberal city 
(DeLeon, 1992, 2002). And unlike Oakland, whose inner core has long been depleted 
by de-industrialization and increased crime rates, San Francisco has never faced 
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similar pressures to re-develop: property here has always been in demand owing to the 
city’s physical beauty and overall quality of life (Kennedy & Leonard, 2001).  
Indeed, with its liberal, urban political orientation, San Francisco has also 
attempted to implement less punitive approaches to prostitution, but despite this, the 
gendered enforcement of prostitution laws has continued. In 1977, the San Francisco 
Police Department (SFPD) tried a policy of non-enforcement in 1977, which was 
recommended in 1971 by a the San Francisco Crime Commission report suggesting 
discreet, off-street prostitution be permitted so officers could devote time to more 
serious crimes (Leigh, 1996); however, this policy was short-lived. According to a 
long-time vice officer with the SFPD (Interview, 20 July 2006), non-enforcement 
resulted in the streets (especially in the Union Square and Tenderloin areas, where 
many of the hotels and tourists congregate) becoming “packed” with prostitutes, many 
of whom came from outside of the city to work. Seen as an unhappy spectacle by local 
business and residential interests, the non-enforcement policy quickly ended and the 
practice of arresting prostitutes continued, facilitating many questionable police 
practices. As Gloria Lockett, a former San Francisco prostitute and CAL-PEP’s 
current executive director writes (cited in Delacoste & Alexander, 1998), street 
prostitutes were commonly arrested for prostitution merely for carrying condoms, 
which the police often destroyed. In response, COYOTE members spear-headed 
efforts to educate the police, which at least curtailed the practice of destroying 
condoms in the city by the early 1980s. 
As the following pages discuss, since the early 1980s the enforcement of 
prostitution laws in San Francisco has fluctuated with shifts in property and citizen 
concerns, and with shifts in the location of prostitution itself. A long-time vice officer 
with the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) thus characterized the SFPD’s 
approach to prostitution law enforcement as follows:  
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“The role of the police is reactive: they must respond to citizen complaints, criminal 
cases, and resident complaints. They are not urban planners (i.e. placed in certain 
areas to keep things clean). Prostitution is the oldest profession and is not going away, 
but if a legislative body says it’s not legal, it’s not legal, and they (the police) have to 
keep a lid on it” (Interview, 17 April 2009) 
Figure 2.2 “Prostitution Arrests in San Francisco, 1980-2007” demonstrate how 
prostitution arrests in San Francisco have fluctuated over time.  
 
Figure 2: Prostitution Arrests in San Francisco, 1980-2007  
Source: Linda Nance, California State Department of Justice 2009 
As Figure 2.2 illustrates, prostitution arrests in San Francisco peaked by the mid-
1990s when sex workers in San Francisco were targeted by police as threats to public 
safety (and, hence, property values) as community groups complained and demanded a 
larger law enforcement presence. These complaints were fueled largely by property 
concerns in San Francisco where, similar to Oakland, the growth of the technology 
economy in the 1990s increased migration to the city. Soon, homebuyers were coming 
to areas such as the Mission district, known for its ethnic diversity, working-class 
small businesses, affordable rents, and live-work studios for writers and artists 
(Schwarzer, 2001). There was also movement by homebuyers to the Tenderloin, 
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known for its large homeless population, single resident occupancy hotels, and 
proximity to the Union Square tourist and shopping district. Soon residents in these 
areas grew vocal about the presence of street prostitutes, who they claimed were 
bringing drugs, violence and other related crimes with them, while the police did little 
to enforce the law (Popp, 1991)41.  By the end of 1992 these resident concerns inspired 
a four-part series in the San Francisco Chronicle’s First Person section entitled “A 
Neighborhood at War with Prostitution” (Winokur, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1993). And 
although sex worker activists such as Carol Leigh stated that the real issue driving 
street prostitution was female poverty, the response that ensued was more uniformed 
police officers on the streets and the creation of more spaces in the city’s already over-
crowded jails (Winokur, 1992b), culminating in a six-day police crackdown targeting 
street prostitutes, pimps, customers, massage parlors operators, and hotels serving as 
houses of prostitution. The crackdown resulted in over 800 arrests, targeting mainly 
street prostitutes (Strupp, 1994a, p.1).  
However, this crackdown was not a one-time affair: as pressures from property 
owners mounted, prostitution arrests increased in the city. As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, 
in San Francisco prostitution arrests rose in from 1,531 in 1991 to 2,673 arrests in 
1992. And between 1992 and 1998, prostitution arrests peaked at an average of 2,500 
arrests per year. Although this increase in arrests appeared to preclude any alternatives 
to criminalizing prostitution, the city did create the San Francisco Taskforce on 
Prostitution (hereafter referred to as the Taskforce), the first public discussion and 
study of prostitution in San Francisco where sex workers were fully included in the 
process. Although the Taskforce will be discussed in more detail in subsequent 
                                                
41 The DA’s office and the police responded with a “mapping” plan that would attempt to ban 
prostitutes from loitering in areas where arrests were regularly made between 9 pm and 3 am, but this 
was not without protest from activist sex workers who protested at City Hall, claiming this would be an 
unconstitutional restriction on mobility rights, and not solve street prostitution but simply push it to 
other areas (Ganahl, 1992; Hoover, 1992) 
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chapters, its major recommendation was that prostitution laws were ineffective for 
meeting sex workers health and safety needs, or for ensuring community safety. It 
ultimately recommended that, similar to 1977, prostitution be removed from the 
purview of the criminal laws in the city by making it a low enforcement priority.  
To date this recommendation has never been implemented officially, but as 
Figure 2.2 shows, prostitution arrests in the city have decreased from 1,729 in 1999 to 
804 in 2006. This decline has not been due to the eradication of prostitution, but to the 
changing location of prostitution in the city. To explain, the SFPD vice officer stated 
(Interview, 19 April 2009) “Overall, prostitution arrests are like a balloon: wherever 
prostitution is pushed, it will come out elsewhere.” As a result, in San Francisco, the 
decline in prostitution arrests is due largely to the fact that prostitutes have either 
moved their operations elsewhere, or made them more discreet: “Lately, that’s in 
residential areas and on the internet” (SFPD vice officer, Interview, 19 April 2009).  
Regarding the internet, the vice officer explained that “since the mid-1990s 
there has been a paradigm shift in the sex industry from the streets to cell phones and 
craigslist [the free online market place: craigslist.org]” (Interview, 19 April 2009) as 
relatively inexpensive access to cell phones and the internet have made it easier for 
many sex workers (and pimps and johns) to conceal their operations: 
 
“As a result, now a pimp can be standing there, texting about a deal, and there is 
nothing the cops can do, unless there is an under-age girl around and they can check 
on her, but if not, he’s getting away with pimping.” (Interview, SFPD vice officer, 19 
April 2009) 
And regarding residential prostitution, the vice officer stated (Interview, 19 April 
2009) 
“it’s boomed, and why not? There is privacy, they don’t need a permit like in a 
massage parlor. This is a great way to do business… until someone goes to the wrong 
door and the residents call the police because they don’t like guys driving around the 
neighborhoods, looking for parking, and getting the address wrong: then citizens 
complain.” 
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She went on to describe how, in one recent example, a “fitness center” opened up 
across from an elementary school in San Francisco. It only had three treadmills and an 
exercise ball, but it had a $6,000 shower and six massage rooms. To neighboring 
parents “it became clear what this place was for, [and] they [parents] went crazy.” 
(Interview, SFPD Vice officer, 19 April 2009), leading the SFPD to investigate the 
property (the officer did not share with me the outcome of the investigation, except to 
say that the fitness center was actually a massage parlor). 
As arrests have declined, due largely to the shifting location of prostitution in 
San Francisco to less visible locations, police practices (and attitudes) towards 
prostitutes have also changed in many ways. Today, many police SFPD officers 
consider prostitutes victims, but, like in Oakland, assistance is only granted through 
contact with the criminal justice system. To illustrate the SFPD vice officer 
(Interview, 25 October 2006) described the “Crimes Against Prostitutes Program” 
(CAPP), which was implemented in 2001 to acknowledge that, “while someone can be 
a criminal, they can still be a victim”. The officer noted further that the SFPD started 
the program “so people in the sex industry know the police will help them, and …that 
their job is to protect and serve everyone, including prostitutes.” CAPP works as 
follows: when an individual is a victim of a crime, he or she calls 911 and “the officer 
will come and a take a report like she or he would for anyone else” (Interview, SFPD 
vice officer, 25 October 2006). However, the officer noted, sometimes the officer will 
pass the report to vice to look into the case because the officer “can tell” or “knows the 
person previously” as a prostitute. The report will be investigated by a vice cop who 
knows the prostitute community and its issues.  
According to the vice officer (Interview, 25 October 2006) “The girls and cops 
usually know each other.” And, at least anecdotally, the relationship between street 
prostitutes and the police in San Francisco has improved through programs like CAPP. 
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According to Jennifer (Interview, 23 October 2006), a long-time street-based sex 
worker in her thirties who has worked throughout the United States and claims to have 
been arrested 188 times, “the cops are good here [in San Francisco].”  She went on to 
note that while she had one bad experience with an SFPD officer (who handcuffed her 
to the gear shift), for the most part “they [prostitutes and the police] know each other” 
(Interview, 23 October 2006). She described one SFPD officer as “ her best friend”—
they would chat about their lives, and when he arrested her, he would take her to the 
station, note she was there, and then drive her back to her stroll. Yet despite these 
experiences, the fact remains that even in San Francisco prostitution is not considered 
a legitimate occupational choice. Instead, law enforcement has primary jurisdiction 
over prostitution, even as arrests fluctuate. 
Actually existing political opportunities  
Neo-liberal trends towards hyper-punitiveness (particularly towards sex workers) in 
the Bay Area have reinforced anti-prostitution sentiments and increased political 
opportunities for COYOTE’s daughters opposing prostitution. SAGE, mentioned 
above and in the previous chapter, has played a key role in shaping policy approaches 
to prostitution in the city42. According to Lane Kasselmann (Interview, 22 November 
2007), a representative from the San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom’s office and 
point person on sex work policy issues, the mayor’s office meets with sex worker 
activists on a regular basis, including representatives from sex worker rights 
organizations like SWOP. His office “deals with them like they do any other interest 
group” and “ will sit down and work with and listen to them”. However, according to 
Kasselman, they work with SAGE on everything, and Norma Hotaling is a good friend 
                                                
42 As noted previously, SAGE was founded by the late Norma Hotaling, a former prostitute, substance 
user and member of COYOTE and CAL-PEP. Similar to CAL-PEP and the SJI, SAGE is run in large 
part by (former) sex workers and offers health and social services to men, women and transgendered 
persons; however, unlike these two organizations, SAGE does not view prostitution as a form of work, 
but as a form of commercial sexual exploitation. 
 101 
of the mayor’s. In the eyes of his office, “SAGE does ‘God’s work’ and is setting the 
bar internationally and across the country.” 
 Adherence to the view of prostitution as a victimizing-yet-criminal activity has 
provided SAGE with opportunities to influence prostitution policy in the city, and this 
is apparent in two of SAGE’s most recent initiatives. The first example is an effort to 
“end demand” for prostitution. Through collaboration with the San Francisco District 
Attorney's Office, SAGE developed the First Offender Prostitution Program (hereafter 
referred to as First Offender) in March 1995. First Offender treats individuals (mainly 
women) arrested for prostitution as victims by providing them with the option to work 
with SAGE (in lieu of jail time). If they choose to do this, they are given in-custody 
and out-of-custody assessments, referrals, peer support, rehabilitation, vocational 
training, and case management (for women trying to exit prostitution). With 
SAGE/First Offender, they also have access to individual case management, groups, 
legal advocacy, and referrals to a variety of health, education, legal, housing, and 
trauma and substance abuse recovery resources.  
However, unlike past efforts that mainly target prostitutes, First Offender also 
targets their clients (“johns”, who are mostly male) arrested for prostitution. With First 
Offender, Johns are given the option to attend “Johns’ school”, a program first 
developed by Swedish conservative legislators and feminists in the 1980s in an effort 
to equally enforce prostitution laws and treat women as victims, not criminals. For 
those opposed to prostitution, end demand programs are considered a progressive 
approach to prostitution-policy-as-usual because they penalize and stigmatize johns, 
not prostitutes. But as the following brief discussion illustrates, end demand programs 
like First Offender only reinforce the status quo—namely that prostitution is not a 
legitimate economic choice made by willing agents, but an immoral, criminal activity.  
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In San Francisco, the district attorney’s (DA) office oversees the First 
Offender, in conjunction with SAGE. According to an assistant DA (Interview, 25 
October, 2006), johns can be entered into the First Offender when they are arrested for 
solicitation and receive a citation. If the john has no previous arrest or conviction, he 
receives a letter offering him the option to do the First Offender in lieu of a conviction 
for solicitation (Section 647(b) of the Penal Code, described above). Willing 
participants must pay a $1,000 fee to attend the eight-hour First Offender class (which 
runs every second month for 25-30 participants), where they listen to speeches by the 
assistant DA on the legal ramifications of prostitution arrests; the health department, 
which shows graphic pictures of STIs; and then a panel of ex- prostitutes (from 
SAGE), who share their own stories, which are often vitriolic towards johns. This is 
quite different from the diversion program offered to arrested prostitutes, described 
above, which can last for weeks. 
According to the DA’s representative (Interview, 25 October, 2006), the johns’ 
school is positive for a number of reasons. First, it is a way to “start thinking outside 
of the box with prostitution” by improving the lives of those arrested because of their 
contact with the criminal justice system. Here, instead of simply punishing johns by 
sending them to jail, the First Offender can “break the cycle of prostitution by making 
people stop and think about what they are doing” (Interview, 25 October 2006). As a 
result, according to two long-time vice officers with the SFPD, First Offender has 
decreased the inequities in prostitution arrests. As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, SFPD 
officers have arrested more johns: the number of males arrested even exceeded that of 
females between 1996 and 200443(Interview, 12 February 2007). Second, as the DA’s 
representative noted (Interview, 25 October 2006), the First Offender raises money for 
                                                
43 Since its establishment, dozens of other jurisdictions in the United States, Canada, and Europe have 
replicated or are exploring replicating First Offender. 
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services for sex workers: approximately $180,000 is raised per year from participant 
fees, but they are directed to SAGE, not programs like the SJI that do not encourage 
sex workers to exit prostitution. 
Since SAGE and its First Offender program have been rewarded for their 
efforts, it is clear that political opportunities favor those opposing prostitution. The 
First Offender made SAGE the only San Francisco nonprofit to win the Innovations in 
Government Award from the Ford Foundation, Harvard’s JFK School of Government, 
and the Council for Excellence in Government in 1998. All of this is despite the fact 
that, as a closer analysis of the First Offender reveals, it has been developed, promoted 
and extensively funded with little new results. First, there is no proof that johns’ 
schools end demand for prostitution. While there is low rate of second arrests among 
johns who have participated in the program, even representatives from the DA’s office 
(Interview, 25 October 2006) and the SFPD (Interview, 25 October 2005) concede that 
this could mean the men seek out prostitution elsewhere, in more discreet locations. 
And second, because they are developed in tandem with heightened policing of 
neighborhoods where street-based sex workers reside and work, First Offender often 
targets street prostitutes more intensely than those working indoors. Moreover, 
increased numbers of police stings often pressure street prostitutes to work more 
quickly, in more secluded locations, and provide unprotected sex. From this 
perspective, then, First Offender is not revolutionary; instead, it merely reinforces the 
moral status quo and further marginalizes and stigmatizes prostitutes and johns. 
The second example of how SAGE has capitalized on political opportunities 
created by the broader anti-prostitution context is through their anti-trafficking efforts 
in San Francisco. According to Kasselman (Interview, 22 November 2007), the mayor 
has taken a very aggressive stance on trafficking issues because the federal 
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Department of Justice (DOJ) ranked San Francisco one of the top five ports of entry 
for trafficked victims (however, he admits that the exact numbers are hard to know, 
especially since many move on beyond San Francisco). Specifically, trafficking 
became a key issue for the Mayor’s office in 2005 when, as noted previously, federal 
interest in trafficking and prostitution was at a very high level.  
At this time, San Francisco was part of Operation Gilded Cage, “a federal 
investigation of alleged sex trafficking, harboring of illegal aliens, conspiracy to 
transport female Korean nationals across state lines with intent to engage in 
prostitution, and money laundering by individuals involved in the massage parlor 
industry”44 (Macaulay, 2005, p.1). In San Francisco, Gilded Cage raided 11 suspected 
brothels and arrested 27 suspects in what was described as a major Bay Area sex 
trafficking operation that preyed on Korean women brought into the country illegally. 
In a series of searches, investigators said they found more than 100 women working as 
prostitutes at ten San Francisco massage parlors and one in Emeryville (VanDerbeken 
& Kim, 2005, p.A1)45. While much of the evidence from this operation is currently 
under federal protective custody, it “made it clear that a lot of the sex in the city’s 
notorious massage parlors was not consensual”46 (May, 2006, p.A1). 
The city’s response to trafficking was to increase surveillance of the city’s 200 
massage parlors through a multi-agency inspection team. According to Kasselman, 
                                                
44 Gilded Cage involved the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California the U.S. 
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division,, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), San Francisco Police Department, Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), and the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service. 
45 At the same time in Southern California, local and federal agents conducted a similar operation that 
resulted in 18 arrests of people believed to be involved in smuggling hundreds of South Korean women 
into the United States to work as prostitutes. Agents there also took 46 women into custody when they 
were found working in suspected brothels in Santa Monica, the Koreatown area of Los Angeles and 
Redondo Beach (VanDerbeken & Kim, 2005) 
46 Since the federal raid, just one of the alleged sex parlors targeted in Gilded Cage has been shut down 
by the city. Golden Dragon Spa was ordered to surrender its massage permit on Aug. 31, after a city 
administrative judge deemed the business a nuisance and house of prostitution. Two others targeted in 
the federal raid closed when their buildings were sold (May, 2006) 
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this team consists of fire inspection, inspectors from the Department of Public 
Health’s environmental division, the police department’s vice division, and non-
governmental organizations, most notably SAGE. This team goes to the massage 
parlors to look for particular code violations (e.g. fire code), and can also “bust” for 
prostitution, while using SAGE to see if the women working there are trafficked. If 
any team member suspects the women in the parlors of victims of trafficking, SAGE 
will talk to the alleged victims and inform them of their legal options and services they 
offer. Kasselman noted further that women in the massage parlors are not arrested 
initially because in San Francisco they consider them victims, and there are many 
programs to help them with rehabilitation and find legitimate ways to move forward; 
however, even though they are considered victims, cooperation with law enforcement 
facilitates access to services. In no way are the women considered agents who might 
have made a conscious choice to enter this line of work to escape poverty or other 
hardships47. Moreover, their only option is to work with SAGE. Indeed, this local 
approach again illustrates how, in the neo-liberal era, punitive approaches to 
trafficking and prostitution predominate, thereby enhancing political opportunities for 
groups supporting them. 
Conclusion: Prostitution policy and political opportunities 
Engaging with the literature on the political opportunity structure, this chapter has 
considered how efforts to suppress prostitution have long-shaped the context in which 
sex workers (and COYOTE’s daughters in particular) work and act politically. Despite 
the neo-liberal emphasis on minimal governmental intervention in society and the 
economy, these suppressive efforts have persisted despite their inefficacy and costs to 
                                                
47 An officer with the SFPD vice division (Interview, 12 February 2007) who has worked extensively 
on the trafficking issue noted that they had tried to work with the SJI on the trafficking issue (for 
example, by asking the SJI to distribute the police department’s trafficking awareness materials they 
hand out when doing inspections), but the SJI has not returned their calls. 
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all levels of government. At the same time, these suppression efforts are entirely 
consistent with the neo-liberal emphasis on controlling and monitoring populations 
that deviate from market norms through techniques of (criminal) surveillance (as 
opposed to social service provision), and they are visible even in the nation’s most 
sexually liberal region, the San Francisco Bay Area. 
 Anti-prostitution sentiments have also limited political opportunities for groups 
opposing the criminalization of prostitution. The recent example of Proposition K (in 
2008) demonstrates these limitations. Since prostitution is illegal under state law, local 
governments cannot decriminalize or regulate prostitution out-right; they can, 
however, pass measures to make enforcement a low priority for the police. Therefore, 
in 2008, SWOP (and a number of other organizations) spearheaded Proposition K, 
which would have barred San Francisco police officers from arresting or investigating 
or prosecuting anyone for selling sex. Advocates (YesOnPropK.org, 2009) claimed 
this would free up $11 million per year in police resources and allow prostitutes to 
form collectives and defend their rights as workers.  
However, despite waging a coherent and aggressive campaign, advocates of 
Proposition K were not able to overcome anti-prostitution sentiments in the region. 
Drawing on long-standing discourses of victimization, and appealing to neo-liberal 
dictates of private property protection, Mayor Newsom and District Attorney Kamala 
Harris (backed by organizations like SAGE, which would likely lose funding from its 
First Offender program if Proposition K were to pass) waged a strong campaign 
countering Proposition K by stating it would remove the ability of law enforcement to 
curb human trafficking and provide services for victims. Claiming "We can not give a 
green light or a pass to predators of young women," (Harris, cited on NBC News, 
2008), Harris said prostitution often accompanies drug crime, violence and quality of 
life in neighborhoods such as the Tenderloin. And speaking to the concerns of 
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property owners, particularly those in the Tenderloin (where they addressed the 
media), Newsom echoed Harris' comments, stating "If Prop K passes, can you imagine 
living here?" he asked, motioning to the surrounding Tenderloin streets. "This is 
serious business," he said. "We're trying to clean up the Tenderloin" (Newsom, cited 
on NBC News, 2008). Demonstrating the resonance of these arguments—but also that 
such sentiments are not universal-- Proposition K received only 41% of the vote.  
Indeed, the failure of Proposition K provides a striking example of how neo-
liberal politics and efforts to suppress prostitution have combined to shape the political 
opportunity structure in which prostitutes work and act politically by creating a 
political climate hostile to prostitutes’ rights’ activism. At the same time, neo-liberal 
politics have also created political opportunities for sex workers in the non-profit 
sector as health and social service providers. For prostitutes, CAL-PEP and the SJI’s 
provision of peer-led health and social services to sex workers, by sex workers, is an 
example of such service provision, arguably challenging popular (political and social) 
conceptions of prostitutes as victims and criminals that have been reinforced through 
decades of law and policy. But how much of a challenge can CAL-PEP and the SJI 
wage here, i.e. can they truly advocate for prostitutes’ rights? The following chapters 
consider explicitly how CAL-PEP and the SJI might make such a challenge. 
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CHAPTER 3 
OR WE’D BE NEXT: SEX WORKERS, INNOVATION AND 
COMPROMISE IN THE FLIGHT AGAINST HIV/AIDS 
This chapter tells the story of the California Prevention and Education Project (CAL-
PEP), the nonprofit HIV/AIDS service organization developed in 1984, in San 
Francisco, by sex workers involved in Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics (COYOTE), 
America’s first prostitutes’ rights organization48. As such, CAL-PEP represents a case 
of the transition by activists from protest to nonprofit service provision in the neo-
liberal era, characterized by (among other developments) the devolution of 
government responsibility for social welfare onto a network of private, nonprofit 
service providers49. All of this raises questions whether the more radical, oppositional 
agendas of these activists has been eclipsed by their service provision duties, 
especially as their organization has grown more dependent on the state. 
Although many scholars (most notably Piven & Cloward, 1977) have noted 
that the creation of formal organizations by activists leads them to focus on 
organizational maintenance at the expense of broader advocacy efforts, six months of 
fieldwork with CAL-PEP involving interviews with their staff, clients, local 
government officials and archival research reveals the story is much more complex. 
This chapter demonstrates that within a political opportunity structure where neo-
                                                
48 Similar to previous chapters, I will use the term “prostitute/prostitution” interchangeably with the 
broader term “sex work”. The latter term refers to the exchange of commercial sexual services for 
material compensation and covers a wide range of activities—some of which are legal in the United 
States—such as dancing, pornography and phone sex. While these legal forms of sex work are certainly 
of interest to me, I am mainly interested in organizational efforts around prostitution, which is illegal in 
most of the United States. As well, the term “client” will be used to refer to those sex workers (mainly 
prostitutes) who use CAL-PEP’s services; it does not, unless specified, refer to the sex workers’ own 
paying clients. 
49 As noted in previous chapters, feminist activists who formed women’s health clinics and gay men and 
women who formed organizations such as Gay Men’s Health Crisis provide comparable examples of 
this transition.  
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liberal politics and efforts to suppress prostitution are predominant, CAL-PEP has 
managed to maintain a commitment to the political struggle from which it was born 
internally, through “radical institutionalization”. Here, prostitutes using CAL-PEP’s 
services are regarded as agents, not victims in need of rescue. Furthermore, despite 
historically being blamed for the spread of HIV/AIDS, sex workers (along with other 
street-based populations) also deliver CAL-PEP’s education and prevention services. 
As this chapter will show, CAL-PEP is able to engage in radical institutionalization 
because the localized nature of HIV/AIDS prevention programming in the United 
States has facilitated the development of programs that meet community needs, and 
because of the professional capacity in which CAL-PEP involves sex workers and 
other street-based populations in their organization.  
However, CAL-PEP’s capacity to engage in advocacy for sex worker rights 
externally, in the broader political realm, is variously restricted by their encounters 
with two vectors of political constraint introduced in Chapter 1: section 501c3 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and granting agreements that require them to prioritize 
data collection and other administrative duties in order to maintain service provision. 
Yet these constraints have not silenced CAL-PEP altogether: the organization has 
employed various strategies to promote prostitutes’ rights, albeit in the highly 
contested realm of nonprofit HIV/AIDS service provision as opposed to the broader 
legislative arena. All of this demonstrates that while the location and focus of their 
advocacy efforts may shift, service provision by activists need not preclude expressing 
a commitment to more radical goals.  
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Part I. Prostitutes respond to HIV/AIDS in the 1980s: the founding and growth of a 
grassroots organization 
 
CAL-PEP was born of the San Francisco-based activist organization Call Off Your 
Old Tired Ethics (COYOTE), in 1984, by Gloria Lockett, a former prostitute and 
CAL-PEP’s current executive director. Prior to this, Lockett (Interview, 18 July 2006) 
who never finished high school, worked for most of her adult life as a prostitute with a 
group of women in hotels, bars and apartments throughout California, Alaska and 
Nevada. Although she and her co-workers knew their activities were deemed socially 
unacceptable and illegal, they continued to support each other as they moved from 
place to place, pooled their money, raised five children together, and ran other 
businesses including a boutique and wig shop. While Lockett was arrested “hundreds 
of times” on prostitution charges, in 1978 she and her co-workers were arrested for 
prostitution and conspiracy to promote prostitution, the latter of which brought a 
potential felony conviction50. After a year in court, they were found guilty of only 
being in a house of prostitution, for which she and her co-workers served six months 
probation. However, as Lockett discusses (1994, p. 208), the police were angry with 
this outcome and “so they stayed after us”, and in 1982, Lockett and Ralph 
Washington (the alleged pimp in the prostitution ring) were arrested again and charged 
with “every felony there was”. Lockett’s bail was set at $500,000 (Lockett, 1994, 
p.208).  
Lockett knew they needed support for this case: she had heard of Margo St. 
James, COYOTE’s founder, and liked her because she was the only person Lockett 
knew of who spoke positively of prostitution and did not refer to it as a crime or form 
                                                
50 A felony conviction would mean they would have to serve time in prison, as opposed to simply 
paying a fine or completing probation, which a basic prostitution charge (a misdemeanor) usually 
incurrs. 
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of victimization (Interview, Gloria Lockett, 16 October 2006). She contacted St. 
James, who went to court with them every day. Lockett won her case51, and 
Washington was sentenced to 20 years in prison for 12 counts of prostitution-related 
charges, but on appeal was released in 1986 ("United States of America v. Ralph H. 
Washington", 1984)52. In the meantime, Lockett and the women she worked with lost 
nearly everything they had (Lockett, 1994). And so following the trial, Lockett joined 
COYOTE, likening it to voting as “something she could do to make a difference” 
(Interview,18 July 2006). As well, she saw that COYOTE’s membership was 
primarily comprised of white call girls, who, unlike women of color, were less likely 
to be working on the streets and be targeted by law enforcement officials.  
The advent of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the early 1980s instigated a shift by 
COYOTE activists into AIDS service provision. As noted in previous chapters, this 
opportunity arose because AIDS decreased support for the fledgling prostitutes’ rights 
movement, and like other stigmatized communities (such as gay men), COYOTE 
activists knew mainstream health authorities would be slow to respond to their health 
and safety needs. As Lockett stated,  
 
“in the very near future, prostitutes would be scapegoated for AIDS. At the time, all 
the attention was on gay men. [But] anyone with any sense whatsoever knew that 
[since the disease] was sexually transmitted… the next group of people they would 
target would be prostitutes” (Interview, Gloria Lockett, 18 July 2006; Lockett, 1994, 
p.209).  
                                                
51 In the state of California, case decisions (and, hence, names) are only kept on record if they proceed 
to the appeal courts.  
52 The decision provides a summary of preceding events as follows: “Appellant Ralph H. Washington 
appeals his conviction on twelve different counts, all of which are grounded in alleged prostitution 
activities. The essence of the government's case is that for fifteen years Washington was the "kingpin" 
of a prostitution ring that operated principally in Northern California and extended into Alaska, 
Arizona, Nevada, Texas, and Utah. The prosecution maintains that, except for very small amounts of 
money paid to the prostitutes for incidental expenses, all prostitution earnings were delivered to 
Washington, to his bank accounts, or to his nominees. During 1976-1978, Washington filed federal tax 
returns claiming about $50,000 in gross income when evidence indicated that he had a gross income 
from prostitution amounting to between $250,000 and $300,000 per year. Under the government's 
theory of the case, Washington laundered the prostitution money by acquiring $1,000,000 in assets, 
including retail businesses, rental property, a Rolls Royce and a $350,000 residence.”("United States of 
America v. Ralph H. Washington", 1984, p.1) 
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With over 15 years experience challenging the public’s perceptions of prostitutes, 
COYOTE therefore began its own HIV prevention efforts. Although they did not have 
much money, COYOTE volunteers began to hand out condoms, informational fliers 
about HIV/AIDS and held discussion groups to inform sex workers about the virus 
(Stoller, 1998).  
Initially, COYOTE expected their grassroots health service efforts would be a 
one-time affair, but two developments provided opportunities for COYOTE’s 
membership to remain involved in HIV/AIDS service provision. The first was the 
devolution of AIDS service provision by health authorities to local, community-based 
organizations. As noted in previous chapters, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
began to understand that including community-based organizations (CBO) in 
HIV/AIDS prevention efforts encouraged behavior change between the risk group and 
the prevention organization, offered flexibility and new ideas for delivering 
information and services to persons with HIV, and brought unaddressed problems to 
public attention (Berry & Arons, 2003; Salamon, 2003). And, as indirect measures 
seemed to indicate, these community-based efforts were beginning to successfully 
discourage unsafe sexual behaviors (M. Bailey, 1991; Wolitski, 2006).  
Second, the very stigmatization of prostitutes COYOTE fought against became 
an opportunity for them to engage in health service provision when health authorities’ 
suspected that prostitutes were potential transmitters of HIV/AIDS. Initially, funding 
for research, community outreach and other AIDS-related services for women was 
very limited because women were not yet considered a vulnerable risk group. But 
since prostitutes had long been considered at higher risk for STIs by governmental and 
public health officials alike, when HIV was discovered, questions arose at the CDC 
about whether prostitutes (but not necessarily the men purchasing their services) were 
a potential source of transmission (Alexander, Decario, & Hsu, 1996). Fuelled by 
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media reports that prostitutes were spreading this virus, public concern also increased 
that female prostitutes would bring HIV to the general population, representing the 
popular, familiar pattern of scape-goating prostitutes for the spread of STIs (J. Cohen 
& Alexander, 1995; J. Cohen, Derish, & Dorfman, 1994). Consequently, the first 
federal research money available to study women and AIDS was announced in 1985 
by the CDC to study HIV infection rates among female prostitutes in the United States 
(Darrow, 1990, p.22). Universities and local health departments applied, and the 
selected grantees were from Miami, Florida; Los Angeles and San Francisco, 
California; Newark, Jersey City and Patterson, New Jersey; Atlanta, Georgia; 
Colorado Springs, Colorado; and Las Vegas, Nevada (CDC, 1987), and data collection 
commenced in May 198653.  
At the San Francisco site, Dr. Judith Cohen (who led this site study through the 
Association for Women’s AIDS Research and Education, known as Project AWARE) 
and her colleagues teamed up with COYOTE in 1984, which, as noted above, was 
already working to decrease the scape-goating of prostitutes for HIV/AIDS. A key part 
of their strategy was to hire three sex workers from COYOTE’s active membership 
and train them about HIV/AIDS transmission and risk reduction, and also certify them 
as phlebotomists (J. Cohen, Derish, & Dorfman, 1994). Along with Gloria Lockett, the 
others hired were Priscilla Alexander, a white woman and ally of sex worker activists 
with excellent writing skills, and Sharon Kaiser, a white social worker with a history 
of sex work. They named their team the California Prostitutes Education Project 
(CAL-PEP’s original moniker). As Nancy Stoller (1998) states in her work about 
                                                
53 At these sites, any woman 18 years of age who reported engaging in prostitution at least once since 
January 1978 was eligible. Women were recruited from a variety of settings (streets, detention centers, 
clinics, call girl networks, etc), but “[n]o attempt was made to obtain a representative sample because 
there was no way such a sample could be drawn” (Darrow, 1990, p.23). The 1,829 women who 
participated provided blood sample, underwent a physical examination, filled out a sheet collecting 
socio-demographic information, and answered extensive questions about their sexual histories and 
practices. Compensation for participation varied by site (Darrow, 1990). 
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CAL-PEP’s development and management of a stigmatized identity, these women 
(and COYOTE more generally) were multi-cultural, knew street culture, had been to 
jail and overall knew a lot about the communities the CDC (and health departments) 
wanted to reach. And so the AIDS establishment considered them gatekeepers to the 
local prostitute population. 
From its inception, CAL-PEP’s service repertoire reflected COYOTE’s radical 
view that prostitutes were safest and healthiest when they were not criminalized, 
moralized or judged. Therefore, Project AWARE’s intervention, in partnership with 
CAL-PEP, did not seek to “rescue” women from prostitution in order to help them 
prevent HIV, but bring health services to them based on their knowledge that sex 
workers would be reluctant to respond to public health authorities and would more 
readily accept HIV education from their peers. And since they knew many sex 
workers they targeted would not be able to afford these health services otherwise, they 
therefore offered the services in exchange for ongoing participation in the study 
(Dorfman, 1992). And so through Project AWARE CAL-PEP workers visited strolls, 
single-resident occupancy hotels, and other areas where prostitutes were known to 
congregate, two to four days per week, usually in the late afternoon or evening. In 
these places, CAL-PEP workers would deliver a variety of educational messages 
concerning AIDS risk reduction (condom use, for example) and other issues of sex 
worker health and safety, along with free condoms and bleach kits. Sex workers 
participating in the study received 10 dollars at the beginning and 10 dollars after they 
received their test results (usually four to six weeks later). Physical examinations and 
interviews took place in rented hotel rooms or in a van outfitted for these purposes. 
One hotel room was always dedicated to interactive education sessions: here, a VCR 
continuously showed HIV education videos, and food and drinks were always served. 
As well, participants could take the “Hot and Sexy Safe Sex Quiz”, where an entry 
 115 
form at the bottom could be filled out to enter a raffle for a draw for $100 (first prize) 
and 100 condoms (second prize).  
In the end, Project AWARE found that due to distrust of public health or other 
officials who might be associated with government or law enforcement, persons 
indigenous to the community studied (i.e. prostitutes) were able to gain access more 
readily to other sex workers, establish a rapport, and became role models for positive 
behavior change 54 (Dorfman, 1992, p.38). These findings contributed to the CDC’s 
broader finding that, like other populations considered at risk, sex workers themselves 
were the most successful at recruiting their peers for HIV/AIDS testing and education, 
thereby providing the CDC with access to valuable information about an otherwise 
hard-to-reach population.  
Although the partnership between COYOTE/CAL-PEP and Project AWARE 
was meant to be a temporary arrangement, the continuation of the AIDS epidemic and 
incentives created by health authorities for local, community-based organizations 
made permanent the shift for many COYOTE members from activism to HIV/AIDS 
service provision. Grants were increasingly available for local, community-based HIV 
prevention work, the first of which was a grant of $30,000 from the California State 
Office of AIDS in 1985, which funded CAL-PEP to conduct outreach in San 
Francisco’s Tenderloin neighborhood, distributing condoms and information about 
HIV/AIDS to street-based sex workers. However, even in sexually liberal San 
Francisco, local socio-political conditions were not immediately favorable to CAL-
                                                
54 Overall, the San Francisco site study (as well as others) contributed to the CDC study’s broader 
finding that HIV/AIDS infection rates for prostitutes were lower than for other risk groups. Among 
infected prostitutes, two major sources of HIV were identified: unprotected sex with a boyfriend or 
husband (who she was less likely to use a condom with than a client); and intravenous drug use (IDU). 
Overall, though, IDU was the major risk factor: HIV/AIDS infection in non-drug using prostitutes was 
either low or absent. Instead, prostitutes who admitted to using IV drugs, and those who had ongoing 
relationships with male IDUs were far more likely to be infected with HIV/AIDS (J. Cohen, 1989; J. 
Cohen & Alexander, 1995; Darrow, 1990). 
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PEP’s work. CAL-PEP soon discovered that the police would arrest and harass 
women on the streets for merely having condoms in their possession. COYOTE/CAL-
PEP obtained an order that prohibited the police from confiscating or damaging 
condoms, and also from charging women on the streets for holding drug paraphernalia 
if they were found to have bleach or water (Delacoste & Alexander, 1998; Lockett, 
1994). Despite these initial challenges, CAL-PEP continued to adapt to their local 
environment and develop innovative programs, such as support groups for sex 
workers, safe sex work shops, information and education programs in the jails, a safe 
sex quiz contest and a speaker’s bureau, which would, for example, work with the 
AIDS Training Center in San Francisco to train community health outreach workers to 
be sensitive to sex worker concerns (CAL-PEP, 1989; Lockett, 1994). 
In order to capitalize on funds the CDC made available (often through other 
government agencies) for HIV prevention and education, in 1987 CAL-PEP 
incorporated as a nonprofit organization under section 501c3 of the IRC, and thus 
became a separate legal entity from COYOTE. However, CAL-PEP maintained a 
strong link to their COYOTE roots initially by staffing their board with sex workers 
and through their philosophy to not moralize or judge women for their participation in 
prostitution but to help them “protect themselves, their partners and their clients from 
contracting AIDS” 55(CAL-PEP, 1989, p.1). 
 CAL-PEP’s nonprofit status was beneficial from a service perspective because 
it allowed them to capitalize on more government funds, which in turn gave them the 
capacity to expand their HIV prevention activities in the prostitute community. For 
example, as CAL-PEP spent more time on the streets, they found they were serving 
three types of sex workers: those who used crack and used prostitution to support their 
                                                
55 By 1988, CAL-PEP was the recipient of grants from the California Department of Health Services, 
followed by grants from the CDC and National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) that same year. 
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addiction; career prostitutes, who had been out on the streets for numerous years for 
variety of reasons; and prostitutes who were IDUs. The IDUs were the hardest to reach 
because they often did not leave the areas close to the source of their drugs. Realizing 
these women would not come to the CAL-PEP offices for the safe sex education 
classes, CAL-PEP knew they would have to find a more effective way to reach them. 
Lockett decided they would use an outreach van, which they were able to fund due to 
their charitable nonprofit status with a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation (most federal agencies would not fund such an activity at the time), and 
take it to areas of San Francisco such as the Tenderloin and Mission and 16th Streets, 
which had high concentrations of street-based sex workers, many of whom were IDUs 
56 (Interview, Gloria Lockett, 16 October 2006).  
At the same time, similar to the women’s health clinics and Gay Men’s Health 
Crisis, CAL-PEP’s growth as a nonprofit service organization led them to focus more 
on maintaining service provision at the expense of prostitutes’ rights advocacy. Many 
COYOTE members, as CAL-PEP staff, were over-worked and had less time for 
COYOTE-oriented prostitutes’ rights activities, especially as CAL-PEP’s grants were 
increasingly specified for AIDS prevention activities. COYOTE/CAL-PEP members 
attended national and international AIDS meetings, and only when there was time (or 
a stopover on a plane ticket) would they pursue COYOTE’s agenda as well (Stoller, 
1998). By 1991, CAL-PEP had only one COYOTE activist on its board, and by 1992 
there were none, as many of its members moved onto other pursuits often related to 
prostitution and HIV/AIDS prevention. All of this led Stoller (1998, pp.89-90) to 
                                                
56 Of course, CAL-PEP’s growth was not without some pains: CAL-PEP came under fire when reports 
showed Ralph Washington, CAL-PEP’s chairman of the board (who was also at one time involved with 
Lockett’s prostitution ring), was convicted of tax evasion and spent time in prison. Although audits by 
the state Department of Health Services and the IRS showed CAL-PEP itself did nothing illegal, 
Washington was forced to resign or CAL-PEP would lose its grant from the San Francisco AIDS Office 
(Marinucci & Williams, 1993a, 1993b). 
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conclude that “[t]he child [CAL-PEP], as it were, swallowed the parent [COYOTE]”. 
Margo St. James, COYOTE’s founder, moved to France, working odd jobs and 
teaming up in Amsterdam with Gail Pheterson, a scholar, to inform Dutch health 
officials about AIDS education and organized two International Conferences of 
Prostitutes, which many COYOTE members attended to discuss issues such as the 
impact of HIV on sex worker communities world-wide. In 1989, Priscilla Alexander 
accepted a position as an advisor on prostitution and AIDS issues with the World 
Health Organization where, drawing from her experience with CAL-PEP, she wrote 
the first guide to setting up HIV prevention programs for sex workers, which was 
widely distributed throughout the world (Interview, 11 July 2006). Gloria Lockett 
continued as CAL-PEP’s executive director, and Carol Leigh as an artist and sex 
worker activist. 
With their distance from COYOTE, CAL-PEP soon began to expand its 
operations beyond its core prostitute constituency, but this move was also motivated 
by a commitment to this constituency. To illustrate, Lockett (Interview, 18 July 2006) 
stated that by the early 1990s it became increasingly clear that if they were to prevent 
AIDS among street-based sex workers, they would have to expand their definition of 
“community” by working with sex workers’ entire familial and social networks, 
including their clients, partners, friends and fellow drug users, among others. 
Consequently, to better serve this population, CAL-PEP decided to move to Oakland, 
CA in the early 1990s, as their concern grew about the increasing number of sexually 
transmitted infections in the county.  
CAL-PEP was certainly moving into a less friendly social and political context 
than San Francisco. As noted in Chapter 2, various authors (Rhomberg, 2004; Self, 
2003a) have documented how racist exclusions built into federal, state and local 
policies contributed harshly to urban decay and the structural poverty now deeply 
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ingrained in portions of Oakland’s African American communities. When CAL-PEP 
moved to Oakland, every census tract in areas like (majority African American) East 
Oakland was designated by the US Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) as medically underserved (Rhomberg, 2004, p.186), and Alameda County 
had 13 percent of syphilis infections in the state (CAL-PEP, 1992, p.1). Today, along 
with violent death, illness--especially sexually transmitted diseases-- has also 
increased in Oakland’s most impoverished neighborhoods. According to the Alameda 
County Department of Public Health (ACPHD) (Witt, Iton, Perkins, & Kears, 2006, 
introductory letter), African Americans bear the burden of the greatest health 
inequities57. Sexually transmitted infections (STIs), especially HIV/AIDS, are also 
concentrated predominantly in the most impoverished African American communities 
of East and West Oakland58. Oakland has the largest proportion of diagnosed AIDS 
cases in Alameda County, accounting for 45 to 66 percent of the cases each year, 44 
percent of which are African American (Boone, Bautista, & Green-Ajufo, 2005, p.44).  
Furthermore, in Oakland, the local political context was less open to 
innovative, harm-reduction oriented HIV prevention health activism that was more 
common in San Francisco (Lane, 1993, p.1), as illustrated by the case of needle 
exchanges in Oakland59. By the mid-1990s, one in five IDUs in West Oakland was 
                                                
57 African Americans in Oakland have the highest rates of both death and illness from coronary heart 
disease, stroke, lung cancer, prostate cancer, asthma, motor vehicle crashes, and as noted above, 
homicide 
58 According to Bowser and Hill (2007), both heroin and crack led to growing HIV infections and 
AIDS. Prior to 1990, gay, bisexual and injection drugs users (IDU) were the main source of HIV in 
Oakland, but then crack inflamed the existing epidemic as young women and men engaged in the 
exchange of sexual favors for the drug (or money to buy the drug). Soon, HIV-positive IDUs also 
became part of their clientele, resulting in a crossover between substance-using populations that was so 
complete by 1995 that it was impossible to tell those who used heroin from those who used crack. And 
it is no coincidence, Bowser and Hill argue further, that the increasing numbers of HIV/AIDS cases are 
from the East and West Oakland neighborhoods ravaged by crack: these are the same communities with 
four decades of accumulated poverty and unemployment behind them. 
59 At the time, needle exchanges were illegal according to California state law, and so previous to this, 
handing out syringes was an act of civil disobedience. In San Francisco, where needle exchanges first 
emerged in the state in response to the AIDS epidemic, it took until March, 1992 when Mayor Frank 
Jordan declared a state of emergency, which gave him the power to legalize the exchanges and provide 
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HIV positive, making it one of the communities hit hardest by IV drug related AIDS 
west of the Mississippi, but Alameda County was only spending $4 million per year in 
services (compared to San Francisco’s $40 million) (Blumenthal, 1998, p.1148). The 
Oakland police and DA’s office also refused to practice non-enforcement of the laws 
forbidding needle exchanges (Light, 1995a, 1995b), even though needle exchanges 
had demonstrated considerable success in neighboring cities like San Francisco and 
Redwood City (Blumenthal, 1998, p.1148). This resistance came to a head in 1992, 
when community activists with the Alameda County Exchange (ACE) set up a table 
on a deserted West Oakland street with clean needles, bleach, alcohol wipes, condoms 
and AIDS literature (and within 30 minutes collected 800 used syringes and gave out a 
roughly equal number) and were arrested. Although they were eventually acquitted, 
needle exchange volunteers continued to endure police harassment, and it was not 
until 2000 when the governor of California declared the AIDS epidemic a State of 
Emergency and legally sanctioned needle exchange programs that the ACPHD began 
to fund the exchanges (Casa Segura, 2007, p.1). Of course, CAL-PEP did not endure 
similar difficulties to ACE because they did not conduct activities that were illegal 
under state law60. But Oakland, as noted above, was and is a far less wealthy and far 
more conservative city than San Francisco, and as subsequent sections have shown, 
this has frequently impeded their ability to develop and offer local programs and 
services for sex workers and other street-based communities.  
                                                                                                                                       
funding for them, namely through the San Francisco AIDS Foundation (SFAF). However, this state of 
emergency had to be declared every 2 weeks, and it was not until 2004, with the passage of Bill 547 
that this requirement was eliminated (Interview, Bobby Bownas, Syringe Exchange Specialist, Harm 
Reduction Coalition of Oakland, 10 June 2007).  
60 According to Carla Dillard Smith, CAL-PEP’s executive director (Interview, 3 November 2006), 
since CAL-PEP receives federal funding, they are forbidden by law from running needle exchanges. 
However, if another agency receives a grant to do this, CAL-PEP can act as the fiscal agent (which 
means they would administer the grant), and also help the other organization get started and help them 
with press conferences and such. CAL-PEP would also conduct sex education and support groups at the 
sites.  
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However, community need has also fueled the growth of their organization, 
and so since moving to Oakland, the CAL-PEP of today bears little resemblance to its 
parent organization, COYOTE, and the grassroots efforts from which it began: its 
main office is located in the former Alameda County Health Department building, 
across the street from the Oakland police department headquarters. Their office is on 
the third floor, in a large open space they share with AIDS Project East Bay. 
According to CAL-PEP’s deputy director, Carla Dillard Smith (Interview, 3 
November 2006), they have approximately 25 paid and volunteer staff (among which 
only Lockett identifies as a former sex worker) and a current budget of $1.2 million 
(up from $500 thousand in 1998 but down from $2.7 million in 2002), eighty percent 
of which is from the federal government through the CDC.  
Today, CAL-PEP’s service provision reflects and addresses the racialized, 
gendered nature of the HIV/AIDS epidemic: services, while available to anyone, are 
targeted mainly at Oakland’s population disproportionately impacted by HIV/AIDS-- 
African American men and women who are predominantly poor. This has occurred 
because although AIDS was once a disease associated mainly with white gay men, 
current data indicates that acquiring the disease is increasingly linked to gendered, 
racialized poverty. Women are now one of the fastest growing infected groups, and 
African Americans, who only constitute 13 percent of the American population, 
constitute 49 percent of total AIDS cases in the United States (and), and are 
disproportionately concentrated in some of the most impoverished areas of the nation 
(Alameda County, 2003, p.1; Boone, Bautista, & Green-Ajufo, 2005, pp.6-7; CDC, 
2007a, p.1). As a result, as Lockett noted in a 1992 newsletter (CAL-PEP, 1992),  
 
“we began as a prostitutes’ health organization…Today… seventy five percent of our 
clients are minorities, most of them need services because they’re poor. The bottom 
line is we’re changing to meet the needs of the communities we serve—and 
represent—because there’s no one else out there doing it” (p.4).  
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Although sex workers still comprise up to 40 percent of their clients (Interview, G. 
Lockett, 18 July 2006), CAL-PEP now reaches more broadly to street-based 
populations, the majority of which are African American, often parolees, homeless 
and without jobs and/or health insurance, all of which commonly leaves them out of 
traditional health care channels (Williams, 2003). CAL-PEP data shows that in 2004 
alone they provided services to 15,529 clients primarily through HIV testing, street 
outreach, workshops, substance abuse treatment services, and case management.  Of 
these clients, 74% were African American, 91% were people of color, and 30% were 
under age 25. CAL-PEP provided services to 657 injection drug users, 2,630 crack 
cocaine users, 998 sex workers, 1,525 homeless individuals, and 288 HIV positive 
individuals. 
Part II. Maintaining radical commitments: CAL-PEP and grassroots, community-
based service provision 
Given their current size and scope of activities, it is initially difficult to see how an 
organization so large and physically a part of a mainstream government agency could 
maintain and express a commitment to sex worker rights. Therefore this section will 
discuss how, despite CAL-PEP’s growth and expansion, they have maintained their 
commitment to sex worker rights through radical institutionalization in two key ways: 
by continually developing and implementing programs that do not seek to moralize or 
rescue those involved in prostitution; and by involving the sex worker (and other) 
communities they serve (who are often blamed for the spread of HIV/AIDS in 
America and not employable due to their involvement in criminal activities) in service 
provision and their operations. 
Programming 
In keeping with their radical roots, CAL-PEP continues to develop and offer 
non-judgmental, community-based HIV prevention and education services to sex 
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workers (and other street-based populations). These programs include 
HIV/AIDS/sexual health education (through street outreach distributing literature, 
condoms and bleach kits in Alameda and San Francisco counties); Mobile Outreach 
and Recovery for Ex Offenders (the MORE project), which uses two large recreational 
vehicles equipped with testing and counseling rooms to bring HIV testing and 
counseling to communities where, because of socio-economic impediments, people 
there might not otherwise be tested; individual and group substance abuse counseling; 
harm reduction workshops; prevention case management, where trained CAL-PEP 
staff work individually with clients to assess their risk for HIV and develop a plan 
involving health care and other prevention-oriented activities; and peer treatment 
advocacy, where advocates focus on providing services to HIV positive individuals to 
help them adhere to medications, access different medical options, and maintain good 
nutrition, among other activities.  
CAL-PEP’s commitment to sex workers’ rights is evident in their continued 
development of HIV/AIDS prevention programs for sex workers that do not require or 
encourage them to exit the sex industry but instead treat them as workers (not 
criminals) who deserve to work safely. Observing that more young women (under age 
18) were conducting street-based sex work (or were considering this work), CAL-PEP 
recently added new programs to their repertoire, including Sisters Informer Sisters 
about Topics on AIDS (SISTA), a CDC-developed and funded skill-building peer-led 
intervention that runs through five group sessions that include discussions of self-
esteem, relationships and sexual health among African American women; and Growth 
Spot (G-SPOT), a Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA)-funded program serving youth 14-24 years old with a goal to provide 
HIV and substance use prevention and education to decrease the spread of HIV and 
substance use among adolescents and young adults while also providing counseling, 
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prevention and education and service linkages. G-SPOT also provides street outreach, 
education workshops, and runs a drop-in center at the CAL-PEP offices. CAL-PEP’s 
Young Sex Worker Program is funded by Alameda County and is for female sex 
workers and other at-risk youth and their partners, aged 14-25. The goal of this 
program is to decrease the spread of HIV and substance use through education via 
street outreach and their mobile unit. Finally, Measure Y, funded through the City of 
Oakland’s Violence Prevention Act, works in collaboration with the county and 
community-based organizations to work specifically with sexually exploited minors 
found walking the strolls and in juvenile hall to assess their needs, educate them about 
their rights, health and safety and self-actualization, and provide service linkages 
(CAL-PEP, 2004b). 
The (now defunct) Day Treatment Program (DTP) provided prominent 
example of CAL-PEP’s linkages to the prostitute community and commitment to 
treating them as workers; however, it also illustrates the challenges inherent in 
maintaining programs with such morally and politically unpopular positions in 
partnership with government agencies. The DTP was an outreach-run, harm-reduction 
outpatient drug treatment program devoted to primarily African American women and 
other women of color for whom abstinence-based drug treatment was either 
unavailable or something they felt they could not do because of childcare concerns, 
affordability, or other reasons (Bowser, Ryan, Dillard-Smith, & Lockett, 
forthcoming). Deciding they needed a program to provide a middle ground between 
street outreach (which was possibly too brief) and formal, mainly abstinence-based 
drug treatment (which was either too burdensome or did not have space), CAL-PEP 
obtained a demonstration grant from the federal Department of Health and Human 
Services’s (DHHS) Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT) to provide drug 
treatment from April 2001 to March 2006. This program would serve the most 
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inaccessible and least likely of their clients to seek and receive treatment, namely 
African American or other women of color who actively used drugs and often traded 
sex for drugs and other resources to support themselves (Bowser, Ryan, Dillard-Smith, 
& Lockett, forthcoming).  
 As a demonstration grant to a local, community-based organization, it provided 
an opportunity for CAL-PEP to provide a safe, judgment-free space for a normally 
marginalized and criminalized population to improve their basic health (Bowser et al., 
forthcoming). Here, instead of street outreach, they provided a space where women 
and other sex workers could come and receive services. The DTP was open during the 
day and offered case management, HIV and drug risk reduction education sessions, 
group discussions, one-on-one psychological counseling, and a laundry and shower 
facility and meals (CAL-PEP, 2001, 2004b). CAL-PEP outreach workers recruited 
clients in cohorts of 50 (per year) from street locations in Oakland where primarily 
African American sex traders and substance users congregated. Clients were directed 
to the house and could drop in and out as needed, although they were required to not 
use drugs on the premises and be sober enough to participate in the counseling and 
group sessions.  
  The program effectively demonstrated that treating sex workers non-
judgmentally, as workers, promoted sex worker health and safety. In the final 
evaluation of the program 61(see Bowser et al., forthcoming), the DTC showed 
                                                
61 For this, CAL-PEP used the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) survey. According to 
the Department of the Interior, “GPRA seeks to make the federal government more accountable to the 
American people for the tax dollars it spends and the results it achieves. The Department of the Interior 
is complying with GPRA through its performance management system that provides useful information 
to managers and promotes accountability for results. In addition to a strategic plan, GPRA requires 
agencies to prepare related annual performance plans and annual performance reports. The legal 
requirements for an annual performance plan are met by a performance budget. The annual performance 
report requirement will be fulfilled by both the performance budget and the performance and 
accountability report (PAR).” (http://www.doi.gov/ppp/gpra.html). In each DTP cohort, then, over the 
course of the year (at intake, and roughly six and twelve months into the program), clients completed 
interviews for the GPRA, and following the 12-month questionaire they were welcome to return to the 
DTC informally. 
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significant efficacy for CAL-PEP’s clients in the areas indicated in Table 1, entitled 
“DTC outcomes”, below:  
Table 3.1: DTC Outcomes 
ISSUE AT INTAKE AFTER 6 MONTHS AFTER 12 
MONTHS 
Full time 
employment 
7% 15% 19% 
Living on streets 13% 5% No data 
Days when alcohol 
and illegal drugs 
used (in the last 30 
days) 
27.7 15.1 16.9 
Average number of 
nights spent in jail 
2.4 1.2 0.9 
 
Source: Bowser et al., forthcoming 
However, as Bowser et al (forthcoming) notes, participants’ HIV sexual risk behavior 
did not change very much over the course of the program. At intake, the more partners 
the women claimed to have, the more they had unprotected sex with known IDUs and 
the more days they spent using crack. By the sixth month, though, while they 
continued to have multiple sex partners, they did so somewhat more safely, namely by 
avoiding known IDUs as partners. To probe this finding more deeply, CAL-PEP 
conducted focus groups, which revealed that risky sexual practices continued because 
sex work was their primary source of income, since many could not find employment 
in the legal economy that paid a living wage62. And so to make enough through sex 
work (especially where crack addiction was involved), they continued having multiple 
partners, although over the course of their participation in the DTP they avoided IDU 
partners on a more regular basis. Overall, though, the DTP and mobile testing 
programs indicated that by making it easy for the target community to access services, 
                                                
62 As their focus group also revealed, sex trading was not uncommon, and many of the regular sex 
traders complained of women in their neighborhoods who were not regular sex traders but came out on 
the streets several days before the 15th and 30th of each month (when welfare checks are issued), thereby 
increasing competition for their regular clients. 
 127 
a population normally considered “hard to reach” by traditional public health channels 
could be reached and, once in contact, respond to education, counseling, attention and 
services without requiring them to abstain from substance abuse as a condition of 
receiving treatment and services. All of this led Dr. Bowser and his colleagues to 
conclude in their evaluation that “[h]arm reduction treatment projects like the CAL-
PEP Day Treatment effort are necessary to address the social and economic needs of 
women who trade sex for drugs and money” (forthcoming, p.12). 
 Despite CAL-PEP’s success with the DTP, the program was discontinued, 
demonstrating how local, community-based programming (and the radical methods of 
service provision it can promote) is often subject to broader neo-liberal trends of 
declining governmental support for health and social services, even if these are 
contracted to private, nonprofit service providers. Although the DTP data showed that 
a group of women normally considered “hard to reach” and unresponsive to treatment 
could be reached and, once in treatment, respond to education, counseling, attention 
and services, Dr. Bowser and his colleagues stated: 
 
“CSAT funded projects that are innovative and that demonstrate effective ways to 
address drug treatment are funded with the understanding that they will be continued 
by state and local health departments. The Alameda County Public Health 
Department that serves Oakland, California, like so many city and county health 
departments do not have the funds to support new prevention and treatment projects, 
but neither do they have the interest in seeking funds to do so. They reflect they same 
philosophical opposition to harm reduction that 50% of national treatment programs 
have. As a consequence, they end up reinforcing African American [especially 
female] marginalization in American society through continued neglect of services” 
(p.13) 
All of this is to say that despite program efficacy, the day treatment program’s existed 
in a broader political-economic environment that not only left many resorting risky 
sexual practices for survival, but limited CAL-PEP’s capacity to continue delivering 
programs that expressed its commitment to treating sex workers non-judgmentally, as 
workers. 
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Service Delivery 
CAL-PEP continues to express its commitment to prostitutes’ rights internally, 
through its method of peer-based service delivery: they still employ their grassroots 
and train them to be experts in HIV prevention and service provision. Initially, CAL-
PEP only hired sex workers, but as their client base expanded, so did their definition 
of a “peer” to include former substance users and persons of color from high-risk 
communities (who might not necessarily have been sex workers or substance users), 
among others. This has helped CAL-PEP establish and maintain trust and a rapport 
with the communities they serve: after all, as Lockett (1994) stated, “we needed 
people who were comfortable going into crack houses, housing projects and out on the 
street at night”. As Bethanne, (Interview, 1 November 2007), a program coordinator at 
CAL-PEP stated, clients also feel more hopeful when they see someone they “ran with 
back in the day get out of the life and give back to the community”.  
Gayle and Grant illustrate this model of peer service provision. Gayle, a 52 
year old African American HIV-positive woman, struggled with substance abuse since 
the age of 12, and is currently on methadone maintenance. Although she only has one 
client (john) now, who comes to her home (to supplement her monthly SSI check), 
“All my life I knew how to exchange sex for money” (Interview, 14 December 2006). 
She worked mainly on the streets, has been arrested many times for prostitution and 
has gone in and out of jail as a result. With little formal education and a criminal 
record, Gayle would be ineligible for most legal employment, and would also not be 
an individual one might immediately consider a credible voice in HIV education 
efforts. However, when CAL-PEP was working in San Francisco in 1990, she came to 
know them and used their services. At the time, CAL-PEP also was producing an HIV 
education video, Breaking the Silence, to show at their HIV prevention events. Gayle 
was hired to star in this (and other) HIV education video. She said this experience and 
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hearing CAL-PEP talk about the virus through outreach helped her share her story 
about acquiring HIV. Currently, Gayle receives health services as a CAL-PEP client 
and has been involved in many of the AIDS awareness marches run by various 
organizations in the Bay Area.  
Grant (Interview, 1 February 2007), a CAL-PEP outreach worker, provides 
another example of how CAL-PEP involves its grassroots in service provision. Prior 
to coming to CAL-PEP, Grant sold drugs and had seen CAL-PEP in his neighborhood, 
but he claimed to have the same attitude as many others in the area, namely that “ok, 
I’ll take the condoms and move on because you’re interfering with my business”. 
Some CAL-PEP employees had asked him if he was interested in working with them 
but he refused initially because “he had a negative image of working with people who 
were gay and/or had HIV” (Interview, 1 February 2007). However, after spending 
time in prison, he felt pressure from his family to change his life; however, with a 
criminal record, it was hard for him to find work. He asked the CAL-PEP staff if there 
was still work and he interviewed and got a job as an outreach worker, for which he 
had to do state training and learned about HIV/AIDS and STDs. After six months he 
was certified as an HIV testing counselor. Overall, he says, “I am proof that you can 
change your life”, and with CALPEP he wanted to give back to the community he had 
affected via drug dealing. With CALPEP, he has been able to show his community 
that it is not just a “gay” organization, and that STDs and HIV/AIDS were not just 
“gay-related” (Interview, 1 February 2007). 
Considering the funding CAL-PEP receives from a federal agency, questions 
arise as to how CAL-PEP is able to continue its radical commitment to hiring 
members of a community who are (or were) involved in activities that are illegal, such 
as drug dealing and prostitution. Two conditions make this possible, the first being the 
professional/credentialed capacity in which they hire members of the communities 
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they serve; and the second being the localized nature of grants for HIV/AIDS 
prevention services.  
Professionalism 
By working with them in a “professional” capacity, CAL-PEP is able to engage with 
and hire from marginalized communities: CAL-PEP has not hired individuals like 
Grant and Gayle (described above) to facilitate or participate in selling illegal drugs or 
prostitution, but to deliver AIDS services. Consequently, their capacity to deliver 
services consistently and effectively is paramount to (moral or other) judgments about 
what Grant and Gayle have done in the past (or do outside of CAL-PEP). Grant’s case 
is particularly illustrative here. Despite having a criminal record and little formal 
employment experience, Grant has been able to work as an HIV prevention outreach 
worker because he has the necessary professional credentials—his state HIV 
prevention certifications—and therefore his criminal record is not relevant to his 
capacity to be involved with CAL-PEP. 
However, none of this is to say that involving sex workers and other street-
based populations in the more professionalized realm of health service provision has 
been easy for CAL-PEP. Although they have many staff members who have been with 
the organization for up to 15 years—a great feat considering the high turnover and low 
retention rates in the non-profit sector (Peters, Fernandopulle, Masaoka, Chan, & 
Wolfred, 2002)—they have seen many staff come and go, and have had to institute 
policies to help recruit employees who can work consistently with the organization. As 
Dillard Smith (Interview, 3 November 2006) noted, since some of their peer staff are 
former substance users, returning to their communities during outreach puts them in 
contact with substances again, sometimes facilitating their relapse. As a result, CAL-
PEP eventually had to hire people who had demonstrated two years of sobriety. They 
now have a staff support policy, which requires staff who relapse to do counseling 
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through the CALPEP medical plan and then remain consistently clean; if they fail, 
they are let go. However, Lockett has remained insistent about community-based 
hiring, stating this is essential to implementing their mission of HIV prevention and 
education, and community empowerment. 
Localism 
Localized HIV/AIDS prevention grants also allow CAL-PEP to hire from the 
communities they serve. Here, Grant and Gayle are ideal service providers, as they are 
from and can more easily reach the communities served-- something which is not 
always possible for government agencies. Instead, CAL-PEP works by the motto 
“their time, on their turf” meaning they will go to places where these individuals might 
congregate at times convenient for them. According to Dr. Ben Bowser (Interview, 17 
November 2006), a professor at Cal State Hayward who has served as an external 
evaluator for a number of CAL-PEP’s programs, the Alameda County Department of 
Public Health (ACDPH) has tried to provide services similar to CAL-PEP’s but being 
a civil service, they only offer services until 6 pm, which works for their clients who 
can make it there63. However, CAL-PEP is willing to work after 6 pm, and so the 
county has an incentive to fund CAL-PEP because they have more flexibility. Bowser 
notes further that this timing issue matters because many of those served by CAL-PEP 
are on parole and cannot be seen in areas where they might have been in trouble, such 
                                                
63 According to the ACDPH website (http://www.acphd.org/user/about/about_overview.htm), “Public 
Health is an array of programs and services designed to protect the health and safety of Alameda 
County residents. The backbone of Public Health includes assessments of the health status of residents, 
disease prevention and control, community mobilization and outreach, policy development, education, 
and assurance of access to quality medical and health care services.” The ACDPH is headquartered in 
Oakland and have 25 satellite offices across the county, covering 1.4 million residents. Their 600-plus 
staff includes public health nurses, doctors, epidemiologists, dentists, medical social workers, physical 
and occupational therapists, dietitians, outreach workers, health educators, program managers, among 
others - working in five divisions, which include Community Health Services; the Division of 
Communicable Diseases Control & Prevention; Family Health Services; Emergency; Medical Services; 
and Administrative Services. 
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as on main streets or near liquor stores. However, notes Bowser, these locations are 
often the only places where “they are less likely to be harassed as poor, African 
American, unemployed people. So they stay inside somewhere all day and then come 
out around 8 pm… because parole officers finish paroling/working around 6!” 
(Interview, Ben Bowser, 17 November 2006). 
But involving sex workers and other street-based populations has not always 
guaranteed CAL-PEP’s access to these communities. Even though CAL-PEP been 
operating for over 25 years, Salina (Interview, 9 November 2007), a CAL-PEP 
program coordinator, noted that when they started their mobile van service, many in 
the communities they took it to did not trust the van because they thought it was 
maybe a parole officer, or “something to do with the police”. Lisa, a 38 year-old HIV-
positive African American CAL-PEP client, expressed this sentiment. Struggling with 
drug addiction from the age of 12, Lisa worked as a street prostitute in Oakland from 
age 14 to support her addiction. While working at 14th St and International Boulevard 
(a high prostitution area in the city) in 1989, the CAL-PEP mobile van came to the 
area “and asked people if they wanted to learn about HIV” (Interview, Lisa, 29 
November 2006). Lisa stated further “people [living and working in the area] were 
suspicious at first because they were doing drugs and were worried that CAL-PEP was 
part of the police”. However, Lisa went on to say, CAL-PEP offered food and put up a 
schedule about when they would do lectures about HIV, and had an HIV quiz and 
raffle where participants could win twenty-five dollars. Consequently, she said, CAL-
PEP became very popular and “people wanted them to come every week” (Interview, 
29 November 2006). To date, Lisa has used CAL-PEP for HIV/STD tests and also has 
a peer advocate, who helps her find housing and navigate the care system for HIV.  
To decrease suspicions about their motives, CAL-PEP has therefore had to 
“walk the walk and talk the talk and meet people where they are” (Interview, Salina, 9 
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November 2007). In so doing, Salina stated further that “people want to know who 
you are and what you are going to do about their problems” (Interview, 9 November 
2007), so CAL-PEP makes it clear that they are there to test for HIV, not give people 
HIV. As a result, Salina stated (Interview, 9 November 2007), when CAL-PEP goes to 
a new area now, they do not just bring the van right in first but instead park farther 
away and then walk to the target area and introduce themselves to the apparent 
gatekeeper and say who they are and what they do (test for HIV and offer incentives 
for the test). She emphasized that to be effective, they need to gain trust and pay 
people for their time and feed them with hot food, and so CAL-PEP will usually stay 
in an area for two to three weeks to make sure everyone has a chance to obtain a test 
and, if necessary, receive linkages to CAL-PEP’s and/or other’s health services. 
Despite these challenges, an outing with CAL-PEP’s mobile HIV testing 
project (described above) one morning in November 2006 illustrates the benefits of 
their (radical) commitment to hiring from and going to the communities they serve. 
On this day, a group of African American CAL-PEP outreach workers parked a large 
recreational vehicle housing the organization’s mobile HIV testing clinic near 32nd 
Street and San Pablo Avenue, where many of the houses are surrounded by chain-
linked fences and violent crimes occur frequently. Many homeless, marginally housed 
and persons recently released from prison congregate in this area. The CAL-PEP 
workers—many of whom were from the area—were unfazed by their surroundings. 
Instead, toting bags of condoms and information about HIV/AIDS, they walked up to 
various individuals, introduced themselves (if someone did not already know them) 
and struck up conversations, asking them if they would like to participate in an HIV 
education session (with a free hot lunch) and take a free HIV test. Everyone 
encountered was given condoms and information about HIV testing, and they filled a 
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room in a near-by building for the lunch, where Elena, a CAL-PEP staff member, 
quizzed them about HIV/AIDS prevention. 
Part III. Beyond Radical Institutionalization? Encountering political constraints   
Indeed, CAL-PEP has maintained a commitment to sex worker rights within the 
organization, but what of advocacy for this externally, beyond the organization? Is 
CAL-PEP able to mobilize individuals like Gayle and Grant and, as an organization, 
advocate for prostitutes’ (and other street-based populations’) rights in the public and 
legislative realm? To explore these questions, this section discusses how CAL-PEP’s 
encounters with charitable non-profit status under section 501c3 of the IRC and 
granting agreement’ data collection requirements indicate the flip-side of activist entry 
into nonprofit service provision in the neo-liberal era (particularly with regards to 
HIV/AIDS). Although (as demonstrated previously) CAL-PEP’s engagement with the 
state has given them the power to develop innovative programs that involve 
marginalized populations (e.g. sex workers) in service delivery, it has also increased 
demands on them to be accountable to granting agencies. All of this has limited CAL-
PEP’s capacity to focus on and remain engaged in broader sex workers’ rights 
advocacy from which they were born.  
Section 501c3 
CAL-PEP’s incorporation as a charitable nonprofit organization (charitable nonprofit) 
in 1987 under Section 501c3 of the Internal Revenue Code made official its evolution 
from a small, grassroots effort attached to a protest organization, to an organization 
focused on health service provision. Indeed, this move was motivated by COYOTE 
member’s commitment to the sex worker community: the demand for AIDS services 
was not diminishing, and nonprofit status was (and is) required by most funding 
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agencies that could help CAL-PEP continue its service provision64. However, it also 
signaled CAL-PEP’s departure from prostitutes’ rights advocacy. Initially. CAL-PEP 
remained closely linked to COYOTE through its board of directors and employees, 
who were predominantly sex workers connected to the organization. But it soon 
became clear that to maintain their funding streams (and, hence, nonprofit status), 
CAL-PEP would have to distance itself from COYOTE. This became apparent when 
their funding from government sources grew and was increasingly specified for certain 
activities, namely HIV prevention and testing activities, and nothing else unspecified 
in the contract (such as lobbying and advocacy work for sex worker rights, or 
otherwise).  
CAL-PEP made two major strategic choices that demonstrated their 
prioritization of maintaining nonprofit status over COYOTE-oriented prostitutes’ 
rights advocacy. The first of these choices was evident in 1990, when COYOTE 
pressed CAL-PEP to volunteer staff and resources for the International Committee on 
Prostitutes’ Rights meeting in San Francisco, a highly politicized event in the area that 
brought sex worker activists world-wide together to discuss and promote such issues 
as decriminalizing prostitution. Not wanting to jeopardize funding or nonprofit status, 
CAL-PEP ultimately refused to do most of the work COYOTE wanted and had a 
minimal presence at the conference, “coming down on the side of service, 
‘responsibility’ to funders, and bureaucratic submission to the terms of its contracts” 
(Stoller, 1998, p.90). As a result, by 1991, only one sex worker was on CAL-PEP’s 
board, and others retired from CAL-PEP, sometimes with considerable conflict 
(Stoller, 1998, pp.89-90). 
                                                
64 As noted in previous papers, this incorporation requires organizations to form a clearly defined board 
of directors and management structure. Moreover, the organization must severely limit its expenditures 
on and participation in political activities, namely lobbying and campaign participation. 
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 CAL-PEP’s second strategic choice was to remove “Prostitute” from their 
name, becoming the California Prevention and Education Project. According to Gloria 
Lockett, (Interview, 16 October 2006), in attempting to expand their funding base, 
they were applying to many federal government agencies and organizations they 
considered more conservative who would not look at CAL-PEP’s proposals because 
of the word “prostitute” in their name. Many of these organizations and agencies were 
concerned that CAL-PEP was educating people to be prostitutes. Although Lockett 
heard some COYOTE members were disappointed with the name change, she is 
thankful for this change because it has helped them continue their work, especially 
during the tenure of the Bush II Administration, which CAL-PEP feels is the most 
sex-negative yet. Therefore, to acquire funding more funding, they changed their name 
and now stress they are not helping people do something illegal, but helping them 
protect themselves. Today, CAL-PEP’s mission is “to provide accessible health, 
education, disease prevention, risk reduction and support services to people at high 
risk HIV/AIDS or those already infected in a culturally and linguistically appropriate 
way” (CAL-PEP, 2004b, p.1). 
Of course, these strategic choices have not meant CAL-PEP and the SJI muted 
their ties to the sex worker rights’ movement altogether: Gloria Lockett remains the 
executive director and in this capacity makes no secret of her history as a sex worker. 
In so doing, as Stoller (1998) has written, “CAL-PEP’s leading staff person [is] an 
assertive, street-savvy African American prostitute, an identity practically guaranteed 
to cause anxiety in a white middle class bureaucrat—especially one who hears his or 
her money is in the hands of such a woman” (p.93). Lockett still supports and advises 
various prostitutes’ rights organizations and causes, such as the St. James Infirmary 
(the sex worker clinic in San Francisco, which is the subject of the next chapter); 
however, this is no longer the sole focus of her work, or that or CAL-PEP’s. Instead, 
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the majority of CAL-PEP’s reflects the organization’s broader mandate of promoting 
HIV/AIDS prevention in the African American community.    
Data Collection 
Incorporation as a 501c3, and the funding this has provided CAL-PEP, has 
consequently increased the organization’s administrative burdens, as their granting 
agreements demand they provide data demonstrating program efficacy. As noted in 
previous chapters, data collection requirements have increased as a function of the 
broader policy climate (particularly under the Bush Administration), which has grown 
more sex negative and suspicious about the efficacy of community-based harm 
reduction-oriented HIV prevention activities (Epstein, 2006). Consequently, funding 
for HIV prevention has also decreased65.  As. Carla Dillard Smith (Interview, 3 
November 2006) stated,  
 
“With Clinton, we had a $2.7 million budget (through lobbying his Minority AIDS 
initiative) and it was heaven. Bush is hell. Since the Bush administration targets sex, 
we had to change our name (taking prostitutes out) because we knew it would 
compromise federal money. As well, since then, two years ago the NIH started 
targeting sexuality researchers and harm reduction in favor of abstinence and defense 
of marriage stuff.” 
With this reduced budget, as Dillard Smith noted further, the pressure for more 
data has occurred “because the US Congress has grown increasingly concerned 
with knowing how we know what we did was effective” (Interview, 3 
November 2006). She stated here that since the State of Emergency regarding 
                                                
65 Currently, the CDC’s $700 million HIV/AIDS budget (80 percent of which goes to state and local 
health departments and CBOs) is estimated to fall short by $350 million needed to provide 
comprehensive prevention services (Boschert, 2006). Along side the falling budget has been growing 
doubt about program efficacy, leading federal and other granting agencies have instituted more 
evaluation requirements, the most significant of which was the CDC’s Program Evaluation and 
Monitoring System (PEMS), “a national data reporting system developed to strengthen the capacity to 
monitor and evaluate CDC-funded HIV prevention programs administered by the DHAP” that includes 
a standardized set of HIV data prevention variables, web-based software for the data entry and 
management, assistance with planning and conducting evaluation, training for data collection and 
evaluation, and support services for the software implementation 65(Thomas, Smith, & Wright-
DeAguero, 2006, p.75). 
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African Americans and HIV/AIDS is still in effect in Alameda County, doubt 
has increased among government officials (especially at the federal level) that 
prevention messaging and education is working at all. All of this has meant 
that to meet increased data collection and program evaluation requirements, 
and complete scarce (yet more complicated and competitive) grant 
applications.   
The following pages discuss the extent of CAL-PEP’s growing data collection 
requirements. In 2001, CAL-PEP hired Shira (Email correspondence, 24 October 
2007), their current data manager, who has a bachelor’s degree and has received 
training in various data management computer programs (namely SPSS-DE). Indeed 
her skills are needed to manage the vast amounts of data CAL-PEP collects to 
demonstrate program efficacy, which is summarized in Table 3.2 “CAL-PEP’s data 
collection activities”, below: 
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Table 3.2: CAL-PEP’s data collection activities 
Form Data variables Where data submitted Programs forms 
collected for 
CAL-PEP Log Sheet 
(created in-house) 
Name, age, sex, race, 
location, number of 
condoms and bleach kits, 
population (prostitute, etc), 
previous contact with 
CAL-PEP and 
commitment to 
information; frequency of 
condom and needle use; 
referrals given 
City of Oakland; CDC SISTA; Measure Y; 
all HIV prevention 
activities: street 
outreach, workshops, 
one-on-one meetings, 
prevention case 
management, testing 
CAL-PEP intake form 
(created in-house) 
Personal info (name, age, 
birthdate, etc); government 
services received; 
employment; medical 
information; mental health 
information; housing 
information; substance use 
history; legal information; 
social network/support 
information 
Alameda County HIV prevention case 
management 
Evaluating Local 
Interventions (ELI) forms 
(group check sheets; 
individual level 
interventions forms; 
outreach check sheet; 
outreach short form; 
prevention case 
management form) 
Across forms, variables 
include: HIV behavioral 
risk population (IDU etc); 
race, age, gender; sexual 
orientation; HIV status; 
health, hepatitis, STD, 
drug use histories 
 
California State Office of 
AIDS via the ACDPH 
(ACDPH collects forms 
from CAL-PEP and enters 
them for submission to the 
State) 
HIV prevention 
activities: street 
outreach, workshops, 
one-on-one meetings, 
prevention case 
management, testing 
HIV counseling 
information form 
Client information (race, 
ethnicity, etc); HIV testing 
history; risk reduction 
steps; counselors notes and 
review/assessment of 
testing issues; client 
referrals 
Alameda County Office of 
AIDS (which submits the 
information to the State) 
HIV counseling 
Government Performance 
and Results Act (GPRA) 
forms 
General demographics, 
kind and extent of drugs 
used, number of times 
arrested, and 
number and types of sex 
partners 
SAMHSA (although no 
longer required, CAL-PEP 
still collects the data for 
their own records) 
GSPOT 
GSPOT intake form (in 
house document) 
Name, age, address, date 
of birth, race/ethnicity , 
incarceration history, type 
of housing, schooling, use 
of legal and health 
services, 
HIV/STI test histories, 
status and risk factors, 
drug alcohol and tobacco 
use; drug treatment mental 
health assessment 
 
SAMHSA GSPOT 
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Overall, Shira noted (Email correspondence, 9 April 2008), for any given intervention 
there are at least two forms that have to be filled out, and with the exception of the ELI 
forms, CAL-PEP enters all of the data into the entry program SPSS-DE. She also 
added that CAL-PEP is part of the PEMS system, stating “However, the system has 
still not been implemented.  They've been training and making changes to the system 
for the past three years or so.  I think they will start enforcing the use of PEMS starting 
in January [2008].  We will be using PEMS for testing, case management, and SISTA 
workshops for our CDC grant” (Email correspondence, 24 October 2007).  
Along with collecting this data, CAL-PEP must enter it into various systems 
(for the city and county) and process and analyze it for the two reports per year (four 
in total) for each of the CDC and the ACDPH. In these reports, they document 
activities such as numbers of HIV tests administered and prevention outreach contacts, 
and discuss whether they reached their projected targets for these, among other 
items66. To illustrate the complexity of this process, the reporting requirements for 
CAL-PEP’s CDC grant contract #04064 “Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) 
Prevention Projects For Community-Based Organizations” (CDC, 2004), which funds 
their HIV testing and prevention projects, are provided below:  
 
1. You must provide CDC with an original, plus two copies of the following reports: 
(a) Your interim progress report, no later than February 15 of each year.  The progress 
report will serve as your non-competing continuation application, and must contain 
the following elements: 
(1) Current budget period activities objectives. (2) Current budget period financial 
progress. (3) New budget period proposed program activity objectives. (4) Detailed 
line-item budget and justification. (5) Baselines and target levels of performance for 
core and optional indicators. 
(6) New budget period proposed program activities. (7) Additional requested 
information.  
(b) The second semi-annual report will be due August 30 of each year.  Additional 
guidance on what to include in this report may be provided approximately three 
months before the due date.  It should include: (1) Baseline and actual level of 
performance on core and optional indicators. 
(2) Current budget period financial progress. (3) Additional requested information.  
                                                
66 Dillard Smith is in the process of providing copies of these reports for this research (Email 
correspondence, 2 April 2008).  
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(c) Financial status report, no more than 90 days after the end of the budget period.  
(d) Final financial and performance reports, no more than 90 days after the end of the 
project period.  
(e) Data reports of agency, financial, and HIV interventions including, but not limited 
to, HIV individual and group level; PCM; outreach; CTR; and/or partner CTR 
services are required 45 days after the end of each quarter or as specified in the most 
recent evaluation guidance.  Project areas may request technical assistance. Submit 
data to the Program Evaluation Research Branch electronically, and then send an 
electronic notification of your data submission to the Grants Management Specialist 
listed in the “Agency Contacts” section of this announcement. 
2. Submit any newly developed public information resources and materials to the 
CDC National Prevention Information Network (formerly the AIDS Information 
Clearinghouse) so that they can be incorporated into the current database for access 
by other organizations and agencies. 
3.HIV Content Review Guidelines 
(a)Submit the completed Assurance of Compliance with the Requirements for 
Contents of AIDS-Related Written Materials Form (CDC form - 0.1113) with your 
application as Appendix D.  This form lists the members of your program review 
panel. The form is included in your application kit.  The current Guidelines and the 
form may be downloaded from the CDC website: www.cdc.gov/od/pgo/forminfo.htm.  
Please include this completed form with your application. This form must be signed 
by the Project Director and authorized business officer. 
(b)You must also include approval by the relevant review panel of any CDC-funded 
HIV educational materials that you are currently using by the relevant review panel. 
Use the enclosed form, “Report of Approval”.  If you have nothing to submit, you 
must complete the enclosed form “No Report Necessary”.  You must include either 
the “Report of Approval” or “No Report Necessary” with all progress reports and 
continuation requests.  
(c)Use a Web page notice if your Web site contains HIV/AIDS educational 
information subject to the CDC content review guidelines. 
4. Adhere to CDC policies for securing approval for CDC-sponsored conferences. If 
you plan to hold a conference, you must send a copy of the agenda to CDC's Grants 
Management Office. 
5. If you plan to use materials using CDC's name, send a copy of the proposed 
material to CDC's Grants Management Office for approval. 
Although both Dillard Smith and Lockett believe in evaluating their programs, they 
stated that such reports to the CDC have become increasingly complex and time-
consuming (especially as their budget has decreased since 2000) and can run over one 
hundred pages in length, leading them to liken the process of producing each report to 
“writing a dissertation” (Interview, Carla Dillard Smith and Gloria Lockett, 25 March 
2008). As a result, it is difficult to obtain and maintain these grants and reports without 
devoting a significant portion of the organization’s staff and resources to these 
activities. As Lockett remarked, “Can you imagine what it [reporting] is like for 
newcomers [small nonprofits that receive CDC grants for the first time]? It makes it so 
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the grant process totally favors organizations where people have PhDs and MAs. We 
are really returning to more of a medical model of HIV prevention, where the 
government prefers to fund bigger organizations like Red Cross with more 
professional staff, not smaller nonprofits” (Interview, 25 March 2008).  
These data collection requirements have challenged CAL-PEP’s capacity to 
maintain and express their commitment to prostitutes (and other street-based 
constituencies) in their hiring practices, especially at the administrative and 
managerial levels. As Amy, a former CAL-PEP staff member (Interview 20 October 
2006) noted, “they [CAL-PEP] aren’t just handing out condoms and having brief chats 
about HIV anymore, which anyone can do”. Instead, she notes, with more data 
collection requirements, staff are required to be more highly trained to do more 
involved interventions, such as following certain protocols, conducting more 
complicated testing, and collecting data on very detailed and complex information 
forms outlined above. Given the high levels of distrust of public officials among 
members of the community CAL-PEP serves and the highly personal nature of much 
of the data collected, it must be collected carefully, which has required CAL-PEP to 
train their outreach staff about the importance of data collection.  
These more complex grant compliance requirements have meant CAL-PEP has 
professionalized their management and administrative staff. Consequently, CAL-
PEP’s board of directors is composed mainly of African American men and women 
who are leaders and/or professionals in the Oakland area. The majority of CAL-PEP’s 
administrative and management staff are African American women, and while many 
of them have advanced degrees, few have histories of sex work. For example, Carla 
Dillard Smith, CAL-PEP’s deputy director, has no history of sex work and a Masters’ 
degree in public policy, and two other women who serve as program coordinators also 
will receive Master’s degrees in public health this year. At the administrative level, 
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CAL-PEP has a scheduling assistant for Gloria and Carla; a part time data-entry clerk; 
and three women comprising the book-keeping and accounting staff. The reception 
desk is staffed by various CAL-PEP clients who are predominantly African American 
men and women, some of whom have histories of sex work/substance abuse. 
Because of CAL-PEP’s growing data collection requirements, the radical 
nature of CAL-PEP’s work is often minimized. As Dillard Smith argues “all of this 
emphasis on numbers has taken some of the edge off what we do. Now every week we 
have program meetings and the first thing we do is review numbers!” (Interview, 29 
November 2006). This has raised questions among the staff as to whether they are 
“serving people or collecting numbers” (Interview, Carla Dillard Smith, 29 November 
2006). Moreover, many of the management staff have grown farther removed from the 
day-to-day operations on the streets, causing some outreach staff to express 
frustration. As one staff member (9 November 2007) stated, “their [CAL-PEP’s] 
directors are getting older and don’t listen as much to the people on the front lines.” 
The staff member went on to describe a testing day where management hoped they 
would test a certain number of people, and when the staff tested far fewer, they were 
disappointed. However, stated the staff member, the testing and counseling combined 
with all of the required paperwork takes so much time that with the number of staff 
they had, there was no way they could test the desired number of individuals, let alone 
empower or educate them about broader political issues and struggles relevant to 
them67. 
 
 
 
                                                
67 This staff member requested I not tape our conversation, and so I cannot provide a more extensive 
direct quotation to describe this incident. 
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Part IV. Pushing the Limits? Advocating for prostitutes’ rights in the nonprofit 
sector 
CAL-PEP’s move from a small, grassroots organization to an agency with a 
professional administrative and management structure capable of dealing with the 
complex data collection/accountability requirements, appears to illustrate, as Piven 
and Cloward (1977) predicted, that protest movements that develop formal 
organizational structures will focus more on activities related to maintaining their 
organization than on disrupting elites and established power structures. Indeed, 
although CAL-PEP maintains a commitment to sex worker rights in its service 
provision methods, it is far removed from the prostitutes’ rights movement from 
which it was born. However, in making this transition over time from protest to 
service provision, CAL-PEP has instead entered a new political realm from which sex 
workers have largely been excluded: nonprofit health service provision. Here, as this 
section will demonstrate, CAL-PEP promotes prostitutes’ rights (i.e. that prostitutes be 
treated as workers, not criminals) through its research and evaluation and AIDS 
service advocacy work in ways that do not compromise their nonprofit status or 
detract from their data collection activities. However, despite deploying these 
strategies, they continue to exist in a broader political climate hostile to prostitutes’ 
rights, even if this is promoted through service provision.  
Research & Evaluation 
Despite the restrictions on political advocacy posed by section 501c3 and data 
collection requirements, CAL-PEP’s research and evaluation efforts have brought sex 
workers into the realm of nonprofit AIDS service provision, a political and 
institutional forum from which they were largely excluded. As Nancy Stoller (1998) 
writes, forming CAL-PEP demonstrated COYOTE’s realization that although the 
government was not interested in supporting sex worker rights, it was interested in 
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fighting HIV/AIDS, and so sex workers could at least “force a place at the policy 
table” (p.85) by becoming part of this fight, namely by providing research and 
evaluation that challenged popular notions that sex workers place the general public at 
risk for STIs. In so doing, she adds further, CAL-PEP helped demonstrate prostitutes 
could be experts in HIV/AIDS education (Stoller, 1998).  
Consequently, since Project AWARE, CAL-PEP has developed their 
reputation as experts in HIV/AIDS prevention by participating in a number of research 
and evaluation projects described below. Participation in these projects-- and the data 
collection they require—is viewed differently by CAL-PEP’s leadership from the data 
collection activities required for grant compliance, described above: unlike the latter, 
these research projects are seen as ways to involve the community served and 
advocate for their needs. Consequently, the production of this research has allowed 
CAL-PEP to provide empirical proof that peer-based non-judgmental, harm-reduction 
oriented approaches to sex worker health and safety are effective and, contrary to 
popular belief, sex workers are responsible for their health and concerned with that of 
their community.” 
Indeed, as a group traditionally acted on by mainstream health officials, CAL-
PEP was initially skeptical of participating in research projects. Lockett (Interview, 18 
July 2007) stated that at CAL-PEP’s inception, research was a “real nasty word” to her 
because she disliked how top-down it appeared when (predominantly white) 
researchers “came to communities of color, got their material, and then basically left 
the population studied with nothing.” However, her opinion of research and evaluation 
activities changed when a doctor with the ACDPH approached them to apply for funds 
from the CDC to promote HIV prevention among women and infants (The Women 
and Infants Demonstration Project, hereafter referred to the Demonstration Project). 
The goal of the Demonstration Project was to decrease pregnancy and increase 
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condom use among women and their partners considered at high risk for HIV (namely 
young women, aged 15-34, who were sexually active, particularly those who used 
crack cocaine use and exchanged sex for cash, drugs or other trade, and were likely to 
have unprotected sex with multiple partners). As such, the Demonstration Project 
would provide services, but it also had a rigorous research and evaluation component 
to determine more broadly the ways a local intervention could be developed and 
adapted for used in other areas.  
This project appealed to Lockett and CAL-PEP because unlike past research 
she had witnessed, this project adhered to CAL-PEP’s mission to involve the sex 
worker community in the project’s implementation and evaluation process. Headed by 
Lockett, Dillard Smith and four research assistants, the Demonstration Project ran 
from 1991-1995 and went to four target areas and attracted residents with free 
condoms and bleach kits. Once there, researchers engaged in a stage-based encounters 
to assess the client’s HIV risk reduction behavior and frequency of condom use. 
Repeated encounters of this type allowed the researchers to adjust the information, 
education and level of support to the clients’ needs, which were determined through 
the project. As part of the project, they also provided referrals to CAL-PEP’s (now 
defunct) Ujima House, which provided prenatal care through the Demonstration 
Project, and they launched the Nefertiti Peer Networks, where women in East Oakland 
were recruited and trained to work as HIV/AIDS educators and referral providers 
(CAL-PEP, 1993).  
The results of this Demonstration Project highlighted the value of non-
criminalizing approaches to prostitution by showing that involving prostitutes in the 
implementation and diffusion of the intervention minimized prostitutes’ stigma in the 
community. These results were published in the journal AIDS Education and 
Prevention (Terry et al., 1999). Since the Demonstration Project, CAL-PEP has 
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bolstered its expert status in HIV/AIDS prevention to marginalized communities by 
engaging in numerous other research and evaluation projects, including a survey of 
young women to study risk for HIV and seroprevalence (1996-1998); a study to 
evaluate their mobile clinic services and their efficacy for preventing AIDS among 
IDUs and sex workers (1996-1998); a HIV behavioral risk assessment study in San 
Francisco (1997-1999); and a study from 2000-2002 of how to reduce HIV in African 
American communities (CAL-PEP, 2004a). Over time, CAL-PEP has published their 
research extensively (for more detail, see the following: Bowser, Ryan, Dillard-Smith, 
& Lockett, forthcoming; Bowser, Word, Lockett, & Dillard-Smith, 2001; Dorfman, 
1992; Dorfman, Hennessy, Lev, & Reilly, 1988; Lockett, Dillard-Smith, & Bowser, 
2004; Oliva, Rienks, Udoh, & Dillard-Smith, 2005; Terry et al., 1999).  
CAL-PEP has applied its expertise in HIV prevention for sex workers to the 
other marginalized, street-based communities they have grown to serve, which has 
further bolstered their role as experts in the HIV/AIDS prevention field. CAL-PEP has 
been a long-time member of the California HIV/AIDS Research Program (CHRP) 
(formerly the University of California’s AIDS Research Project [UARP]), which “was 
established [in 1983] to support excellent, timely and innovative research in basic, 
clinical, social/behavioral and epidemiologic sciences through research awards, 
collaborative agreements with the State Office of AIDS, and special initiatives…. 
CHRP communicates the findings of its funded research to the public through a 
variety of mechanisms: the annual report, the bi-annual Conference on AIDS Research 
in California, and various publications” (CHRP, 2008, p.1). Through the CHRP their 
most recent major project was the Brutha’s Project, which works to prevent 
HIV/AIDS among men who have sex with men but do not identify as gay (termed 
“MSM”).  
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The Bruthas Project illustrates how CAL-PEP has also applied its philosophy 
of non-judgment to service provision with other marginalized communities. According 
to James (Interview, 27 October 2007), who works with the project, Bruthas was 
developed in light of the State of Emergency and the growing rates of transmission 
among heterosexual couples; here MSMs were suspected of being major transmitters 
of the disease. He stated many MSMs believe they are “not gay” and thus “not 
susceptible to AIDS,” and so they will engage in sexual encounters without condoms, 
returning to their female partners and putting them at risk for HIV/AIDS. Applying 
CAL-PEP’s belief that services must be brought to clandestine and marginalized 
communities, the Brutha’s Project employs men to go out after-hours to (heterosexual) 
bars, to walk down the street, and also to recruit people they know. James stated that 
since most MSM try to keep this aspect of their sexual life a secret, it is hard to recruit 
them, so their main tool is an information booklet with prevention messages inside. 
They use the books at bars to engage people in conversations and “let them know 
what’s going on” but also talking about other diseases African American men are also 
higher risk for (diabetes, etc) as an entre into talking to them about HIV/AIDS.  
Advocacy 
CAL-PEP’s record of research and service provision has given them credibility 
and thus a place in the policy process, but as a charitable nonprofit and recipient of 
federal grant money CAL-PEP is very limited in its advocacy activities in the formal 
political arena (with regards to legislative lobbying and participation in political 
campaigns). However, CAL-PEP has been able to draw on its expertise and lobby in a 
manner permitted under section 501c3: by providing information to various legislative 
and other interested bodies about their constituency and its needs in order to continue 
service provision. Here, having such a large body of research and data has allowed 
 149 
CAL-PEP to improve their programs and also advocate for their grassroots at the 
local, state, federal and international levels.  
Locally, Gloria was the Chair of the regional Ryan White Council, where she 
helped to ensure the Ryan White Care Act was re-funded (CAL-PEP, 1995). Lockett 
and Dillard Smith also sit on the local HIV Health Services Prevention and Planning 
Council (established under the Ryan White Care Act in 1990), which is important, 
according to Dillard Smith (Interview, 3 November 2007) because they are visible to 
local health authorities and therefore are often “first in line” for funding and programs 
because they test, document, report and evaluate what they do. Dillard Smith cites the 
example of piloting their mobile testing program, which they were able to do because 
they were on the Planning Council. At the state level CAL-PEP has always traveled to 
Sacramento for the AIDS Lobby Day, and has sent staff members invited to speak on 
various issues such as the importance of providing health education to sex workers and 
women of color (CAL-PEP, 1999/2000). Federally, Carla Dillard Smith participated in 
Congressional hearings on HIV/AIDS in Washington, DC in 1998 when the state of 
Emergency was declared (CAL-PEP, 1998), and Lockett, Dillard Smith and various 
staff members frequently travel to Washington, DC and Atlanta, GA for CDC-
sponsored conferences and training events. As well, this year CAL-PEP will attend the 
National Conference on AIDS, hosted by the National Minority AIDS Council, which 
works to develop leadership among communities of color to fight AIDS. And 
internationally, CAL-PEP has been active at the International AIDS Conferences in 
Japan, Geneva and Toronto, among other locations.  However, CAL-PEP’s lobbying 
and advocacy work has not come without compromise. As Dillard Smith stated 
(Interview, 3 November 2006), while all of this advocacy work is necessary, it pulls 
them from their core work, so they must keep in mind that their first commitment is to 
their clients.  
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Limited possibilities in health service provision 
Within the realm of nonprofit health service provision, however, CAL-PEP’s expertise 
has not guaranteed them freedom to innovatively serve their community, 
demonstrating that-- in spite of desires expressed by policy-makers in the neo-liberal 
era for creative, local, community-based approaches to social service provision-- 
nonprofits are commonly constrained in expressing their radical commitments through 
service by the broader political/moral environment in which they operate. In CAL-
PEP’s case, they continue to operate in a broader political climate resistant to 
nonjudgmental approaches to sex worker health and safety: as a result—as 
demonstrated by the examples below-- their proposals are occasionally rejected by 
mainstream health authorities, or they must modify how they demonstrate a 
commitment to prostitutes’ rights in their programming. Indeed, these examples are 
not typical, but they demonstrate CAL-PEP is not immune to (or ignorant of) the 
broader political environment in which they operate, and thus adapts to it accordingly 
in order to continue with service provision. 
SAMHSA 
In the winter of 2007 CAL-PEP applied for a Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration (SAMHSA) grant. Before discussing this grant in particular, 
it is important to note that although CAL-PEP has clearly been quite successful at 
obtaining grants for service provision, it has often had to act subversively in how they 
write their grants, often omitting terms like “prostitute” and “harm reduction”, even 
though “this is exactly who the program will serve or what the proposed program will 
do anyway” (Interview, Gloria Lockett, 16 October 2006). Such strategic 
considerations have become essential, especially as large grants from federal agencies 
(which are the most sought after, as they are often larger, multi-year grants than those 
offered by foundations and local government agencies) have grown scarce and more 
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complicated. Although one might argue that such strategic considerations are proof 
CAL-PEP has lost its radical edge, its commitment to sex workers and other 
marginalized street-based populations is still evident in the programs they develop that 
refuse to moralize and judge sex workers.  
To illustrate, in 2007 CAL-PEP decided to apply for the SAMHSA grant to re-
open its day treatment program, but this time for younger sex workers or those “at 
risk” for entering the sex industry. As a group closely attuned to the needs of street-
based populations, CAL-PEP had been noticing more of these individuals in their 
street outreach work. While the proposed program would not address the lack of 
detoxification and safe house facilities, it would fill specific, identified gaps in the 
network of services 68. This center would be open to women aged 12-24 and have 
services such as individual and group substance abuse counseling, meals, connections 
to job training and other social services. Employing a harm reduction philosophy and 
expressing a commitment to prostitutes’ rights, they also would not force any of the 
women to leave the sex trade or to stop using substances as a condition of accessing 
services at the day treatment center.  
Their application for a SAMHSA grant demonstrates the broader political 
context’s resistance to certain approaches to sex worker health and safety, despite the 
American governmental interest in promoting local, community-based health and 
social service programs in the neo-liberal era. To fund the DTC, CAL-PEP learned (by 
tracking relevant government agency funding announcements, which they do almost 
daily) of SAMHSA’s request for proposals (RFP) in the fall of 2006, which invited 
                                                
68 For example, there is no detox facility in Alameda County for youth age 18 and under, and there are 
only a limited number of beds for inpatient substance abuse treatment. There is also no “safe house” in 
the county to provide housing for young sex workers, although it is possible to make referrals to a “safe 
house” in San Francisco, but it only has a small number of beds. Some educational and vocational 
services are available from Scotland Center, but many young sex workers need pre-vocational skills-
building to be able to take advantage of these resources. 
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community groups to submit proposals for a three year, $300,000 grant to offer 
services to women of color who engage in substance use and other activities that could 
put them at risk for HIV/AIDS. The RFP for this SAMHSA grant-- which provides 
application directions and requirements for groups applying for the grant-- was 58 
pages in length, and called for extremely detailed research to demonstrate community 
need, program descriptions, discussions of evaluation processes, budgeting, 
predictions of outcomes, letters of support from other community and local 
government groups, not to mention strict document formatting instructions, among a 
myriad of other requirements (it spent nearly three pages outlining font and document 
formatting requirements).  
Although it is understandable that groups receiving government funds should 
be explicit and accountable in their wishes so that, in turn, the federal granting agency 
can justify how it disperses funds, these requirements are also extremely time-
consuming and complicated for community groups. At CAL-PEP—which, one could 
argue has the data, skilled staff and history of program success needed for this grant-- 
composing this particular SAMHSA grant took nearly two months to complete (in the 
end, the submitted application was 132 pages in length). Although CAL-PEP hired a 
professional grant writer to compose the main narrative and program description 
components of the grant, it still taxed the administrative and management staff with 
not only program design, but also with writing and soliciting letters of support from 
community groups and government agencies, and providing adequate statistical and 
evaluation of CAL-PEP’s efficacy in providing related services (it also was not the 
only grant they had to write that year).  
However, CAL-PEP failed to obtain the grant, indicating that local, 
community-based programming must also, at times, confront a broader political 
context the often does not favor groups that adopt radical stances (in America, 
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anyway) towards sex worker health and safety. In the end, although CAL-PEP was 
careful to remove any explicit reference to harm reduction and was able to provide 
adequate evidence of their success with their previous day treatment center, they did 
not receive the grant. According to Gloria Lockett (Interview, 25 March 2008), an 
official from SAMHSA informed them that although their grant was “technically 
excellent” (meaning it was a well-developed program and the grant had all of the 
required components), they would not receive the funding because their method of 
reaching sex workers (i.e. not requiring them to leave the sex industry) was and is not 
very popular with the current federal administration.  
SEMS 
In response to the concerns of public officials, and in support of occupational choice 
for young people, CAL-PEP has modified their commitment to sex worker rights 
when it comes to working with young sex workers in Oakland. Lockett (Interview, 18 
July 2006) stated that CAL-PEP began to work with sex workers under the age of 18 
when they began to notice more young women (ages 14-16) working on the streets. 
The growing number and visibility of young sex workers in the Oakland area has also 
been noted by the county, local agencies and other law enforcement officials, leading 
to the formation of the Intra-agency Children’s Policy Council (ICPC) in 2002, which 
CAL-PEP was invited to join. According to Gary Thompson (Interview, 30 November 
2006), the director of the ICPC, the ICPC was developed to help organizations 
working with young sex workers-- termed “sexually exploited minors” (SEMs)69—
design programs, develop resources (ICPC does not fund organizations directly), 
                                                
69 According to Thompson, those in the Network had to fight the prostitution moniker in order to shift 
the label from “child prostitute” to ‘SEM”. They felt this definitional change was necessary because at 
least 90 percent of the youth prostitutes that come “through the system” have experienced or are 
escaping sexual exploitation, and also often have single parents, incarcerated parents, are academic 
failures, and about 75% have substance abuse issues. Despite all of this, he states that it was still hard to 
get this change because “many still see them as choosing to do it: this is not the case; it’s child abuse. 
As a result ‘Child prostitution is child abuse’ has become our [main mission] line.” 
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facilitate meetings, create programs and develop partnerships among CBOs and other 
agencies. ICPC was also asked by the county to research who the SEMs were, where 
they worked, etc. and report their results. They were then asked to form a taskforce, 
which was composed of law enforcement, CBOs, interested adults and others to do 
specific research and produce a report. Although SEMs are a not new phenomenon, 
and it is still difficult to assess whether the number of minors in prostitution locally is 
growing, a two-day conference about the issue was convened in April 2006 in 
Oakland (Chang, 2006; Graham, 2006; Sherman, 2006). Thompson stated that at this 
conference CAL-PEP and a number of other agencies came together informally and 
soon received money through Measure Y, which was passed in 2004 by the city 
council to provide approximately $19 million annually for violence prevention and 
public safety programs and services. Through the ICPC, CAL-PEP teamed up with 
other organizations in the area to develop the Sexually Exploited Minors Network in 
Alameda County70, whose mission is to  
 
“provide specialized services to sexually exploited minors, as well as provide ongoing 
education and awareness to support adolescent victims of sexual exploitation in the 
areas of policy development, cross system/cross regional case planning efforts, viable 
placement options, prevention of further victimization and highlight best 
practices/lessons learned” (Alameda County, 2006) 
CAL-PEP has worked with this network since 2005 and is the only organization in the 
network doing direct street outreach to this population, namely through its G-SPOT, 
SISTA and Measure Y programs described above.  
However, CAL-PEP’s has modified its philosophy of treating prostitutes as 
workers when it comes to women under the age of eighteen. Regarding the young sex 
worker population in general, Lockett reinforced that while CALPEP believed women 
                                                
70 Other organizations in this network providing direct services include Asian Health Services, which 
works with young Southeast Asian women engaged in or at risk of sexual exploitation; Dream Catcher 
Youth Shelter, the only emergency shelter for youth ages 12-28 in Alameda County; and the George P. 
Scotlan Youth and Family Center’s Sexually Exploited Minor’s program, offering case management 
and support services to SEMs. 
 155 
over 21 can “decide what to do with their bodies, children (like these girls) need to be 
in school” (Interview, 18 July 2006). And so, through involvement with the ICPC, she 
and the CAL-PEP staff want to ensure these girls are “making choices and not just 
doing street work because they think it’s their only option.” Moreover, she stated, 
CAL-PEP sees many of the young girls do this work because of their family 
backgrounds (for example, their mothers did this work or there is drug addiction in the 
family, and so these girls are the breadwinners.) Therefore, Lockett stated, “CAL-PEP 
says yes, you are doing this for a living, but that there are other things you can do as 
well.”  
As a result, Lockett (Interview, 18 July) notes, CALPEP has come to differ 
from COYOTE on prostitution when it comes to minors because “[COYOTE] was 
more just about doing what you want with your body/ your body is your business”. 
Here she noted further that COYOTE’s attitude was more characteristic of “white girls 
who see [prostitution] as a choice,” whereas CAL-PEP’s clients participate in 
prostitution because they have no other choices. But even with a modified 
commitment to sex worker rights for young women, CAL-PEP is still limited in the 
services it can offer due to funding constraints. Within the SEM network/ICPC, it is 
up to the organizations to raise their own funds to implement their programs, even 
though the county has determined the SEM issue should be considered seriously.  
Conclusion 
A 1988 article in the San Francisco Chronicle, entitled “Former Hookers Help 
Themselves” (Olszewski, 1988) describes a CAL-PEP outreach excursion in the city’s 
Tenderloin neighborhood, where they handed out condoms and bleach kits. The article 
ends by describing how Gloria Lockett has handed condoms without judgment to Beti, 
a transgendered sex worker who shoots speed. Over 20 years later, Lockett is more 
likely to be found in the boardrooms of health departments, meeting with major 
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donors, and making presentations at AIDS prevention events world-wide than she is 
out on the streets. But then again, CAL-PEP is no longer a small organization on a 
shoestring budget that mainly distributes condoms and bleach kits in the Tenderloin.  
 Indeed, one may conclude that CAL-PEP has “sold out” and is yet another case 
of a grassroots organization outgrowing and abandoning its radical roots by 
prioritizing service provision over protest. However, a closer look at CAL-PEP’s 
organizational growth and development shows the reality is much more complex. 
Indeed, from removing “prostitutes” from its original name, to creating a highly 
professionalized management and administrative structure and establishing themselves 
as expert advisors in issues of HIV/AIDS prevention, CAL-PEP has made some 
compromises, shifting from advocacy to service provision maintenance. But these 
compromises have been made to ensure CAL-PEP can reach its grassroots 
constituency (now more broadly defined as street-based populations at risk for 
HIV/AIDS) and involve them in service provision. 
 Despite these compromises, CAL-PEP has also managed to remain a 
fundamentally radical institution, committed to putting a vision of sex workers’ (and 
other street-based populations) rights into practice. At CAL-PEP, prostitutes—a group 
commonly blamed for the spread of disease—can act on their own behalf to serve their 
peers (and broader community) and help them meet their own immediate health and 
safety needs. In so doing, CAL-PEP represents an important site of possibility: it 
provides sex workers with a credible model of peer service provision they can 
replicate elsewhere (the St. James Infirmary, the subject of the following chapter, is 
one such example of this replication). However, CAL-PEP also represents a site of 
criticism: many also argue that while CAL-PEP might offer valuable services, this has 
taken it away from the broader, long term struggle for sex workers’ rights, which are 
also essential to the community’s health and safety.  
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Certainly, CAL-PEP’s capacity to advocate here is constrained by their 
nonprofit status and data collection requirements, which have led them to largely 
avoid political activities that might compromise their nonprofit status and/or grants. At 
the same time, CAL-PEP has demonstrated an uncanny ability to circumvent these 
constraints and advocate for prostitutes’ rights within the HIV/AIDS prevention 
establishment. They have continuously evaluated their programs and engaged in 
various research projects, the results of which they have published extensively to 
inform political and public officials alike of the benefits of non-judgmental, non-
criminalizing approaches to sex worker health and safety. Furthermore, they have 
engaged in a wide variety of advocacy and lobbying activity permitted under Section 
501c3 of the IRC, such as providing information to various legislative bodies about 
the importance of funding HIV/AIDS prevention services for sex workers and other 
street-based populations; participating in AIDS Lobby Days at the state level; and 
speaking at International AIDS Conferences world-wide. Indeed, none of these 
activities involve directly lobbying public officials or engaging in protests to 
decriminalize prostitution; however, they have promoted the notion that sex workers 
(and the general public) will be safer and healthier if they are not criminalized. After 
all, to quote Gloria Lockett, in the age of HIV/AIDS, when it comes to advocacy, 
"there's no time to be stuffy. People are dying" (cited in Olszewski, 1988, p.D5)
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CHAPTER 4 
A PLACE OF OUR OWN? EXPLORING THE RADICAL POSSIBILITES AND 
POLITICAL POTENTIAL OF THE ST. JAMES INFIRMARY 
This chapter turns to consider the St. James Infirmary (SJI), COYOTE’s daughter and 
CAL-PEP’s “younger sibling”. Established in 1999 in San Francisco by sex worker 
activists involved with COYOTE and CAL-PEP, the SJI is the world’s only 
occupational health and safety clinic for sex workers. In telling the SJI’s story, this 
chapter considers how sex worker activists might maintain their radical commitments 
(in this case, to prostitutes’ rights) when they transition into the realm of nonprofit 
health service provision in the neo-liberal era. Similar to the previous chapter, this 
chapter first discusses the political context in which the SJI emerged in the 1990s: the 
social movements of the 1960s were long over, and anti-prostitution sentiments were 
on the rise among political officials and the public. Sex worker rights activists 
therefore moved from the realm of protest to form partnerships with the local health 
department and establish the SJI. 
Yet this close partnership between sex worker activists and government has not 
precluded their commitment to prostitutes’ rights. Similar to CAL-PEP, the SJI 
expresses a commitment to prostitutes’ rights internally by treating sex workers as 
workers (not criminals) and by involving them in the organization’s service provision 
and management operations, despite a history of prostitutes being blamed for the 
spread of STIs and HIV/AIDS. But what of the SJI’s capacity to mobilize the sex 
workers who gather there on a weekly basis and engage them in broader advocacy 
externally, in the political and legislative realm? In response to this question, this 
chapter discusses further how the SJI is variously constrained in such endeavors by 
two vectors of political constraint: incorporation as a nonprofit under section 501c3 of 
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and by data collection requirements imposed on 
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them by various granting agencies. Indeed, encounters with these vectors have led 
them to focus on organizational maintenance and service provision at the expense of 
broader political advocacy. But, like CAL-PEP, the SJI also employs strategies of 
circumvention that help them promote and express their commitment to prostitutes’ 
rights beyond their organization without compromising their capacity to offer services 
to sex workers.  
Part I. Only in San Francisco? Sex workers, public health and the development of 
the SJI  
When told about the SJI, the response for many might first be to say “only in San 
Francisco”. For this reason, it is important to first discuss briefly how the political 
context in San Francisco has created opportunities for sexual minorities to develop 
partnerships with various government agencies. Broadly speaking, San Francisco has a 
reputation as the nation’s vanguard progressive city and is nationally known for its 
culture of tolerance and celebration of diversity, and for being generous when it comes 
to social programming for its residents71. Given the city’s high degrees of political 
engagement, liberal ideology, secularism, friendliness towards immigrants and sexual 
liberalism among its residents (DeLeon, 1992, 2002), on the surface it is unsurprising 
that San Francisco government agencies have been open to developing and 
implementing progressive methods of health and social service delivery for and with 
sexual minorities, particularly with the advent of the HIV/AIDs epidemic.  
Indeed, much of San Francisco’s reputation for sexual liberalism—and hence 
openness to working with sexual (and other) minorities-- stems from the fact that it is 
the center of lesbian and gay political influence in the US 72(R. Bailey, 1999). 
                                                
71 With an annual budget of $5.7 billion per year and a population of only 750,000 (City and County of 
San Francisco, 2007, p.18), the city exceeds even New York City-- with an annual budget of $59.0 
billion (Budget, 2008, p.1) and population of 8 million—in per capita spending. 
72 Of course, as D’Emilio (2002) writes, this did not mean the gay and lesbian movement was unified 
and harmonious. For many gay men, liberation meant freedom from harassment, whereas for many 
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Therefore, when the AIDS epidemic emerged, San Francisco began its efforts to 
identify, treat and prevent AIDS long before other cities, the federal government or the 
state of California because of the nature of the affected community and its relationship 
to the city (I. Cohen & Elder, 1989). Gay men—namely those who were white and 
middle class-- had the resources and a well-established political presence in the city’s 
civic and political life, which facilitated the city taking responsibility from the start for 
AIDS service provision, in conjunction with the gay community. Most notably, the 
city was able to draw from the network of social welfare organizations within the gay 
community itself in order to deliver care at reasonable costs (I. Cohen & Elder, 
1989)73. One of the major examples of this collaboration was between the San 
Francisco Department of Public Health (SFDPH) and the San Francisco AIDS 
Foundation (SFAF)74.   
As noted in the previous chapter, however, prostitutes were not in a similar 
political position to gay men with the advent of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Even in 
supposedly sexually liberal San Francisco, the AIDS epidemic quickly led sex workers 
                                                                                                                                       
lesbians it meant freedom from patriarchy. As well, class issues also riffed the community: gay male 
real estate speculators had little concern for their brothers who could not pay skyrocketing rents, and 
gay men and women of color found themselves displaced by more privileged members of the 
community. 
73 Of course the city also had a financial imperative to work with the gay community: AIDS was costly 
to the city. As the illness increased and patients required more care, clinical and convalescent facilities 
and were often unwilling to accept AIDS patients because of the perceived threat AIDS posed to 
patients and staff. 
74 Opened by gay activist Cleve Jones in a storefront office in the Castro neighborhood, the SFAF began 
with a donated typewriter, pilfered office supplies and one phone line as an all-volunteer grassroots 
CBO composed mainly of gay community leaders and physicians (Armstrong, 2002; Arno, 1986). 
Although the SFAF’s initial goal was to raise funds to support and disseminate research about AIDS, it 
soon became clear that this would be of little immediate, practical help for the increasing numbers of 
gay men afflicted with AIDS, and so the SFAF soon shifted its focus to direct service provision (I. 
Cohen & Elder, 1989). By October 1982, the SFAF formally contracted with the SFDPH to provide 
educational services in San Francisco, including educational events, telephone services, materials 
development and providing the media with accurate information. In 1983 the SFAF also contracted with 
the state of California’s Department of Health Services to provide information about AIDS to other 
counties in northern California, and the foundation also established a social services department that 
same year to assist persons with AIDS and related conditions in need of emergency services such as 
shelter, financial assistance and medical attention (Arno, 1986).  
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to be scape-goated by public health and political authorities alike for the spread of 
disease, and the criminalization of prostitution made it difficult for them to gather 
without fear of arrest. Yet despite lacking the resources and political clout of gay men, 
activist sex workers in San Francisco were at least networked through COYOTE, 
through which they formed CAL-PEP in the early 1980s to respond to the epidemic. 
CAL-PEP thus proved to be an important precursor to the SJI because through it, sex 
worker activists learned how to access public health and other government resources. 
Furthermore, through CAL-PEP many sex worker activists also established their 
expertise in sex worker health and safety. Most notably, Priscilla Alexander, a 
COYOTE activist and CAL-PEP founder, developed a model for a sex worker clinic 
while working for the World Health Organization in the 1990s that would provide 
much needed services to the sex worker community and provide a site from which 
prostitution research would be conducted and disseminated.   
The clinic model (Alexander, 1995b) was based first and foremost on the 
radical and highly pragmatic notion that sex work was work—regardless of 
motivations—in that it involved the provision of a service in exchange for 
compensation, and like any other work, posed occupational health and safety hazards 
to participants. So unlike the clinics created by public health officials in San Francisco 
in 1911 that sought to regulate and control sex workers (described in Chapter Two), 
this clinic would be peer-run, mixing professional and administrative personnel, 
wherever possible, with sex work experience, to provide free and non-judgmental 
health services, including general medical care, gynecological services, orthopedic 
care/physical therapy, mental health services, and drug treatment groups. A Board of 
Directors comprised of sex workers and those knowledgeable about relevant issues 
would over-see the planning and operations of the clinic, while day-to-day 
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management would be provided through an administrative coordinator in a non-
hierarchical manner (Alexander, 1995b)  
Although establishing a clinic would meet sex worker’s health and safety 
needs more immediately and empower sex workers and help them build community, 
opportunities for establishing one were limited, even in San Francisco. Opening a 
clinic required money, space, staff and licensing, among other costly elements. 
Activist sex workers and their allies knew that history and politics were largely 
stacked against them, and despite COYOTE’s presence in the city and CAL-PEP’s 
growth and success, they still lacked the resources and representation within the city’s 
governing institutions that would make implementing this project much easier. 
Moreover, few politicians or other public figures were willing to stand in favor of 
openly supporting such an endeavor. However, as the following pages demonstrate, 
two events (motivated by the very scapegoating of prostitutes COYOTE fought so 
hard to challenge)— gentrification concerns leading to the San Francisco Task Force 
on Prostitution, and the SFDPH’s targeting of prostitutes for the spread of syphilis—
provided an opportunity for sex worker activists in San Francisco to establish an 
occupational health and safety clinic for sex workers. 
The San Francisco Taskforce on Prostitution 
As discussed in Chapter Two, in the early 1990s growing concerns about the impact of 
street prostitution on property values in gentrifying areas led the San Francisco Board 
of Supervisors to create the San Francisco Taskforce on Prostitution (hereafter referred 
to as the Taskforce) in 1994, the first public discussion and study of prostitution in the 
city. The Taskforce wanted to consider a new approach to prostitution for the city, 
which could include anything from the non-enforcement of prostitution laws to city-
owned love barracks (McCormick, 1993). The Taskforce also was unique in that it 
offered sex workers an opportunity to be fully included in the process, providing an 
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important cultural and political site in which conversations took place and 
recommendations were made for alternative approaches to prostitution (Lutnick, 
2006). Sex worker activists drew from the organizational presence they developed 
with COYOTE to capitalize on this (brief) political moment to promote a non-
judgmental, non-criminalizing approach to prostitution75.  
The Taskforce’s activities and politics were an important formative event in 
the SJI’s establishment: it brought activist sex workers (and their allies) into the 
political institutions and processes of local government. The Taskforce produced its 
final report in March 1996, presenting findings and making recommendations in the 
areas of law enforcement, health and safety, quality of life concerns, labor policy, 
immigration and youth issues (SFTF, 1996). Its major finding was that prostitution is 
not monolithic, but the city had institutionalized one approach—persecution-- which 
disproportionately targeted street workers, who composed less than 20 percent of the 
prostitution trade in the city. The Taskforce emphasized further that this approach was 
costly to the city (at approximately $7.6 million per year in law enforcement-related 
expenditures) and did little to eradicate resident concerns or provide safety, security 
and services to prostitutes. It therefore recommended the city stop enforcing and 
prosecuting prostitution crimes and focus instead on quality of life infractions, which 
in turn would free-up resources to provide services for needy constituencies.  
Although this major recommendation (non-enforcement) has yet to be 
implemented, the Taskforce also made recommendations which the SJI would later 
reflect: that health care be accessible, without discrimination, to sex workers; and that 
health care providers be trained to be sensitive to sex worker needs. These 
recommendations were based on the Taskforce’s finding that many sex workers were 
                                                
75 Six members of the Taskforce representing various neighborhood associations also expressed 
concerns, eventually leaving the Taskforce claiming that they believed the deck was “stacked” in favor 
of legalizing prostitution (Strupp, 1994b, 1995). 
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receiving inadequate health care due to a lack of health insurance and to a fear that 
disclosing their work activities to health care providers would lead to discrimination or 
arrest.  
Activist sex workers in San Francisco took advantage of this political window 
of opportunity created by the release of the Taskforce’s findings by establishing 
themselves further in the social and political institutions of the city. In 1996 Margot 
St. James ran for Supervisor, coming in seventh in a race for six seats. As well, in 
1995 Carol Stuart, a long-time COYOTE member and SJI founder and board member, 
created the first sex worker caucus in the Harvey Milk LGBT Democratic Club 
because it would provide an open political space from which prostitutes could speak 
publicly, organize, and develop alliances with another sexual minority whose struggle 
was in many ways similar to theirs as sexual minority76 (Interview, Carol Stuart, 20 
November 2006).   
Syphilis & the SFDPH 
Even though they were becoming more entrenched in the city’s political institutions, 
sex worker activists and their allies were aware that gentrification forces and anti-
prostitution sentiments remained strong in San Francisco. And so as the years passed 
following the Taskforce, it became clearer that the non-enforcement of prostitution-
related laws in the city was a remote possibility at best. However, when sex workers 
were targeted for the spread of syphilis in San Francisco in the late 1990s, sex worker 
activists realized again, as they had with the formation of CAL-PEP, that sex workers 
would have to help themselves when it came to disease prevention: working more 
                                                
76 Stuart noted further in the interview that they when COYOTE had been more active, there was 
always a concern that they would be arrested for conspiracy to commit prostitution. By organizing a 
caucus in the Harvey Milk club, if they were to be arrested for prostitution conspiracy, all of the 
members of the club would have to be arrested too (although this never happened). However, 
maintaining the partnership between sex workers and the Harvey Milk Club has been difficult. Stuarts 
stated that as the LGBT community becomes more empowered/enfranchised, they want less to do with 
prostitutes on the street; she claims this will hurt the LGBT community eventually. 
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directly with the public health department might provide a more effective rout to 
eventually decriminalizing prostitution (Alexander, 1995a).   
In 1998, Carol Stuart and Margot St. James received a call from a brothel-
based sex worker who had been arrested and had her blood drawn (under the guise of 
testing for syphilis) without her consent. The sex worker asked Carol if this testing 
was acceptable, and Stuart said “hell no” (Interview, Carol Stuart, 20 November 
2006). Stuart and St. James soon began to hear from more sex workers who had 
recently been tested this way for syphilis. Carol called the general counsel at the health 
department and was put in touch with Dr. Jeffrey Klausner, the newly appointed head 
of the SFDPH’s department of STI Prevention and Control 77 (also known as City 
Clinic). Stuart et al met with Dr. Klausner to express concerns about testing prostitutes 
in jails and stated there was a more effective way to prevent syphilis (and other STIs) 
among sex workers: Priscilla Alexander’s occupational health and safety clinic for sex 
workers.  
Fortunately, the SFDPH was open to new approaches to sex worker health, and 
Dr. Klausner provided exactly the alliance sex workers needed. Upon coming to his 
position, Dr. Klausner (Interview, 31 October 2006) had assessed the sexual health 
landscape and realized the SFDPH was still not meeting the needs of a number of 
communities in the city, including sex workers. The testing incident in the jails 
signaled the need to improve on this. However, for sex workers to gain the SFDPH”s 
support for their clinic model, concessions were required. Klausner was aware of a 
discussion in the late 1990s to move massage parlor regulation from the police to the 
                                                
77 Within the SFDPH’s structure, City Clinic is a subdivision of one of the SFDPH’s two major 
divisions, the Population Health and Prevention Division, which has two major sub-sections, the San 
Francisco AIDS Office and Community Health and Safety Services. The other major division is the 
Community Health Network, which is the system of integrated health services delivery and includes 
such sub-divisions as San Francisco General Hospital, Housing and Urban Health, Behavioral Health, 
and Community Health Promotion and Prevention, among others. 
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health department, which came out of the Taskforce’s finding that a conflict existed 
for the police, who enforced the regulations but also gained licensing fees from them 
(in the amount of $170,000 per year). He wanted the massage parlors to be regulated 
by the health department, and so he sought sex worker community support for this 
change. As a result, he was open to discussing the possibility of a clinic. 
At the same time, sex workers in the dancing sector were also making gains 
and becoming increasingly visible. Johanna Breyer and Dawn Passar, heads of the 
Exotic Dancers’ Alliance (EDA) had recently won a $2.85 million settlement for 
dancers in 1998 against the Bjiou Group in reference to pending sexual harassment 
cases (Akers, 2005; Lutnick, 2006). Even though this victory demonstrated to the 
public and political officials alike that sex workers had legitimate health and safety 
concerns, Breyer was increasingly concerned about the health needs of dancers. At the 
same time, both women had jobs with various community-based public health services 
(Breyer worked for the SFAF and Passar was with Asia-Pacific Islander Wellness 
Center and the Asian AIDS Project), which brought them into contact with various 
public health officials. In August 1998 Breyer and Passar were at an HIV Planning 
Council meeting, where they met Dr. Klausner, who they encouraged to better meet 
the needs of sex workers; he in turn found the support he needed from the sex worker 
community for shifting the massage parlor regulations away from the police. A 
meeting was consequently arranged with Carol Stuart and Priscilla Alexander. 
Together, the awareness of (illegal) syphilis testing in jails (by the health department, 
discussed above) and growing support for sex worker health and safety in the dancing 
and massage sectors coalesced. With Priscilla Alexander’s program model, they were 
able to open the St. James Infirmary on June 2, 1999, after hours in the City Clinic 
offices. 
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However, it soon was clear that the SJI’s location in the City Clinic hindered 
its ability to establish itself as an independent group that could act as claims-makers 
and service providers (Lutnick, 2006). According to Dr. Deb Cohan, the SJI’s former 
medical director (Interview, 19 December 2006), day staff at the city clinic were a bit 
resentful of their presence, thinking this group was getting “an easy ride”: after all, 
many of the SJI’s staff were volunteers without a health care background. And 
according to Drew (Interview, 9 January 2007), a peer staff member, they often 
received complaints about any mess or movement of office equipment (real or 
imagined) they might have left. So with some help from the SFDPH, the SJI moved to 
its current Mission St. location (formerly the city’s Disease Control and Investigation 
division). Although smaller than City Clinic, there was (and is) enough space for three 
counseling rooms, two offices, a small group meeting room and a community room 
that hosts the food and clothing bank and a computer workstation. 
The SJI Today 
Today, the SJI’s remains closely connected to the SFDPH (particularly the AIDS 
Office and City Clinic) because of budgetary concerns: the SFDPH was one of the few 
sources of funding available for such a project. And so with Dr. Klausner’s support, 
City Clinic donated the space and many of the supplies and medical staff needed for 
the clinic. However, there was little else in terms of funding, since, as Carol Stuart 
(Interview, 20 November 2006) noted, “there was an aversion to funding something 
that did not focus on saving fallen women”. So Stuart paid people (and other fees, like 
incorporation expenses, etc) out of pocket until the SJI accepted money from the 
AIDS Office, the only other place open to supporting sex worker health projects. 
Indicating the compromise that this budgetary arrangement represented, Johanna 
Breyer (Interview, 23 October 2006) stated that accepting this money was also 
unfortunate because “we wanted to get away from the idea that sex workers were 
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vectors of disease, and now the agency that historically promoted that idea also funded 
us”. But at the same time, as Carol Stuart stated (Interview, 20 November 2006), she 
and the SJI would take money from anyone if it meant giving people health care, 
noting further that “Any woman who has been a prostitute knows about taking the 
money, and you take it to get what you need” (Interview, 20 November 2006). 
Currently, the SJI is funded by a variety of sources, although they remain 
largely dependent on the SFDPH. According to Naomi Akers, the SJI’s current 
executive director (Interview, 5 December 2006), the SJI’s budget is approximately 
$450 thousand per year, summarized in Table 4.1, below: 
Table 4.1: The SJI’s Budget    
Source Amount  Programs Funded 
SFDPH AIDS Office $138,815 per year until the end 
of 2008 
HIV prevention works for sex 
workers and their current 
partners, including STI testing, 
groups, outreach, needle 
exchange, evaluation, 50% of 
annual audit, portion of 
insurance and accounting fees, 
10 hours per week of executive 
director’s salary 
SFDPH Office of STI Control 
and Prevention (aka City Clinic) 
$128,245 (in-kind, annually) HIV testing services, certain 
medical staff (nurse/clinical 
director, phlebotomist, HIV 
counselor). Includes also rent for 
the clinic, computer and phone 
network support and 
infrastructure, medical supplies, 
lab testing costs, harm reduction 
supplies (condoms and lube)  
Source: SJI. (2007). St. James Infirmary: 6 month agency report. San Francisco: St. 
James Infirmary. 
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Table 4.1 continued 
California State Office of AIDS $75,000/year for 3 years (until 
end of June 2010) 
Needle exchange services, 
specifically to increase needle 
exchange services to include 
HIV/STI/HEP C testing, Hep 
A/B vaccines, holistic services, 
partial funding for peer educator 
training program for secondary 
syringe exchangers  
California Endowment $94,000 over 2 years (ending in 
2008) 
Capacity development. Includes 
small portion of executive 
director salary and salary for 
development director to explore 
web-based programs; patient 
database; registration 
coordinator and support staff for 
medical records management 
and patient billing; portion of 
annual accounting and insurance 
fees; some office supplies and 
educational materials; board and 
management staff trainings at 
Compass Point, a nonprofit 
development service; consultant 
fees for board and executive 
director and staff development 
Syringe Access Fund $5,000/year for 2 years (until 
2008) 
Needle exchange coordinator 
General funds (from individual 
donations and various 
fundraising events, such as Gay 
Pride, Erotic Health Day, the 
Folsom Street Fair, and the San 
Francisco AIDS Walk) 
$97,000 50% of executive director’s 
salary and accounting fees; 90 
percent of development 
director’s salary; most medical 
providers; acupuncture services 
not covered through Immune 
Enhancement Project (described 
below); all database fees over 
$10,000 provided by California 
Endowment; all computer and 
office equipment; some printing 
costs; staff training costs not 
covered funding sources; 
partially funds massage services; 
needle exchange services not 
covered by SF AIDS Office 
grant (wound/abscess care) 
Source: SJI. (2007). St. James Infirmary: 6 month agency report. San Francisco: SJI  
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Along with this funding, the SJI also relies heavily on the generosity of other agencies, 
namely the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) AIDS Research Institute 
(for medical services), Walden House (a drug treatment center where they refer 
clients), and the Immune Enhancement Center (an acupuncture college; trainees here 
volunteer at the SJI’s clinic night). Akers and the development director also recently 
completed a grant from the National Minority AIDS Foundation (for two computers) 
and, at the time of writing, were in the process of applying for grants from the 
Horizons Foundation (to develop and promote HIV prevention media materials for sex 
workers) and the Third Wave Foundation (to enhance programs for transgendered 
individuals). 
 With this budget, the SJI has grown to serve a broad spectrum of the sex 
worker community. As Dr. Cohan, the SJI’s former medical director observed 
(Interview, 19 December 2006), at the beginning most who came to the clinic were 
“either Margo St. James’s friends or strippers and a few BDSM folks,” but this has 
changed over time and today the SJI serves a diverse sex worker clientele. The tables 
below (based on 2006 data collected by the SJI) provide an overview of the 
populations served, recruited through word of mouth (37 percent), outreach (on the 
streets, in massage parlors and dance clubs, etc: 29 percent), referrals (16 percent), 
pre-trial diversion (8 percent), and media advertising (8 percent). Data published by 
the SJI (Cohan, Cobaugh, Cloniger, & Klausner, 2002, slide #9) indicates that 
between 1999 and 2003 there were 1,059 total encounters between SJI staff and sex 
workers (in and out of the clinic), and 699 people were served at the clinic during this 
time 78(with a mean of 2.5 visits per client in this time period, in a range of 1-34).  
                                                
78 While 1,059 total encounters over three years (1999-2001) appears to indicate that the clinic served 
less than 1 client per day, as discussed below, the clinic is only open three days per week for very 
limited hours (Tuesday from 1-6 pm; Wednesday from 6-9 pm; and Thursday from 6-9 pm). 
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Table 4.2: SJI Clientele 
Gender 
22% men who have sex with men 
2% men who have sex with women 
43% women who have sex with men, women or transgenders 
33% transgenders 
Ethnicity 
60 % white 
19% Latino/a 
15% African America 
2% Asian/Pacific Islander 
2% American Indian 
3% Other 
Types of sex work reported *  
Hooking/prostitution – 10 Escorting—22 
BDSM—17 Dancing/stripping—12 
Street work—7 Survival sex—2 
In-call – 1 Massage/sensual massage—10 
Porn—3 Various—7 
This is a one-month sample, in real numbers, based on voluntary responses and thus is 
not the total number of clients served. According to Naomi Akers, the SJI’s executive 
director, the SJI does not yet keep data on demographic changes over time (Email 
correspondence, 15 May 2007). 
Although the data above shows the clinic serving a range of sex workers, many long-
time clinic staff readily acknowledge that their clientele is becoming increasingly 
service-dependent: transgender individuals and street-based sex workers are the fastest 
growing groups at the SJI79. Since these groups disproportionately face issues of 
substance abuse, mental health, employment, housing and violence challenges, they 
demand more of the SJI’s resources, as they require more time for counseling and 
assistance finding housing, food, employment and linkages to other social services, 
                                                
79 According to “Good Jobs NOW!” (TLC, 2006, p.1), the most recent snapshot of the economic health 
of transgenders in San Francisco, of those surveyed 60% of respondents earned under $15,300 per year, 
and only 8% earned over $45,900, while over 57% have experienced employment discrimination. The 
report illustrates further that low income and transgender status has also contributed to instability in 
living situations for many: 27% have experienced housing discrimination, and not even 5% own their 
own residence. Regarding street-based sex workers, General research on prostitution makes clear that 
this population, while estimated to only make up twenty percent of the trade (PEN, 2004, p.1), are more 
likely to be women of color, have less education, and face the highest risks for abuse, such as 
exploitation by pimps and law enforcement officials, and drug and health-related problems (Weitzer, 
1999). At the SJI, street-based workers certainly experience these challenges. According to Cohan et al 
(2006), at the SJI those doing street-based work were less likely to have a community/contact with other 
sex workers, and were also the most likely to be arrested and convicted of sex work-related charges and 
to have experienced sex work-related violence. 
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such as General Assistance (GA) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Trisha, a 
transgendered sex worker, provides an example of this dependency: she stated 
(Interview, 1 November 2006) she uses the SJI for not only medical services, but the 
computer, massage service, and clothing and food banks.  
Part II. Expressing radical commitments: sex workers and health service provision 
at the SJI 
With sex workers at the SJI so closely connected to the SFDPH, questions arise as to 
whether the organization might promote sex worker rights among those it serves and 
in the broader political realm. As this section will discuss, the SJI does this internally, 
by employing a non-judgmental philosophy towards sex workers, and by involving 
them in service provision and organizational management. All of this is made possibly 
by the local government’s (SFDPH’s) openness to community-based health service 
provision (termed “localism”), and by the professional capacity in which sex workers 
are involved at the SJI. 
Philosophy 
The SJI’s commitment to prostitutes’ rights is expressed through their philosophy 
(mission statement), which is informed by a commitment to harm reduction. Harm 
reduction is generally associated with substance abuse treatment, emphasizing non-
judgmental service provision and meeting people “where they are at” to help them 
make informed health choices80. This philosophy is clearly reflected in the SJI’s 
mission, which is as follows:  
“Our mission is to provide compassionate, non-judgmental health care and social 
services for adult entertainers and sex workers, while preventing occupational 
illnesses and injuries through a comprehensive continuum of services” (SJI, 2008, 
                                                
80 According to the Harm Reduction Coalition (www.harmreduction.org), “Harm reduction is a set of 
practical strategies that reduce negative consequences of drug use, incorporating a spectrum of 
strategies from safer use, to managed use to abstinence. Harm reduction strategies meet drug users 
"where they're at," addressing conditions of use along with the use itself.” Practical examples of harm 
reduction include methadone and heroin assisted treatment, and syringe exchanges and safer facilities.    
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p.1) 
Therefore, in stark contrast to most community and government-related programs, 
which often seek to “save” sex workers from the trade by making their exit a 
prerequisite for getting help, the SJI non-judgmentally accepts the performance of all 
kinds sex work, including helping people leave the industry if that is what they want 
(Selke, 2004). 
Localism 
Implementing this philosophy is facilitated by the health department’s belief that local, 
community-based service provision provides the most effective means of reaching San 
Francisco residents. According to officials from the AIDS Office,  
“Sex workers are citizens and have rights to health services, and the SJI is a specific 
agency decided to provide services to them. The SJI also does prevention messages 
for HIV, and the sex workers’ partners get services too. The AIDS Office makes no 
judgment about the populations they reach, and since they are at risk, this makes 
reaching to sex workers all the more important. The job of the AIDS office is HIV 
prevention, no matter what people are doing.” (Interview, 27 February 2007) 
And so, according to Dr. Klausner (in Lelchuk, 1999) the SJI’s philosophy 
acknowledges that access to health care should not be determined by what people do 
in their private lives; after all, he says, “if someone is driving under the influence and 
crashes his or her car, are we not going to care of him or her?” (in Lelchuk, 1999, 
p.A4).  
A brief description of a clinic night at the SJI one night in January 2007 
provides an example of this philosophy in practice. At 6 pm, the doors open and 
community members stream in—a mix of biological and transgendered men and 
women-- chatting, taking a number and a chart, and helping themselves to food that 
has been laid out by a peer volunteer. Some venture to the community room to take 
advantage of the reiki and acupuncture offered while they wait for their appointment. 
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Pratima, the physician on duty (everyone is a on a first-name basis), comes to the 
community room to hug a patient she has not seen in awhile. Towards the end of the 
night, a stunning tall blonde dancer comes in to collect a bag of condoms (half mint, 
half regular) for a sex party she and some fellow dancers will be working at, while one 
of the peer staff working that night discusses how she has to go home and clean up 
from a client who has a cooking oil fetish.  
This sex worker-friendly environment provides a radical challenge to how sex 
workers have received health services because, as noted extensively in the literature, 
sex workers often do not disclose their profession to their health care providers for 
fear of arrest or of receiving inadequate care, among other concerns (Alexander, 
1995a, 1998; Cohan et al., 2004; Cohan et al., 2006; Zalduondo, Hernandez-Avila, & 
Uribe-Zuniga, 1991). Therefore, as Dr. Cohan (Interview, 19 December 2006) stated, 
at the SJI, by the time she sees the patient they have already gone through intake and 
met with a peer counselor, so they know they can trust the doctor, which means there 
is “no bullshit” and they can get to their health issues immediately. To illustrate, she 
cited the example of a patient she had since 1997 whom she thought she knew well…. 
Until she saw her at the SJI when it opened in 1999! Both of them were apologizing 
because they had no idea about this. Now, this patient came to her recently with a 
shoulder injury from fisting, and they joked about listing it as “repetitive stress” on the 
intake form. As Cohan notes, “You cannot replicate such honesty in a clinic, no matter 
how hip” (Interview, 19 December 2006). She now teaches classes on sex worker 
health and she warns students that, within this area of practice, they jump right into 
sexual history differently from in “the real world”. 
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Peer-based Service Provision 
With its non-judgmental approach to sex worker health and safety, the SJI expresses 
its commitment to prostitutes’ rights within the organization by involving sex 
workers—a group historically blamed for the spread of HIV/AIDS—in service 
provision and organizational management. Before discussing how they do this, it is 
important to first outline the range of services the SJI offers free of charge to a 
primarily uninsured but very diverse sex worker population. These services meet a 
range of sex worker health and safety needs, beyond HIV/STI prevention, including 
primary medical care, gynecological services, confidential HIV/STI testing and 
counseling, immunizations, acupuncture and massage, transgender health care 
(including hormone therapy), peer counseling, substance use counseling, legal, 
housing and social assistance referrals, condom and lube distribution, and a food and 
clothing bank. Specifically, primary medical care, STI/HIV counseling and testing, 
and holistic services are offered on Wednesdays from 6-9 pm. Counseling and testing 
for STIs, HIV and Hepatitis C, as well as vaccinations for hepatitis A&B, wound and 
abscess care, holistic services, and needle exchanges and secondary needle exchanges 
(where an individual is trained to exchange syringes on behalf of others) are available 
on Tuesdays from 1-6 pm. Thursdays from 6-9 pm is specifically for transgender 
health care and HIV/STI testing and counseling. The SJI also publishes its 
“Occupational Health and Safety Handbook” (SJI, 2004). Now in its second edition 
and referred to as “the Bible” by many SJI clients, this purple book lists the SJI’s 
hours and services, along with 260 other pages pertaining to where to access health, 
legal, housing, transportation, social assistance, and other related services. Heart icons 
next to the service locations indicated whether the organizations are sensitive and 
friendly to sex worker issues. 
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The SJI also offers services to sex workers in partnership with various other 
organizations in San Francisco, one of which is a needle exchange service in 
partnership with the SFAF’s HIV Prevention Point (HPP) Syringe Exchange program 
81. This program provides the SJI with in-kind support of clean needles and outreach 
supplies (such as bleach kits and condoms). Aside from the Tuesday night exchange 
noted above, the SJI also offers free HIV/STI testing every Saturday with the HPP 
program on 6th street in San Francisco. Along with these services, in partnership with 
the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF), the SJI runs the Positive SHE 
program, a series of group sessions addressing issues of sexual health for HIV positive 
women, on Mondays and Wednesdays (SJI, 2004). The SJI has also, with the support 
of Supervisor Jake McGoldrick, worked in partnership with the Sex Workers Outreach 
Project (SWOP) and the SFDPH to implement a sex worker grievances hotline, where 
sex workers can anonymously file (via phone or email) complaints about the police, 
public health officials or any other issues they might which to discuss (McGoldrick, 
2006). According to Dr. Klausner (Interview, 31 October 2006), beginning in April 
2007 the SFDPH would review the information collected in order to determine what 
issues were most pressing and how to best move forward82. All of the SJI’s services, 
described above, are provided by sex workers, presenting a radical departure from 
how sex workers traditionally receive health care. As the SJI’s informational brochure 
states, 
“The Infirmary is run by current and former sex workers from the many sectors of the 
adult entertainment industry. Although the Infirmary uses fully trained medical 
professionals for primary care, we’re unlike many clinics in that we fully represent 
                                                
81 Since the majority of the SJI’s funding is from the city’s Office of AIDS, which is federally funded 
(mainly through the Ryan White CARE Act), they are not permitted to use this money for purchasing 
syringes (there is a federal ban on this). 
82 Klausner also noted that, at the time of the interview, that the SFDPH has had five calls and two 
emails. Although they are working with SJI and SWOP to get the word out, they know that the least 
empowered sex workers (namely street workers) are the able or trusting to call and share such 
information. 
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the community we serve. Most of our clinic’s staff, interns, & volunteers are also 
clients. We’re challenging the traditional client/provider dichotomy. That means that 
unlike many other clinics that try to target sex workers, we don’t just treat sexually 
transmitted infections. We look beyond one kind of health problem, and try to deal 
with each person’s specific occupational and health concerns. Putting ourselves in 
charge of health care delivery is a powerful revolution in the way American clinics 
are run [italics added]” (SJI, 2008, p.2) 
During clinic hours at the SJI there are two physicians, a physician’s assistant and 
nurses who do not have histories of sex work; and the holistic service providers 
(massage, reiki and acupuncture) and plebotomists have varying degrees of sex work 
experience. However, the remainder of the paid and volunteer staff (all of whom work 
on a part-time basis) -- including the executive director, development coordinator 
(responsible for fundraising), executive assistant, harm reduction training and 
transgender services coordinator, harm reduction services coordinator and 5 harm 
reduction counselors, outreach coordinator and 8 outreach workers, needle exchange 
coordinator, registration coordinator and 4 registration staff and volunteers, and 
community and clothing room volunteers -- are current, former or transitioning sex 
workers.  
Professionalization 
Like CAL-PEP, professionalization allows the SJI to involve sex workers in service 
provision and organizational management: all sex workers offering services to their 
peers have received training and certification for their respective positions from a 
number of sources, such as phlebotomy and harm reduction training through the 
SFDPH or City College, and HIV counselor training through the AIDS Health Project 
at UCSF, which is offered to programs/groups with a relationship to the AIDS Office.  
However, this professional training has not necessarily de-radicalized the 
clinic: by using this training to involve sex workers as health service professionals, the 
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SJI makes a (political) statement that sex workers are capable of and supported in the 
provision of care to their own community, which is quite remarkable given the long 
history of sex workers (particularly prostitutes) being spoken for and intervened on by 
health, community, government and social service workers alike83. As Johanna Breyer 
stated, “while the SJI is peer based, it is also professionalized in that they need 
policies, procedures, protocols, namely because it is a health clinic, and confidentiality 
and creating a safe space is important” (Interview, 23 October 2006). And indeed, 
qualified primary care providers are important at the SJI. 
Moreover, as Aly, who works with the SWEAT Project, stated (Interview, 18 
July 2006), this model of hiring sex workers allows them to use the SJI “as a way to 
get something (legal) on their resumes and gain other job skills”. She stated that this is 
useful for sex workers who want to transition to other employment, as many are doing 
something that is illegal or carries a stigma, and this makes them reluctant to disclose 
their sex work (and any skills they gained from it) to a potential employer. David, a 
former staff member (Interview, 10 November 2006) cited an example here of the 
transgender population at the SJI, many of whom have been trained as peer educators, 
outreach workers, and HIV counselors, which are entry level jobs in the health and 
prevention fields. 
Gina’s experience at the SJI illustrates how the combination of professional 
skill development and a commitment to offering services to sex workers, by sex 
workers, radically challenges how health services have been delivered to this 
population. Gina (Interview, 17 October 2006), a 33 year-old African American 
                                                
83 Unlike clinics in even the so-called straight community, there is an absence of hierarchy in terms of 
service provision, which is apparent in the terms used to describe “clients” and “service providers”: 
those using services are not clients but “participants” and those providing the services are “community 
members”. 
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woman, is originally from Chicago and worked as an escort and ran a phone sex 
business. After selling this business, she moved to Sacramento in the mid-1990s and 
became ill. Although she had private health insurance and was up-front with her 
doctor about her sex work, she found him dismissive because he assumed that, 
because she was a sex worker, her illness was the result of an STI (which was not the 
case). Through friends, she heard about the SJI and went there, and within 24 hours 
was diagnosed. She returned to Sacramento and “told her friends about the place and 
how impressed I was and that I wanted to move here to San Francisco and volunteer 
with them.  I was blown away by the comprehensive care and went there for it 
although I had private insurance” (Interview, 17 October 2006).  
Upon moving to San Francisco, Gina began to volunteer and currently runs the 
Positive SHE program for women and transgenders who are newly diagnosed with 
HIV/AIDS and need assistance. She also facilitates various groups at the infirmary. As 
she described it (Interview, 17 October 2006) “most sex workers come into the 
infirmary without any health skills to work in a hospital, and it was through the 
infirmary that I got such training. I believe the founders [of the SJI] thought providing 
such training to sex workers would be a good way to show sex workers had brains and 
also have the skills to help other sex workers.”  To illustrate these skills and how 
effective this seemingly radical model of peer-based health service delivery is, she 
cited an example where she counseled a male client of a sex worker (or “john”). He 
came to her and told her “he had barebacked [not used a condom] with a hooker and 
was worried and wanted information” (Interview, Gina, 17 October 2006). As opposed 
to chastising him for his actions, she instead focused on his concerns and gave him 
statistics and information about HIV/AIDS prevention, and offered him some tests, 
and “he walked away happy and I walked away feeling like I helped someone” 
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(Interview, Gina, 17 October 2006). 
Of course, this peer model of service provision has not always been flawless, 
even with the professional training its employees receive. As Johanna Breyer stated 
(Interview, 23 October 2006), the SJI draws from a community of workers that often 
has no traditional, or “straight”, work experience, and so “sometimes just telling 
someone they have to be there at a certain time on a certain schedule is hard because 
their sex work hours are often unpredictable” (Interview, 23 October 2006). Moreover, 
she added, it has also been hard to keep a core group working/volunteering “because 
people need money, and often if more lucrative opportunities come around, people 
will take them instead of volunteering (volunteers are usually first to go here)” 
(Interview, 23 October 2008). As well, since the SJI is a harm reduction organization, 
Breyer added here that “they have sometimes had to deal with people working while 
using [substances]” (Interview, 23 October 2006), and so they now have a policy that 
a person cannot work at the clinic if they have used a substance within a certain 
number of hours before work.  
Furthermore, requiring peers to have certain credentials has meant that-- 
similar to other grassroots community based organizations such as GMHC and the 
WHC (described in Chapter 1)-- the race and class makeup of the peers providing 
services is different from many of those receiving services. The majority of the fifteen 
paid staff interviewed at the SJI had at least a bachelor’s degree, and all but one were 
Caucasian. For the most part, participants also worked in the more privileged sectors 
of the sex industry, such as dancing, in/outcall, escort, and dominatrix sectors, all of 
which usually have higher pay and are far more shielded from law enforcement. 
According to Jennifer, a female street-based sex worker (Interview, 23 October 2006), 
“different types of sex work have different dangers, and street is the most dangerous. 
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If there were more people at the St. James who worked on the street, it could be better 
because a lot staff who have worked as escorts and dancers have attitude problems, 
and you can’t have attitude on the street!” And so since many of the sex workers 
receiving services at the SJI are not from the more privileged sectors of the industry, 
promoting diversity among the staff and sensitivity to different sex work experiences 
has always been important. As Naomi Akers, the executive director, indicated 
(Interview, 5 December 2006):  
“there is an assumption that one peer can represent the community, and this is not 
really true because the community is so diverse … For sex works, there are different 
types of experiences and some here are in recovery and this is their first real job, or 
they had a bad sex work experience, so they really have to try to get peer staff to be 
open to all types of experiences with sex work.” 
Therefore, as David notes (Interview, 10 November), he was happy to see more staff 
of color with the most recent hiring wave, which will take the clinic in a bold new 
direction. He cites the example of the new outreach director, a Latina woman who has 
done lots of work in the Mission, which will be useful because the SJI has never had 
that insight and inroad into the neighborhood’s largely Latino/a population.  
Despite these challenges, however, sex workers interviewed at the clinic 
generally favored the peer-model of service provision and were enthusiastic about how 
the clinic was serving them. When asked how they would rate the clinic on scale of 
one to five (with one being the least satisfied, and five being the most satisfied), all but 
two of twenty sex workers interviewed gave it an overwhelming “five” (with two 
rating it a four because “there’s always room for improvement”).   However, most 
expressed sentiments in line with Rockie, a female-to-male (FTM) transgender sex 
worker, who stated (Interview, 17 October 2006) he likes the fact that the SJI is peer-
run “because it is more comfortable and seems to work better. People outside [the sex 
industry] might know what I have gone through [as a sex worker] or about sex work 
intellectually, but will never understand it as intimately”.  
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Part III. Encountering vectors of constraint: promoting for prostitutes’ rights 
beyond the SJI?  
The SJI provides a place where sex workers-- some of the most socially isolated, 
resource-poor and politically marginalized individuals in the nation (Mathieu, 2003)—
can gather, all of which raises questions about the SJI’s capacity to support and 
advocate for prostitutes’ rights externally. In particular, what elements of the broader 
political environment impact the SJI’s capacity to mobilize sex workers and challenge 
the broader laws and policies that compromise their health and safety? The following 
pages turn to consider how section 501c3 of the IRC and data collection requirements 
imposed by granting agencies constrain the SJI’s capacity for political mobilization 
and advocacy. 
Section 501c3 of the IRC 
The SJI is incorporated as a nonprofit organization under Section 501c3 of the United 
States Internal Revenue Code (IRC). As described in more detail in Chapter 5, the 
major advantage of incorporation is it allows the SJI to offer tax deductions to donors, 
and its income for “exempt purposes” (i.e. those activities that give the SJI its 
charitable status, such as free HIV testing) is not subject to federal taxation (IRS, 
2006a). Along with the tax exemption, incorporation as a charitable nonprofit also 
allows the SJI to capitalize on funding from the SFDPH. As a result, since the 
majority of the SJI’s funding is from the SFPDH for exempt purposes like HIV 
prevention work, the SJI does not pay tax on this money, nor does it pay tax on the 
remainder of its donations from individuals and private foundations.  
However, incorporation as a nonprofit potentially decreases the propensity of 
the organization to engage in any political advocacy work for fear of losing their 
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nonprofit status. Reluctance to engage in advocacy for this reason was reflected 
among staff at the SJI.  Although the SJI’s informational flyer explicitly states “The 
St. James Infirmary is fundamentally against the criminalizing of sex workers for their 
profession” (SJI, 2008, p.2), SJI staff members were largely reticent to encourage or 
promote any political activities to this (or any other) end as an organization, reflecting 
the concerns that doing so might jeopardize their charitable nonprofit status and, 
hence, ability to offer services. As David, a long-time peer staff member and volunteer 
at the clinic declared, 
 
“the SJI should stay out of political and community organizing completely because… 
this violates their agreement as a non-profit, and is potentially dangerous to the 
organization because it kicks up dust. They should stay out of all of it and just do their 
job. Instead, SJI can really be an incubator/meeting ground/community space for sex 
worker organizations and use the space in a way that does not involve the SJI in an 
administrative way, like a church, for example” (Interview, 10 November 2006) 
This position was reiterated by, another long-time peer staff member, who noted 
(Interview, 15 December) that while the SJI seeks to provide a space for healthy 
opinion and debate so people can think a bit differently when they leave than they did 
before, they do not want to jeopardize their status as a 501(c)3 health service provider.  
Although this position might appear to indicate submission by the organization 
to their funders (and the IRS), this position is understandable for two important 
reasons. First, with their explicit commitment to sex worker health and safety, the SJI 
has a limited universe of funds it can apply for and therefore does not want to risk 
losing them. According to COYOTE activist Carol Stuart (Interview, 20 November), 
the SJI “does not have relationships with the type of individuals and other potential 
donors who would just give $20,000” because the SJI lacks the capacity to reach out 
to them and a mission focused on “saving fallen women”. Moreover, she added here, 
the SJI refuses to take money from the Department of Justice, law enforcement or 
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other groups or individuals who have been known to “do harm” to prostitutes84. 
Consequently, according to Johanna Breyer (Interview, 23 October 2006), the biggest 
challenge for the SJI has always been funding—“basically keeping the SJI afloat and 
working with limited resources”.  
She stated further here that because the SJI came out of COYOTE and the 
EDA—and they support decriminalization of prostitution—“the SJI has always been 
disadvantaged for funding, especially from the feds, who want more stuff that brings 
outcomes of people getting out of prostitution” (Interview, 23 October 2006). As 
noted in Chapter 2, the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
(2003) starkly curtailed any federal funding for groups that support or advocate the 
legalization or practice of prostitution. The SJI, in its refusal to condone criminalizing 
prostitution and view prostitutes as victims, clearly is ineligible for these funds. As a 
result, declares Naomi Akers (Interview, 19 December 2006), “the trafficking issues 
and money for it has grown like a malignant cancer and keeps money in the anti-camp, 
which makes it hard to talk about making meeting sex worker and human rights a 
public health issue.”  
The SJI is also reluctant to jeopardize its nonprofit status because the grant-
oriented funding it receives is highly contingent and in no way guarantees long-term 
service provision for sex workers. In one example, the AIDS Office officials noted 
(Interview, 27 February 2007) that it is possible agencies like the SJI might not be 
funded if they do not have competitive applications or continue to fit with the current 
priorities set by San Francisco’s HIV Prevention and Planning Council, which 
currently sees female sex workers (as part of the HIV risk group of heterosexual 
                                                
84 A slight exception here is the SJI’s participation in a city program called “Project 20”, where 
individuals sentenced to community service for unpaid parking tickets, among other minor offenses, can 
complete their required community service hours, if appropriate. 
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women who have sex with men) as a key population to target. The officials stated 
further, however, that if female sex workers are not considered at-risk for HIV one 
day, then they would not have to fund the SJI anymore (or as much), although they do 
not expect this to happen. As a result, their office is committed to ensuring agencies 
like the SJI have long term funding because “it takes awhile for (new) agencies to get 
going and institutionalize their services” (AIDS Office officials, Interview, 27 
February 2007).  
In another example of this contingency, in 2007 the SJI was awarded a one 
time award of $75,000 from the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, which would be 
added to their existing SFDPH contracts to pay for a harm reduction training 
coordinator, increase the hours of their harm reduction coordinator and counseling 
team, increase outreach to indoor sex workers and conduct an assessment of their 
needs, fund social media projects (podcasts and blogs by SJI clients and staff), 
purchase office supplies and incentives for clients, and pay approximately one half of 
the costs for the new medical records database (described in more detail below) they 
are developing. However, according to Naomi Akers (Interview, 25 March 2008), they 
have yet to receive the award from the Board, even though they spent six months 
completing five revisions of their proposal and receiving approval for this funding. 
Akers is not sure what is causing the delay, although she suspects it has to do with a 
city budget deficit, which (at the time of writing) could amount to a 15 percent 
reduction in program expenditures across the board (in which case the SJI is also 
expecting to have to make cuts across programs). Although Akers says the SJI has 
been reassured it will receive its money, in the mean time, they have had to cover their 
costs with their general funds (Interview, 25 March 2008). Given such contingencies, 
it is understandable why the SJI does as little as possible to minimize risk of losing 
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their nonprofit fundraising status. 
Data Collection 
Along with maintaining their nonprofit status, the SJI has also contended with data 
collection requirements (although not to the same extent as CAL-PEP), which detract 
resources from the organization. According to Naomi Akers (Email correspondence, 2 
November 2007), the SJI has collected data from its inception, mainly to support their 
programs (in grant applications, etc) and to better understand the community they 
serve. Similar to CAL-PEP, however, she notes that much of their data collection has 
become more onerous at the SJI in recent years as the federal government under the 
(now previous) George W. Bush Administration grew more concerned about the cost 
of providing medical/health care solutions for HIV/AIDS.  
Today, according to Akers (Email correspondence, 2 November 2007 & 
Interview, 25 March 2008), the SJI now collects two types of data about their 
activities and clients (aside from medical chart information, which is common at any 
clinic) for submission to various local and state agencies: core variables and data for 
the California State Office of AIDS. Core variables are required for their SFDPH 
AIDS Office contracts for HIV prevention activities, not inclusive of HIV testing (this 
requires a different form, described below). Core variables include date of birth or age, 
zip code, race/ethnicity, gender, gender of sex partners, whether there has been 
injection drug use in the last 6 months (and, if yes, whether they shared needles), and 
whether there has been sex without a condom in the last month. They also document 
the date, type of service the client received and how many minutes of service. Core 
variables are collected on forms distributed to clients while they wait for services on 
clinic nights and after groups. The forms are submitted to the relevant program 
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coordinator (the individual in charge of clinic night or the particular group), who in 
turn makes sure they were filled out properly. The coordinator then submits the forms 
to the SJI’s data entry clerk, who enters all the core variables into the SFDPH 
database. This data is then used by the San Francisco HIV Prevention and Planning 
Council to evaluate programs to understand HIV risk in the city, and make plans and 
set priorities for future HIV prevention work.  
The SJI also collects data for the California Office of AIDS, through the state’s 
Counseling Information Form (CIF). The CIF forms ask for a range of variables 
regarding HIV risk assessment, such as presence of tattoos (which might indicate 
exposure to HIV-infected needles), whether the individual has received a blood 
transfusion since the 1980s, whether the person has done sex work, presence of 
hepatitis B and whether vaccinated, and questions about condom use and the number 
of sex partners. This data is collected at the close of each HIV testing and counseling 
session. The form remains on site (at the SJI) for 30 days and is “for reimbursement 
and data gathering about HIV test clients throughout the State of California” (Fecente, 
2007, p1).  According to Akers (Interview, 25 March 2008), since the SJI is contracted 
by the SFDPH (City Clinic) to do HIV testing, they collect this information and are 
reimbursed by the State through their contract with City Clinic. The SJI does not 
actually have to enter the data collected on the forms into any system; instead, the 
forms are collected periodically by a representative of City Clinic, which in turn 
submits them to the San Francisco AIDS Office for submission to the State Office of 
AIDS. 
Data collection requirements detract from the SJI’s capacity for community 
empowerment and/or broader political advocacy in a number of ways. First, they have 
increased the staff’s workload, costing time and resources. Overall, according to Akers 
(email correspondence, 2 November 2007), “the collection is not necessarily the 
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burden because most of it is what we would either already want to collect or is in 
many counseling settings and would come out in conversations anyway.” She stated 
further here that what is most difficult is the data entry, which she declared was “way 
time consuming” (staff refer to the core variables as “chore” variables) and fluctuates 
over time depending on the tool, and can become more burdensome when a new 
evaluation tool is started.  
This fluctuation in workload is illustrated by the SJI’s involvement with the 
CDC’s Program Evaluation and Monitoring System (PEMS) implementation and 
trials. According to Akers (Email correspondence, 2 November 2007),  
When PEMS was piloted two years ago it was crazy!  We had to do it for our AIDS 
Office contract programs, so basically all of them.  We hated it and so did everyone in 
the City.  Our DPH eventually put the halt on PEMS over a year ago.  And we never 
actually entered any PEMS data just collected it, but I would say it took about 5-10 
minutes for each client interaction, so [multiply] that by 250 or so a month which 
would have been way more if we entered the data. 
Akers elaborated further (Interview, 25 March 2008) that the major problem with the 
PEMS data collection system was that for every client interaction through their 
programs, they had to collect 17 pages of data. As Akers said, “it [the form] made it so 
obvious that whoever developed it had never sat down with a person and actually 
collected the data: each form was like taking an entire medical history!” (Interview, 25 
March 2008). Fortunately for the SJI, the SFDPH took feedback from their 
stakeholders about PEMS and negotiated with the State AIDS Office about how to 
minimize the amount of data stakeholders needed to collect to demonstrate compliance 
with their contracts and that they were meeting the needs of communities prioritized 
by the San Francisco HIV Prevention and Planning Council.  
Second, data collection duties have also increased the operational costs at the 
SJI, thus detracting resources from other (potential advocacy) activities. Currently, the 
SJI pays their data entry clerk $15.50 per hour for approximately 10 hours per week of 
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work entering the core variables. They used to have different program staff do their 
own data entry, but according to Akers (interview, 25 March 2008), “this was too 
expensive because some people took forever to do it!” Along with the costs of data 
entry, database development has also proven expensive, as illustrated by the SJI’s 
experience with developing the infrastructure needed to obtain reimbursements ($72-
$73 per patient visit) from the California Department of Health and Human Services 
(CHHS) for medical services they provide and fund with the in-kind services of City 
Clinic staff and the SJI’s general fund. For the past three years, the SJI has had their 
billing number and approval to submit bills to the CHHS, but they needed a medical 
records database (which would contain all of their patient’s medical chart information, 
such as allergies, prescriptions, lab results, etc) to run reports and submit information 
necessary to CHHS for reimbursements.  According to Akers (Interview, 25 March 
2008), SJI staff members went to Sacramento for the training about how to bill the 
CHHS and learned the database the state was developing would not be very helpful, 
and that they would be better off contracting to an outside agency to create their own 
database. The California Endowment grant (described in Table 4.1, above) provided 
funding for this database’s development ($10,000 of the $75,000 grant). However, 
Akers declared, “it [the database] ended up costing five times as much! [$50,000]” 
(Interview, 25 March 2008) and is still not finished. There were multiple reasons for 
the delay and cost over-runs. According to Akers (Interview, 25 March 2008), the 
original person hired for the project ended up “not doing her job and not working out” 
(Interview, 25 March 2008). Moreover, the SJI’s computer network got a virus, and 
there was a break-in and the computers were stolen. As a result, the SFDPH took them 
off of the city system, and they had to create an independent network for the SJI. 
There is pressure at the SJI to get this database done, though, because, according to 
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Akers (Interview, 25 March 2008), “once September passes we cannot bill 
retroactively, and at $72 to $73 per client visit, we need the money!” 
In response to the time and resource costs data collection requirements impose 
on the organization, the SJI has had to professionalize their board and management to 
a degree, which is beginning to limit the number of sex workers they hire in these 
positions. At the management and administrative levels, the SJI has also shifted to hire 
individuals with more credentials. Johanna Breyer (the first executive director) and 
Naomi Akers, the current executive director, have Masters degrees, a requirement that 
has become essential due to the large research, evaluation data management 
component of the job. At the board level, according to board member Terrance Alan 
(Interview, 16 February 2006), to raise more funding, the SJI Board has decided to 
move away from strict sex worker community membership quota here to include more 
professionals with extraordinary public and private practices (such as doctors and 
lawyers) that also have connections to the sex worker community. As the owner of a 
gay strip club, Alan represents this new shift in SJI board membership. Of course, 
Alan noted further, there was trepidation to expand the Board this way because the SJI 
is such a “homegrown” organization, and there is a fear that this might make the SJI 
more professionalized as opposed to radical. Furthermore, although someone like Alan 
might know the industry well, he also profits from the industry, which raises questions 
about how far he might go in advocating for sex worker health and safety if it means 
hurting his bottom line.  
Despite the different ways in which data collection detracts resources and 
professionalizes the clinic, the staff generally sees some value in these activities. For 
example, Akers believes there is a lot of utility in the core variables. She stated here 
that although collecting the data requires more staff time, the forms are a valuable tool 
for keeping the SJI clients occupied while they wait for services—“it keeps them 
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distracted and they are less likely to fight”—and many clients also enjoy filling them 
out because it makes the clinic feel more “official” (Interview, Naomi Akers, 25 
March 2008). She added here “the data entry is paying off in the time I am saving to 
run reports for billing and evaluation.  I also use the reports for every grant we apply 
for” 85(Email correspondence, 2 November 2007).  However, Sara-Anne (Interview, 
31 January 2007), a program coordinator at the SJI, expressed frustration with the data 
collection process, stating that in order for them to serve their population they have to 
do the research to prove their needs to get money to do the work, while other care 
providers have someone else doing the studies. She feels she spends a lot of time 
“counting and collecting arbitrary numbers for the SFDPH” when she could spend the 
time testing someone. However, she conceded,  “the SJI is the only place for sex 
workers, so they have to work hard to make sure they look good” in order to keep the 
SJI funded and open for service provision. 
Part IV. More than just a clinic? Examining the political potential of the SJI 
On the surface, maintaining nonprofit status and completing data collection duties 
appear to render the SJI “just another nonprofit clinic” concerned with budgets and 
management (much like the women’s health clinics described in Chapter One), albeit 
one staffed with sex workers. However, this focus on organizational maintenance has 
not entirely precluded the SJI’s promotion of prostitutes’ rights. The following pages 
discuss how the SJI is planning to and already has employed various strategies of 
circumvention to promote prostitutes’ rights beyond the clinic’s doors. 
 
 
                                                
85 The reports Akers is referring to are the bi-annual reports documenting and evaluating their programs 
and organizational activities, which a major requirement of their grant agreement with the SFDPH 
(SFDPH, 2006). 
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The H-election  
A major step the SJI is taking to increase their advocacy work is through making the 
H-election under section 501h of the IRC. As described in more detail in Chapter 5, in 
exchange for their tax exempt status, charitable nonprofits (including the SJI) forgo 
participating in political campaigns and face severe restrictions on the amount of 
direct and grassroots lobbying they can do (Internal Revenue Service, 2007; IRS, 
2006a, 2006b, 2007a). Charitable nonprofits may, however, elect under IRC section 
501h to be covered by this section, which specifies how much they can spend on 
lobbying.  At the SJI, Naomi Akers stated (email correspondence, 15 November 2007) 
they are planning with the Board of Directors to make this election in the future, but 
board member Terrance Alan (Interview, 16 February 2006) stated the SJI currently 
spends “zero dollars” on political activities or advocacy of any sort.  
However, if they make the H-election, engaging in political activities will 
likely remain difficult for two key reasons. First, the SJI has very little “extra” money 
to devote to these activities because the majority of its funds (which are from the 
AIDS Office) are restricted funds, meaning they can only be used for HIV testing and 
counseling, among other narrowly-stated purposes (such as the paperwork related to 
testing, etc) dictated by their contract (SFDPH, 2006). These funds (from the Office of 
AIDS) are quite unlike unrestricted funds (such as those from private donors or Erotic 
Health Day), which—while also not guaranteed or renewable-- could be used at the 
SJI’s discretion for programs and projects not related to HIV testing. A major source 
of unrestricted funds is often private donors and organizations that are less constrained 
by the dictates of HIV planning councils, government agencies and all other parties 
that might oppose harm-reduction approaches to prostitution. But, as noted previously, 
the SJI has few of these sources.  
Second, even with unrestricted funds and the H-election, gaining support for 
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prostitutes’ rights from the SJI’s clientele is not guaranteed: not all of them agree with 
its mission opposing the criminalization of prostitution. As Mo, a 29 year-old male sex 
worker stated, “prostitution should be illegal because some people prostitute 
themselves and know they are sick and still have unprotected sex, which puts the 
whole world at risk” (Interview, 8 November 2006). And Tanesh (Interview, 13 
November 2006) also added the following sentiments, for different reasons: 
“I will never think prostitution should be legal, and things like needle exchanges 
bother me because it encourages you to use. Here [at the SJI] they give you condoms 
and stuff, which encourages you to go out there [on the streets to do sex work], and I 
totally believe transgenders should have other ways to work besides being on the 
corner. If sex work is what you want, then you have my blessing, but I see myself as 
having something more or being better. What do these girls on the street [referring to 
the younger women] do when their looks fail?” 
However, more sex workers at the SJI favored some type of legal reform, although 
they were in no way unified on what this might look like. Vickie, a 37 year old 
transgender sex worker who “had to do what I had to do to survive”, stated “they 
should decriminalize prostitution because if people want to buy and sell their bodies, 
then it’s their prerogative and there is no crime in this. It should not have any 
regulations and should just be left alone because things have less problems when they 
are left alone” (Interview, 8 November 2006). Rockie (Interview, 17 October 2006) 
expressed a slightly different sentiment: “we should legalize it, like in Amsterdam… 
because it spreads disease and needs control and oversight by a government entity”. 
Ronita, a 43 year old transgender sex worker also stated “we should legalize it 
[prostitution] so they [the government] can tax it”. 
Indirect politicization 
Even without the H-election, many SJI staff members believe the organization is 
indirectly making political statements and encouraging their clients to become 
politically active, even if this is not done in by more traditional means (through 
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lobbying, etc) that are largely prohibited under their current charitable nonprofit status. 
According to SJI founder Carol Stuart, “While people at the clinic will say they are 
not political or doing anything political, the fact that they can sit in a room together 
without the threat of arrest is in fact a political act… especially in a state where 2 or 
more people in a room talking about/doing prostitution can land you in jail for 
conspiracy” (Interview, 20 November 2006). And so, according to David (Interview, 
10 November 2006), “the waiting and community rooms at the SJI are one of the most 
powerful things about the clinic”. Here, states Aly, a long-time peer volunteer and 
staff member at the SJI (Interview, 18 July), the SJI is indirectly politicizing sex 
workers by providing a space where a marginalized population can come together and 
share information in a protective environment, which brings a lot of self-efficacy and 
social capital development as a result of feeling and being part of a community.  
Aly went on to describe a number of examples of indirect politicization at the 
SJI, such as raising sex workers’ awareness about the laws prohibiting sex work.  She 
cited the example here of the SJI’s ongoing harm reduction groups with rotating 
topics, which provide clients access to information that can politicize them by making 
them more aware of their rights. In one workshop, a lawyer detailed how prostitutes 
might be arrested (through undercover operations, for example) and how they can to 
recognize the signs that a john is actually a police officer (entrapment) and what to do 
if they are not read their rights. Another way the SJI raises awareness for sex workers 
is through access to language. According to Aly (Interview, 18 July 2006), many of 
the SJI’s clients have never heard the term “sex worker” and when they do, many 
immediately feel less stigmatized and more empowered. As well, a large sign in the 
SJI’s community room reads “ Ban Poverty, Not Prostitutes” which alerts many sex 
workers that the enforcement of prostitution laws impacts mainly the poorest sex 
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workers on the streets, and therefore alleviating poverty might be a more effective way 
of dealing with prostitution 
Indeed, this indirect politicization is not only strategically important (in that it 
allows the organization to maintain its nonprofit status), it is quite pragmatic: 
participating in political activities of any sort might not be possible for many of the 
SJI’ clients, especially as the number of sex workers with more resources (indoor 
workers) declines at the clinic, and the number of street-based and transgendered sex 
workers (with fewer resources) increases. As Robyn Few, a Bay Area sex worker 
activist stated (Interview, 20 October 2006), “although they [the SJI] do great work 
offering services, many other sex workers will not go to SJI because they do not feel 
welcome there, mainly because of the long wait and the ‘bitchy trannies’ that make it 
less appealing”. Melania, an SJI program director (who has also worked in the indoor 
sector as a dancer and escort, among other work) notes further that, “Some [sex 
workers] also will not come to the clinic because of pride. I know women charging 
$2000 per hour (with a 2 hour minimum) who would never come here because they 
are too invested in not being whores and would feel like one if they came to the clinic. 
For them to come here would be to maybe confront the reality that some are not as 
well off as you are” (Interview, 19 December 2006). And so, as Vicky W (Interview1 
November 2006) noted,  
 
“It is hard to mobilize the populations who are at the SJI and just scraping by: if you 
don’t have your basic needs met, you cannot do justice work, especially when there is 
no justice in your own life…although sometimes people who are denied justice are 
also the most motivated”  
To illustrate, Nick (Interview, 23 October 2006), a 39 year old transgendered (FTM) 
sex worker who had a history of involvement with Hydra, the German prostitutes’ 
rights group (when she lived in Germany), stated that it currently is most important for 
her to “work on herself first” as she deals with her crystal methamphetamine 
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addiction. Furthermore, only three sex workers interviewed at the SJI had been 
politically active regarding prostitution law reform in the past: as noted above, Nick 
was involved with Hydra in Germany; Vicky W participated in SWOP activities; and 
Jennifer went to a COYOTE meeting once in Washington, DC when Margo St. James 
was active there. Samantha, a 35 year-old female who has worked mainly as a 
dominatrix and in phone sex stated “being open about sex work is a political act in and 
of itself” (Interview, 17 November 2006). For the most part, other sex workers 
interviewed at the SJI had not participated in sex worker activism because they had 
never heard of SWOP or COYOTE, or because they were too concerned with other 
issues in their own lives (such as addiction).  
And so although many of the SJI’s clients are currently not engaged (or ready 
to engage in) political advocacy for prostitutes’ rights, it appears as if indirectly 
politicizing them has had some effect. Many SJI clients stated that being at the SJI 
encouraged them to get more involved in political and community life about issues 
that were personally important to them, such as transgender rights or to the 
continuation of service provision at the SJI. Regarding transgender rights, 
Shaquaneequa, a 35 year old transgendered sex worker “who has never even voted in 
my life because I am just not into that,” (Interview, 2 November 2006) stated  
“the SJI has made me want to become more politically active in some ways; for 
example, when I see someone make a bad choice or discriminate, I like to educate 
them about it. For example, when kids say “ew, you’re a man”, I say ‘yes, I am a 
man, but I am TG [transgender], and there are people like that here’. I have felt more 
political this way because of how much the SJI talks about being open-minded and 
about unity, and unity is something a lot of TGs don’t have” (Interview, 2 November 
2006) 
In another example, Monica (Interview, 25 October 2006), a 37 year old MTF 
transgendered sex worker noted that she sometimes attends demonstrations in San 
Francisco against the war in Iraq and candle light vigils for those who have died from 
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AIDS deaths. For her, the Transgender Day of Remembrance is especially important 
because, as she stated, “it could be me”. Here she explained that she feels she has put 
herself at risk for being a victim of a hate crime by cross-dressing, and feels “this has 
to stop”. She has also testified on behalf of the Native American AIDS project at the 
Board of Supervisors meeting, where she also shared how valuable her experience at 
the SJI has been (she uses the SJI for the Positive SHE group, peer counseling, 
condoms and lubricant, clothes, STI checkups and massage and acupuncture).  
Regarding the continuation of services at the SJI, Nick (Interview, 10 
November 2006) stated that she appreciates how the SJI encourages political 
involvement by posting flyers and brochures about different events (such as the AIDS 
Walk in San Francisco). Here, she stated    
 
“The most important thing that has contributed to my politicization at the SJI is seeing 
there can be a place (the SJI) where people care and support people and are not full of 
BS [bullshit]. The SJI shows it is possible to have a meaningful life. At the time when 
I am ready to give back to society, I would want to give back here [the SJI]” 
(Interview, 23 October 2006)  
Kelly, a 34 year old transgendered (MTF) sex worker stated the SJI “makes her want 
to do more politically because she knows they get some money from the government 
and she would like to get politically involved to know what goes on behind the scenes 
to make sure the St. James [Infirmary] continues to operate” (Interview, 7 November 
2006). She started further here that “I feel I could lead something like that with people 
here, but I’m not sure what is holding me back”, noting here that “being a trans could 
be seen as a character defect that could destroy my efforts in the process [of 
advocating for the clinic]” (Interview, 7 November 2006). 
Research 
Like CAL-PEP, the SJI also promotes prostitutes’ rights by conducting and 
disseminating research that clarifies misconceptions about sex workers in order to 
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encourage law reform86. As Margo St. James declared, “basically, the way now for 
prostitutes to get respect is to have a clinic and publish research and information out of 
it” (Interview, 25 October 2006).  The SJI’s first research project began in 2001, and 
true to the community-based orientation of the clinic, research was (and continues to 
be) conducted with the goal of meeting the occupational health and safety needs of the 
community, as opposed to debating how to shift the community into other forms of 
work. Therefore, the first study was a pilot assessment of where in San Francisco sex 
work occurs so they could decide where a mobile van should go for outreach. The 
second research project occurred in 2002, when the SJI community developed its  
“Occupational Health and Safety Handbook”.  
With Dr. Cohan’s connections to UCSF, the SJI has also embarked on research 
that works to educate the public about issues of sex worker health and safety. An 
example here is the Sex Work Environmental Assessment Team (SWEAT) study that 
began in 2003 and focuses specifically on sex worker experiences in order to explore 
the ways social capital impacts the health of biologically born female sex workers, not 
inclusive of transwomen. In the published results to date (Cohan et al., 2006), an 
observational study was conducted with SJI sex workers. Through univariate, bivariate 
and multivariate analyses of 783 sex worker interviews, they discovered that the 
majority of sex workers never discussed their sex work with a health care provider, 
and that those who worked collectively with other sex workers were less likely to 
contract STIs. According to Dr. Cohan, they are now in the second phase of the study, 
where they are doing a quantitative piece regarding stigma and what people like and 
do not like about their work, among other issues, and how this relates to health. In 
                                                
86 According to the IRS, charitable nonprofits are permitted to conduct, publish and disseminat issue 
research and analysis, as long as it is non-partisan. Discussing broad social issues-- as long as specific 
legislation are not discussed—is also permitted (IRS, 2007b).  
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many ways, this research challenges the utility of the current legal regime by looking 
at how criminalization affects health. According to Aly (Interview, 18 July 2007), they 
are asking questions to flesh out what people mean and want by different legal 
regimes, and how they are impacted by the current regime. 
However, conducting and disseminating research that supports prostitutes’ 
rights has been limited by the broader political climate, which, as noted previously, is 
dominated by groups opposing non-criminalizing approaches to prostitution. To 
illustrate, Dr. Cohan noted that when she applied for funding from the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), which she eventually received to fund the SWEAT study, 
someone “looking out for her” at the NIH called and told her it would be best if she 
took “sex work” out of the title of her project, “Social Capital, Self-Efficacy and Sex 
worker Health” and change it to “Ethnography in an HIV Risk Population” because 
the former was “too controversial”. However, according to Aly (Interview, 18 July 
2006), who currently oversees the SWEAT study at the SJI, despite these challenges, 
they have managed to publish material and make it available through conference 
presentations (such as the International AIDS Conference in Toronto in 2006) and 
publications (see for some examples Cohan, Cobaugh, Cloniger, & Klausner, 2000; 
Cohan, Cobaugh, Cloniger, & Klausner, 2002; Cohan et al., 2004; Cohan et al., 2006; 
Lutnick, 2006). Aly added here that other individuals and groups could use this 
information to make their own political arguments, which she claims is useful because 
many do not want the SJI to exist, so getting the information out can keep up support 
for their work (Interview, 18 July 2006).  
Conclusion 
In the mid-1990s, neo-liberal politics and policy emphasizing service contracting to 
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nonprofit organizations and gentrification concerns were entrenched in the supposedly 
liberal San Francisco Bay Area. And once again, sex workers found themselves 
blamed for neighborhood “blight” and the spread of disease (this time, syphilis). This 
time, however, sex worker activists in the Bay Area were arguably, older, wiser and 
more experienced. Capitalizing on opportunities for access created by various levels of 
local government (namely the Taskforce and the SFDPH), sex worker activists took 
the struggle for prostitutes’ rights “inside” and founded the SJI in partnership with the 
SFDPH.   
As this chapter has also shown, the SJI remains heavily dependent on the 
SFDPH for funding, raising questions about the clinic’s capacity to continue the 
struggle for prostitutes’ rights from which its founders were born. However, stepping 
inside the SJI reveals it has maintained a commitment to prostitutes’ rights by putting 
this into practice: sex workers—long blamed for the spread of STIs—are the key 
service providers, managers and leaders. And, on a weekly basis, their peers are 
gathered here, free from harassment, rendering the SJI a potential political incubator, 
where sex workers could be mobilized to challenge the very laws that stigmatize and 
marginalize them. However, similar to the WHC, GMHC and CAL-PEP, encounters 
with the broader regulatory environment (namely the vectors of political constraint) 
have severely curtailed the SJI’s potential here. As a result, maintaining nonprofit 
status, funding streams and fulfilling contract requirements for data collection pre-
occupy the organization as they work to maintain service provision.  
Consequently, one might conclude the SJI is really no different from any other 
nonprofit health service organization in the neo-liberal era that, while formed by 
activists, has lost its “radical edge”. However, this chapter has demonstrated that such 
a characterization is not accurate. By employing various strategies—including (a 
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consideration of) the H-election, indirect politicization and the publication of 
research—the SJI has managed to promote prostitutes’ rights beyond its doors while 
also maintaining its service functions. And indeed, many of the SJI’s clients—despite 
challenges—have been active in the political realm, in some cases motivated by their 
contact with the SJI.  All of this shows that despite its limitations, “There is political 
potential in the SJI: if the clients feel supported, you might be surprised at how they 
will speak out” (Interview, Margot St. James, 25 October 2006). 
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CHAPTER 5 
TO SERVE AND TO ADVOCATE? TAX STATUS, DATA COLLECTION AND 
NONPROFIT POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
In the United States, prostitutes’ rights activism failed to repeal laws criminalizing 
prostitution, while further legal developments (particularly at the federal level since 
1980) have heightened state efforts to suppress prostitution and created political 
opportunities for COYOTE’s daughters opposing sex worker rights. Among the 
daughters favoring sex worker rights, CAL-PEP and the SJI are two nonprofit 
organizations that offer health services to sex workers in partnership with state 
agencies. If, similar to earlier chapters, one understands that political opportunities are 
shaped by exogenous factors that facilitate and/or inhibit prospects for mobilization, 
the advancement of claims, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional 
politics and policy (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004), this chapter asks what factors influence 
CAL-PEP and the SJI’s capacity as health service nonprofits to advocate on behalf of 
those they serve to challenge and/or influence state policy? 
To provide a conceptual and contextual framework answering this question, 
this chapter draws from the literature regarding the relationship of civic organizations 
(particularly nonprofits) to the state to analyze in more detail how the vectors of 
political constraint (introduced in Chapter 1 and considered though CAL-PEP and the 
SJI’s experiences in Chapters 3 and 4) potentially limit their capacities as nonprofit 
health service organizations to engage in advocacy and challenge state policy. Indeed, 
these vectors-- tax-exempt status under section 501c3 of the Internal Revenue Code 
(IRC); and data collection requirements imposed by granting agencies, particularly the 
federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC)— do not apply only to CAL-PEP and the 
SJI, and so the goal of this chapter is to discuss broadly how each vector potentially 
limits nonprofits’ political capacities by restricting their lobbying and campaign 
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activities, and detracting resources (particularly time and money) from their 
organizations, and professionalizing their staffs. However, building on the notion 
(described in Chapter One) that engagement with the state is dynamic and need not 
entirely preclude political activity, this chapter also considers various strategies 
organizations like CAL-PEP and the SJI might employ to circumvent these vectors 
and continue engaging in advocacy for prostitutes’ rights. 
PART I: Theorizing government-organizational relationships 
Specifying the political constraints CAL-PEP and the SJI face as nonprofit 
organizations raises broader questions about the relationship of organizations to the 
political process. As discussed in Chapter 1, Piven and Cloward (1977) argued that the 
creation of formal organizations by activists limits their the political potential by 
shifting their efforts from protest to organizational maintenance (and thus appeasing, 
not opposing, elites). However, as Elizabeth Clemens (2006) writes, organizations are 
also potential sites and resources for political activity outside of formal institutions, 
even though they are not part of the formal political system. Given these perspectives, 
to understand the factors that shape the capacity of nonprofit organizations specifically 
to act in the political realm, theorizing their relationship to the state (begun in Chapter 
1) is useful.  
Although the social movements literature was used previously to frame the 
discussion of the broader political-legal context in which sex worker activists have 
organized, this literature has had less to say about the about the capacity of nonprofits 
specifically to engage in political activism and challenge state policy. As Daniel Cress 
(1997) writes, despite widespread adoption of the nonprofit form by social movement 
actors, only a small number of scholars (Jenkins, 1987; McCarthy, Britt, & Wolfson, 
1991) have noted this development, finding that nonprofit social movement 
organizations (such as peace, anti-drunk-driving and poor people’s organizations) 
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often re-shape their goals to be more in line with what is defined by the state as 
charitable ends. And since they are prohibited by law from engaging in certain forms 
of resource aggregation and political advocacy, they become more conservative in 
their tactical repertoires (Cress, 1997). Yet despite the growth of the nonprofit sector, 
there remains little information about how nonprofits represent their constituents 
externally, in the broader political realm, and whether and how this is influenced by 
the regulatory environment in which they operate (Berry & Arons, 2003; Marwell, 
2004).  
Given this, work regarding the relationship of organizations—particularly civic 
associations—to the political process provides an instructive starting-point for 
understanding the political possibilities and constraints nonprofits face.  Early 
observations of American society by Alexis de Tocqueville describe a proliferation of 
associations formed by individuals for numerous purposes, leading de Tocqueville to 
conclude these organizations were a uniquely democratic response to social problems 
and thus were necessary to a democracy, forming spaces where individuals could 
gather, act collectively and accomplish various goals (deTocqueville, 1835). These 
observations have provided the basis for scholarship on civic organizations (see for 
example Putnam, 1995, 2000) in America that largely holds they have the potential to 
foster and promote civic, and, by extension, political engagement 
However, much of the literature on associations and civic engagement is 
largely focused on voluntary associations (for example, the Rotary Club or the Elks 
Lodge), which are quite different from the majority of nonprofit organizations, of 
which CAL-PEP and the SJI are an example. Indeed, “nonprofit” is a relatively elastic 
term covering a range of organizations in America serving various public purposes, 
such as health, human services, the arts, culture, foundations and federated fundraising 
organizations (Berry & Arons, 2003; Hodgkinson & Weitzman, 2001). Community-
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based organizations (CBOs) like the SJI and CAL-PEP, however, are smaller non-
profit organizations typically organized around and operating in a particular 
geographical place. Their mission is more often to attract attention to and serve the 
needs of disadvantaged residents of this area, and there is often a significant amount of 
community member participation in the daily activities of CBOs. 
While voluntary associations have been praised for their capacity to gather 
individuals and involve them in activities (such as letter writing campaigns, etc) that 
foster the development of civic skills, scholars (Gronbjerg & Rathgeb-Smith, 2006) 
have argued that nonprofit organizations are a somewhat different case: in many cases, 
they are often hierarchical, professionalized, and dependent on large government 
grants, and, arguably, less conducive spaces for developing civic skills (for example, 
larger nonprofit organizations like the Red Cross etc). At the same time, many 
nonprofits—namely those like CAL-PEP and the SJI—were formed from radical 
social movements, are community-based and gather and involve individuals in their 
operations in ways that might also develop civic skills and conduct political advocacy 
and promote political participation.  
Yet regardless of whether they are voluntary or nonprofit in structure, scholars 
such as Theda Skocpol (2003) have contended that civic associations are far more 
deliberate creations that have grown in tandem with and motivated by the American 
federal structure87. Therefore, one cannot understand the political potential of any civic 
organization (voluntary, nonprofit or otherwise) without considering its relationship to 
the state and how state actions have fostered their creation and expansion. To illustrate 
historically, in England, the Reformation and the breakup of the feudal system 
contributed to the creation of the English Poor Laws of 1601, the first documented 
                                                
87 For example, Skocpol (2003) cites how the PTA—though mythologized as a local creation—was 
actually a national organization that was established and structured to resemble the US federal structure, 
and make policy demands at all levels of government.  
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organized response to the plight of the poor by Parliament. The Poor Laws sought to 
stop begging by the indigent and able-bodied poor who were not deterred by the laws 
in the local townships; the expectation was that individuals should work and take care 
of their families needs, and if certain individuals could not do this, the community was 
obliged to respond and provide at least the minimum resources (funded by property 
taxes) for them to survive (Block, 2001). The early colonial settlers in America 
adopted and applied a similar philosophy and community/charity ethos: the early 
implementation of poor laws in America occurred at the state level and delegated 
responsibility for looking after the poor to church and county officials, commonly 
through local, voluntary charitable organizations (Block, 2001).   
Throughout industrialization, as immigration increased and cities grew, 
charitable nonprofit organizations continued to flourish, aided by state incentives. 
Even with the ascent of the New Deal and Keynesian economic policies, Americans’ 
misgivings about excessive government power limited the scope of government social 
protections and left ample room for the charitable, voluntary non-profit sector to grow 
(Salamon, 2003; Sokolowski & Salamon, 1999). Consequently, a variety of social, 
political and economic changes saw the non-profit sector grow rapidly through the 
latter half of the 20th century as post-war economic growth increased charitable 
donations and fuelled the development and expansion of foundations. The Great 
Society programs of the 1960s that provided money for local community development 
also facilitated non-profit development in host communities.  
Local, community-based nonprofit development began to accelerate 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s with the rise of neo-liberal politics. As Theodore and 
Brenner (2002) write, processes of de-regulation, market liberalization, and, most 
notably, state retrenchment—lynchpins of the neo-liberal policy repertoire-- facilitated 
the devolution of government support for social services, leading to, they argue, a  
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“revival of the local” (p.341). Here local arenas were (and are) increasingly viewed as 
key institutional arenas for wide range of policy experiments and political strategies. 
As a result, nonprofits have become the preferred service providers in the neo-liberal 
era, as they are assumed to be more flexible, cost-effective and knowledgeable of local 
community needs (Berry & Arons, 2003; Salamon, 2001b). Consequently, with neo-
liberal devolution, institutional incentives (i.e. grant opportunities) have fueled the 
growth of the nonprofit sector (O'Neill, 2002). According to Salamon and Sokalowski 
(1999, p.278), “between 1990 and 1995 the nonprofit sector in the U.S. grew by 20 
percent, exceeding the growth rate of the entire economy by a ratio of almost 3:1 (the 
overall growth rate during this period was about 8 percent)”88. This growth is 
demonstrated further by Table 5.1 “Employment Growth Rates: 1997-2001”, which 
illustrates employment rates in the nonprofit sector exceeded those in the business and 
government sectors:  
Table 5.1: Employment Growth Rates: 1997-2001 
  
Source: Independent Sector, 2004 
                                                
88 However, they note further (1999, p.278) that “this growth rate was pretty much in line with 
employment growth in the service sector, which grew faster than the rest of the economy. Since the 
nonprofit sector is, for the most part, a sub-component of the service sector, its rate of growth can be 
explained by the growing prominence of services in the U.S. economy.” 
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Along with the growth of the nonprofit in tandem with government support for it 
(discussed in Chapter 1), considering and specifying the vectors of political constraint 
CAL-PEP and the SJI face is usefully framed within a neo-institutional theory of 
government-nonprofit relations. This theory, advanced by Steven Rathgeb Smith and 
Kirsten Gronbjerg (2006), links nonprofits and state and societal systems, focusing on 
ways the institutional environment shapes the nonprofit sector, suggesting that the 
“prevalence and vitality of nonprofit organizations are largely a product of the 
political, legal and institutional environment” (p.235). They argue further that this 
neo-institutional theory contrasts civil society understandings of nonprofits noted 
above that tend to regard the prevalence and vitality of nonprofits as products of 
citizen demand and cooperative social networks, with social capital as the independent 
variable and nonprofit organizations as the dependent variable. And, they add, their 
theory is also unlike market theories of nonprofits that tend to emphasize citizen 
demand as the independent variable and nonprofit organizations as the dependent 
variable (i.e. nonprofits are the outcome of the demands of citizens—often in the 
minority—which government finds more efficient to meet through a nonprofit). 
Instead, neo-institutional theory holds that the emergence and activities of a nonprofit 
represents the choices of individuals shaped by their institutional environment, thus 
demonstrating a mutual synergism between government and nonprofits (Gronbjerg & 
Rathgeb-Smith, 2006).  
The vectors of political constraint define the particular institutional 
environment CAL-PEP and the SJI operate in today as service providers and political 
actors. As described in Chapters 1 and 2, the emergence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
shifted many activists (including COYOTE members) into HIV/AIDS prevention 
work, and funding opportunities from agencies like the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) and state and local health departments that required incorporation as a 
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nonprofit created major incentives for grassroots activists to incorporate as nonprofits 
and engage in health service provision. All of this created a context where sex workers 
(and others involved in early AIDS prevention activities) could make a political choice 
to shift from activism to the realm of nonprofit health service provision, with its 
attendant regulations and legal requirements. Today, many nonprofit AIDS service 
organizations originally formed by AIDS activists (and others), ranging in size from 
large organizations like Gay Men’s Health Crisis in New York, to smaller 
organizations like CAL-PEP and the SJI, now receive major portions of their funding 
from various government agencies, directly or indirectly from the CDC. And although 
many of these community-based nonprofit organizations continue involving the 
marginalized populations they serve in service delivery, what institutional factors 
shape their capacity to engage in advocacy externally, as organizations, in the broader 
political realm, especially given their relationship to government through grant 
agreements?  
PART II. The vectors of political constraint: IRC Section & Data Collection 
Keeping in mind Rathgeb-Smith and Gronbjerg’s (2006) notion that the “prevalence 
and vitality of nonprofit organizations are largely a product of the political, legal and 
institutional environment” (p.235), this section attempts to answer this question by 
discussing generally how the vectors of political constraint--incorporation as a 
nonprofit under Section 501c3 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and data collection 
requirements imposed by granting bodies, namely the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC)-- potentially constrain the political activities of nonprofits by variously 
restricting their lobbying and campaign activities, and detracting resources and 
professionalizing their staffs. 
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IRC Section 501c3 
Section 501c of the IRC lists 26 types of 501c nonprofit organizations, including 
everything from labor unions (501c5) to cemetery companies (501c15)89. The only 
commonality among these organizations is that they are tax exempt, meaning they pay 
no taxes on income related to their exempt purposes (Berry & Arons, 2003; Hoyt, 
2001). The focus of this discussion, however, is on charitable non-profits, which are 
regulated under Section 501c3 of the IRC; these particular nonprofits comprise the 
largest percentage (48 percent) of all 501c nonprofit organizations and are defined as 
follows: 
 
501c(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, 
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports 
competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic 
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part 
of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or 
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in 
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the 
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office. ("Internal Revenue Code", 2007) 
What distinguishes these organizations from all other 501c non-profit organizations is 
that they are the only type of tax-exempt organization that can offer donors a tax 
                                                
89 Other tax exempt organizations include the following: 501(c)(1) Corporations organized under acts of 
Congress such as Federal Credit Unions; 501(c)(2) Title holding corporations for exempt organizations; 
501(c)(4) Various political education organizations; 501(c)(5) Labor Unions and Agriculture; 501(c)(6) 
Business league and chamber of commerce organizations; 501(c)(7) Recreational club organizations; 
501(c)(8) Fraternal beneficiary societies; 501(c)(9) Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Associations; 
501(c)(10) Fraternal lodge societies; 501(c)(11) Teachers' retirement fund associations; 501(c)(12) 
Local Benevolent Life Insurance Associations, Mutual Irrigation and Telephone Companies and like 
organizations; 501(c)(13) Cemetery companies; 501(c)(14) Credit Unions; 501(c)(15) Mutual insurance 
companies; 501(c)(16) Corporations organized to finance crop operations; 501(c)(17) Employees' 
associations; 501(c)(18) Employee-funded pension trusts created before June 25, 1959; 501(c)(19) 
Veterans' organizations; 501(c)(20) Group legal services plan organizations; 501(c)(21) Black lung 
benefit trusts; 501(c)(22) Withdrawal liability payment fund; 501(c)(23) Veterans' organizations created 
before 1880; 501(c)(25) Title-holding corporations for qualified exempt organizations; 501(c)(26) 
State-sponsored high-risk health coverage organizations; 501(c)(27) State-sponsored workers' 
compensation reinsurance organizations; 501(c)(28) National railroad retirement investment trust 
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deduction on their contributions 90(Block, 2001; Scrivener, 2001). For an organization 
to qualify for a tax exemption, they must serve some charitable purpose; they must not 
distribute their net profits, if any, to individuals who control the organization; they 
must devote their net earnings to the mission of the group; and they must refrain from 
devoting any substantial portion of their earnings to political activities (Block, 2001; 
IRS, 2007a; O'Neill, 2002; Scrivener, 2001) 
 For government, of course, there is a major incentive to offer a tax exemption 
to these charitable organizations: many of these organizations perform functions that, 
in their absence, government would have to provide. Therefore, the argument goes, 
since there is a moral obligation to provide the services many charitable nonprofits 
provide (feeding the hungry; providing beds to the homeless, etc), the government 
should impose as few impediments as possible to their provision and forgo the tax 
revenues for the services rendered (Scrivener, 2001). However, charitable nonprofits 
are prohibited from engaging in two types of political activity discussed in turn below: 
lobbying and election campaigns.  
Lobbying 
Regarding lobbying, the “[r]egulation of lobbying by non-profits is firmly 
grounded in the belief that the subsidy [tax exemption] granted through the tax code 
                                                
90 According to Stephen Block (2001), government endorsement of the tax exemption for charitable 
organizations has been a practice since the Founding. Consistent with English Common laws regarding 
philanthropy, religious organizations were first spared from the first federal income tax from 1862-
1972, and the 1894 Tariff Act was the first major piece of legislation specifying entities subject to tax 
exemption-- namely charitable, religious, educational, fraternal, and certain savings and insurance 
organizations (Scrivener, 2001).  By 1917, however, the government raised individual income tax rates 
for the war effort but noticed that following this charitable gifts decreased, so deductions for charitable 
gifts were increased and amendments to the Revenue Acts until 1950 permanently established tax 
exemptions for certain organizations. These tax exemptions for 501c organizations were implemented 
and have endured because of tradition (historically, certain types of charitable organizations were not 
taxed, so legislators were reluctant to set a precedent by taxing them) and because of their power to 
obtain and maintain this exemption (examples here include 501c5 organizations, like labor unions and 
agricultural associations) (IRS, 1980). 
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gives the government the authority to restrict such behavior (Berry & Arons, 2003, 
p.51). Prior to 1934, however, there was no specific statutory restriction on the 
lobbying activities of charities, although early Treasury Regulations (45, art. 17, 1919 
ed.) provided that organizations “formed to disseminate controversial or partisan 
propaganda” were not “educational” within the meaning of the statute (Kindell & 
Francis-Reilly, 1997). A consequence of this rule was that contributions to these 
organizations allegedly disseminating propaganda were not tax deductible, and several 
lawsuits challenged this treatment, most notably Slee v. Commissioner (1930) 
91(Lunder, 2006). In 1934, however, Congress enacted lobbying limitations through a 
floor amendment, drafted by the Senate Finance Committee staff, as part of the 
Revenue Act, inserting the portion of section 501c3 that reads “no substantial part of 
an organization’s activities constitute carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting 
to limit legislation” (Kindell & Francis-Reilly, 1997, p.411). The legislative history of 
this amendment is sparse, but it is widely accepted that it represents a codification of 
the Slee decision and a rejection the Treasury Department’s strict point of view 
embodied in the 1919 regulation noted above 92(Kindell & Francis-Reilly, 1997; 
Lunder, 2006). The 1934 Act also included a provision restricting charities’ ability to 
participate in partisan politics, but it was removed in conference out of concern from 
Members of Congress that it was too broad (Lunder, 2006). 
Today, Treasury Regulations (501c3-1c3ii) describe the prohibitions against 
lobbying by charitable nonprofits:  
                                                
91 In this case, the courts denied the tax-exempt status of Margaret Sanger’s American Birth Control 
League on the grounds that lobbying the legislature for changes to access to birth control constituted a 
public subsidy for political advocacy and did not necessarily further the organizations political purposes 
("Slee v. Commissioner", 1930). 
92 The only noted objection to the amendment was from Senator David Reed, the ranking minority 
member and provision’s sponsor, who was dissatisfied with its formulation. He did not see why a 
“contribution made to the National Economy League should be deductible as if it were a charitable 
contribution if it is a selfish one made to advance the personals interests of the giver of the money.” (78 
Cong. Rec. 5, 861 (1934)).  
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For this purpose, an organization will be regarded as attempting to influence 
legislation if the organization: 
(a) Contacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a legislative body for the 
purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation; or 
(b) Advocates the adoption or rejection of legislation. 
The term legislation, as used in this subdivision, includes action by the Congress, by 
any State legislature, by any local council or similar governing body, or by the public 
in a referendum, initiative, constitutional amendment, or similar procedure.  
Consequently, a wide range of activities can count as lobbying, including directly 
contacting government officials with respect to acts, bills, resolutions, or similar items 
(such as legislative confirmation of appointive office), or seeking to influence the 
public in a referendum, ballot initiative, constitutional amendment or other related 
activity. The IRS regards a charitable nonprofit as attempting to influence legislation if 
the charitable nonprofit engages in grassroots lobbying via appeals to the electorate or 
general public for the purposes of advocating supporting, opposing or proposing 
legislation (IRS, 2007a; Lunder, 2006). 
Campaign Activity 
 Regarding campaign activity, in 1954 (then) Senator Lyndon Johnson 
introduced a floor amendment prohibiting charitable nonprofits from (as stated in 
Section 501c3, above) “participating in, or intervening in (including the publishing or 
distributing of statements) any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) 
any candidate for political office” (Section 501c3). This amendment was enacted a 
part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and although Senator Johnson’s motives 
behind the law are unclear, it is suggested (Kindell & Francis-Reilly, 1997) that he 
proposed it either as a way to get back at an organization that had supported an 
opponent of his, or because he wished to offer an alternative  to another Senator’s 
proposal to deny tax-exempt status to organizations that made grants to individuals or 
groups deemed subversive. 
Today, prohibitions against political campaign activity by charitable nonprofits 
are stated in Section 501c3-1c3iii of the Treasury Regulations: 
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(iii) An organization is an action organization if it participates or intervenes, directly 
or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate 
for public office. 
The term candidate for public office means an individual who offers himself, or is 
proposed by others, as a contestant for an elective public office, whether such office 
be national, State, or local.  
Activities which constitute participation or intervention in a political campaign on 
behalf of or in opposition to a candidate include, but are not limited to, the publication 
or distribution of written or printed statements or the making of oral statements on 
behalf of or in opposition to such a candidate. 
As the IRS (2007) notes in its guidelines for 501c3 organizations, “The political 
campaign activity prohibition is not intended to restrict free expression on political 
matters by leaders of organizations speaking by themselves, as individuals”, stating 
managers and leaders of 501c3 organizations can participate in campaign activity in 
their own private capacity, but they must keep these private views out of any of their 
organization’s publications, statements, etc. Part III of this chapter discusses the 
various ways charitable nonprofits might engage in political activities without 
compromising their tax-exempt status.  
Data collection 
What many charitable nonprofits also share, alongside this regulation by the IRS, is a 
duty to be accountable to their granting organizations. Similar to tax laws, granting 
agreements between nonprofits and government agencies like the CDC (directly or 
indirectly, through the state and local health departments) shape the institutional 
context in which these non-profits operate and act politically. As Rathgeb-Smith and 
Gronbjerg (2006, p.227) write, “contracting out” to nonprofits allows governments to 
circumvent complicated and lengthy civil service hiring procedures, which 
substantially reduces program start-up costs and therefore allows government (at least 
in theory) to respond quickly to the emergent needs of different groups. However, for 
nonprofits, Rathgeb-Smith & Gronbjerg (2006) add that managing these contracts can 
also impose substantial burdens on nonprofits-- particularly those that are smaller and 
less experienced. This has happened because governments at all levels have moved in 
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recent years from regularly renewing grant contracts to relying instead on 
performance-based renewal, all of which has required nonprofits to submit not only 
increasingly high-quality grant proposals, but also engage in extensive program 
monitoring and reporting activities, i.e. data collection (Rathgeb-Smith & Gronbjerg, 
2006). In light of this, this section looks particularly at requirements for data collection 
developed by the CDC that charitable nonprofit health service organizations like CAL-
PEP and the SJI must fulfill, discussing how they constrain these organizations’ 
capacity for political advocacy by detracting resources from the organization.  
Since the CDC has become the major funder for HIV/AIDS prevention 
activities nation-wide, it also dictates how these organizations will account for their 
work, and, as a result, how they spend most of their time. As Bailey (1991) writes, in 
1984 the CDC initiated its first attempt to collect data from community organizations 
in the gay community to learn about their HIV prevention programs and determine 
which groups might be at risk for HIV/AIDS and how best to reach them. In nine high 
incidence areas, the CDC assessed HIV/AIDS-related educational efforts, finding that 
these community-based prevention efforts directed at (and run by) groups at risk (such 
as gay men), that were appropriate to their lifestyle, language, and environment were 
more effective93. The CDC thus began its community-based HIV prevention strategy 
in 1985 by announcing that funds were available with two goals: to forge collaboration 
between public health entities and community organizations; and, to support the 
development of local, community-based HIV prevention, education and testing 
interventions that, if successful, could be transferred to other localities (called 
“demonstration projects”) (M. Bailey, 1991).  
                                                
93 At this time, the “San Francisco Model” as it became known, was identified as the ideal model for 
local HIV prevention efforts, as it utilized local health departments for planning and evaluation, medical 
experts for assuring the validity of scientific information, and (gay) community groups for delivery 
services and providing advice on messaging and information (Shadle & Ford, 1989; Silverman, 1992). 
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 However, since their inception, these CDC-funded community-based AIDS 
prevention organizations were not given free reign over program development and 
implementation, and accountability requirements have grown since federal funding for 
the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act (the CARE Act)-- 
which funds HIV/AIDS prevention programs serving the uninsured, underinsured, 
women and minorities-- failed to increase at adequate rates under the Bush II 
Administration (Boschert, 2006). According to Robert Buchanan and William Hatcher 
(2007, p.2013), while CARE Act funding under President Clinton more than doubled 
from the first to sixth federal budgets (from $579 million to $1.411 billion), under 
President Bush, total CARE Act funding under its first six federal budgets increased 
from $1.91 billion to $2.113 billion, an increase of only 11 percent94.  
  While funding for HIV service provision has decreased, government 
monitoring of HIV prevention programs has increased. Since the CDC has to be 
accountable to Congress for the money it spends, it states “Evaluation is an essential 
component of comprehensive HIV prevention… All programs funded by CDC are 
required to develop evaluation plans and activities, establish performance indicators, 
and target activities to those persons living with HIV/AIDS and those at highest risk 
for HIV acquisition and transmission” (CDC, 2007c, p.6). Evaluation activities are 
conducted mainly through the CDC’s Program Evaluation and Research Branch 
(PERB), which falls under the DHAP and “evaluates the processes, outcomes, and 
impacts of CDC HIV/AIDS prevention programs, activities, and policies for their 
improvement and accountability; develops and enhances evaluation methods and 
systems; and serves as a resource for building evaluation capacity” (CDC, 2002, p.1). 
                                                
94 Buchanan and Hatcher also note that for these groups, Medicaid is often not an option. HIV infection 
does not automatically qualify a person as meeting the disability status for Medicaid eligibility, so most 
low income people with HIV do not become eligible for Medicaid until they become disabled by AIDS.  
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 But reflecting the localized way in which HIV/AIDS prevention programs 
have grown throughout the United States, the evaluation process has never been 
standardized or consistent. According to a PERB official (Telephone Interview, 12 
December 2007), evaluation requirements for local HIV/AIDS prevention programs 
have generally varied by the grant and contract agreement. However, as the number of 
community-based prevention programs expanded across the nation, the CDC’s 
capacity (as a central, federal agency) to monitor them has been challenged.  The 
PERB official stated that for many years the CDC collected data about the work it 
supported through interim reports made by grantees to project officers. But, according 
to a CDC report (Thomas, Smith, & Wright-DeAguero, 2006), the variety of funded 
programs grew over time and across a range of geographical areas, meaning the 
CDC’s ability to monitor and evaluate grantees’ performance was compromised by a 
“lack of standardized set of HIV prevention variables and adequate data collection 
systems for managing and reporting such data” (p.75). As a result, they noted, since 
grantees typically developed their own data collection systems, programs and 
processes were measured differently and data reported to the CDC was often 
incomplete, of dubious quality, and hence programs were not comparable across 
agencies or program areas. 
Reflecting a broader federal interest in the activities of local, community-based 
nonprofit organizations, in 2004 the CDC “respond[ed] to the need for a more efficient 
and effective means to assess HIV prevention programs…” (Thomas, Smith, & 
Wright-DeAguero, 2006, p.75) by creating program evaluation practices at the federal 
level that have increased data collection requirements for charitable nonprofits 
conducting HIV prevention work locally. Before discussing the specific response 
(namely the CDC’s Program Evaluation and Monitoring System [PEMS], which both 
CAL-PEP and the SJI have engaged with to varying degrees), it is important to first 
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discuss its origins. According to the PERB official (Telephone Interview,12 December 
2007), “We [at the CDC] are interested in improving our own work as well, but the 
CDC has been hounded, especially during the current [now former Bush] 
Administration by Congresspeople who just don’t like what we do and try to interfere 
with the programs we fund and our presentations at meetings.” In one incidence, 
reported and documented by the Community HIV/AIDS Mobilization Project 
(CHAMP)95, the Office of Management and Budget and the DHHS sent auditors to 
look at the CDC’s HIV prevention efforts in the DHAP. Although the auditors did not 
acknowledge that the DHAP’s budget decreased since 2000, they were curious about 
what the CDC had to show for their $700 million HIV prevention budget, especially 
since the number of infected individuals continues to grow (Gilden, 2005, p.3). 
Certainly, these questions are valid; however, CDC-funded initiatives cannot be 
expected to single-handedly decrease the spread of HIV AIDS96.  
PEMS 
In response to Congressional concerns about CDC grantee outcomes, the CDC 
developed a Program Evaluation and Monitoring System (PEMS), “a national data 
reporting system developed to strengthen the capacity to monitor and evaluate CDC-
funded HIV prevention programs administered by the DHAP” that includes a 
                                                
95CHAMP is a national initiative which seeks to build a community-based movement to challenge and 
develop HIV/AIDS policies by bringing together community activists, persons with AIDS, and 
researchers, among others. See www.champnetwork.org 
96 However, the Bush Administration’s concerns about program spending and outcomes are notable 
because they have not translated to CDC-funded (and other DHHS-funded) HIV/AIDS prevention 
efforts that mirror the Administration’s moral stance, namely abstinence-only sex education. According 
to a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS, 2004), despite the fact that the American 
Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Public Health Association, 
and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists all support comprehensive sex education 
programs that encourage abstinence while also providing adolescents with information on how to 
protect themselves against sexually transmitted diseases, the Bush administration has distorted science-
based performance measures to test whether abstinence-only programs were proving effective. In place 
of collecting data on such established measures of program effectiveness as the number of pregnancies 
among female program participants, the Bush administration has required the CDC to track only 
participants’ program attendance and attitudes about sexual intercourse (UCS, 2004).  
 219 
standardized set of HIV data prevention variables, web-based software for the data 
entry and management, assistance with planning and conducting evaluation, training 
for data collection and evaluation, and support services for the software 
implementation (Thomas, Smith, & Wright-DeAguero, 2006, p.75).  
According to the CDC, they plan to collect the following data from CDC-
funded HIV prevention programs with PEMS: agency information (location, staffing 
levels, etc); program plan details (detailing the HIV prevention and education 
intervention, e.g. condom distribution to street-based populations); client 
demographics; referral outcomes (e.g. did the client with the positive HIV test see the 
doctor?); HIV test results; partner elicitation and notification; client use of services; 
behavioral outcomes (e.g. did clients increase condom use over time?); and 
community planning priority populations and interventions (what populations were 
identified as a priority for the intervention and what will be done to reach them). The 
CDC website notes further that 
 
“…These data will allow more comprehensive reporting of HIV prevention activities, 
fiscal information, and community planning information. These data will help HIV 
prevention stakeholders examine program fidelity, monitor use of key program 
services and behavioral outcomes, and calculate and report the program performance 
indicators. PEMS will help CDC monitor, evaluate, and coordinate HIV prevention 
programs and support the rapid set-up of special studies and evaluation projects.” 
(CDC, 2007b) 
Collecting this data for PEMS would be no simple matter, however, for charitable 
nonprofits in the field of HIV/AIDS prevention. In general, the PEMS manual ran 125 
pages, and the data set book, which listed all the variables required for collection by 
the CDC-funded agency is 228 pages in length. Of these variables (see CDC, 2005 for 
the complete data set), the first set (Tables A-D, N, P, S, E1, E2, and F), which ask for 
the grantees name, contact information, program name, and budget information, are 
quite straightforward and only have to be entered once. Tables G1-3, H, and I, 
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however, have to be filled out for every CDC-funded client-staff interaction and are 
very extensive. Table G1 asks for 18 types of demographic information (first and last 
name, age, date of birth, physical description, relationship status, etc); G2 asks for 
over 10 risk factors to determine the clients’ risk profile (is she or he a sex worker, IV 
drug user, self-reported HIV status, etc); G3 asks about the client’s confirmed HIV 
status (date confirmed, type of test taken, etc); H asks for data about each service 
provider-client intervention, such as intended number of sessions, where and when the 
sessions held, HIV prevention information provided in the session, etc; and table I 
asks about the client’s HIV risk behavior details (which are supposed to be collected at 
the first encounter, final encounter, and intermittently), such as number of partners, 
status of partners, etc97. Should the client also be part of another CDC-funded 
intervention run by the organization, this data would have to be collected again. 
Concerned that PEMS would increase data collection duties and costs, in 
December 2005 and January 2006 CHAMP contacted charitable nonprofits and health 
departments in 27 states regarding their initial experiences with PEMS (S. Barry, 
2006b). Overall, CHAMP agreed that all charitable nonprofits wanted to improve 
service provision and be accountable for their funds, but the CDC’s effort to mix 
measuring the quantity and type of prevention services delivered, combined with the 
collection of extremely personal client information, was far too extreme and complex 
for most grantees to complete (Gilden, 2005). As well, as noted previously, many 
organizations already collected various forms of data for the CDC (through program 
officers) and for various foundations and state and local health departments 
(depending on their grants). In light of the concerns raised by nonprofits through 
                                                
97 The PEMS data set also has nine other tables that must be filled out based on the intervention. For 
example, Table X1 must be completed for each client who receives and HIV test as part of the 
intervention, which requires information about the type of test (rapid, oral, blood, etc), when it was 
done and the result. Table X3 collects data about attempts to locate clients, including how the provider 
tried to locate the client, when etc. 
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CHAMP, as well as various technical difficulties, PEMS has yet to be fully 
implemented98. 
However, PEMS provides a clear case of how data collection requirements are 
increasing in the era of neo-liberal nonprofit contracting, and thus have the potential to 
(further) constrain nonprofits working in the field of HIV/AIDS prevention. Increased 
data collection requirements detract resources from the nonprofit organizations 
delivering services, as extra funds are not often provided to meet the new data 
collection requirements. Although the CDC states (Thomas, Smith, & Wright-
DeAguero, 2006) that PEMS will be brought to CDC funded agencies without charge, 
and “for agencies already collecting data…the PEMS data and evaluation 
requirements can be accommodated into existing management and data collection 
processes” (p.78), they do acknowledge that those organizations with limited program 
management and data collection capacities might see PEMS as a “major challenge” 
(p.78), especially since the CDC will not provide grantees additional funding for this 
data collection. 
 These costs could be extensive: altogether is estimated that collecting data for 
the PEMS tables outlined above would add no less than 20 minutes to any HIV/AIDS 
prevention intervention, not to mention the time spent afterwards entering it into the 
database (Feldman, 2006, p.1). So, for example, an intervention where an outreach 
worker hands a condom to an individual on the street and discusses his or her risks for 
HIV/AIDS might take ten minutes. With PEMS, 20 more minutes are added collecting 
                                                
98 On this matter, the CDC website reads as follows: “PEMS is to be used by health departments and 
CBOs funded through CDC HIV prevention cooperative agreements... PEMS software was first 
released in the fall of 2004 to 42 health departments and 27 CBOs. It allows grantees to collect agency, 
community planning, and program plan data. The next release, scheduled for fall 2005, will enable 
grantees to enter client-level data and report to CDC. By the end of 2005, PEMS will be available to 
over 200 agencies nationwide. PEMS will ensure that CDC receives standardized, accurate, and 
thorough program data from health department and CBO grantees.” (CDC, 2007b) 
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data about this intervention. Multiply this extra 20-minute expenditure across multiple 
interventions, and hours can be added to the workload. Indeed, PEMS estimates a 
paperwork burden of 22 hours per month, and the National Minority AIDS Council 
(NMAC) calculated that for a nonprofit with an annual budget of $200,000, 22 hours, 
times 12 months multiplied by the minimum wage ($5.15) equals $1359.60 per month. 
Adding fringe benefits (SSI, insurance, unemployment, etc), in total, PEMS could 
increase the organization’s expenses by $1658.71 (or more, if more hours are required 
and wages are higher) per year. This amounts to a “compliance burden” of nearly 1 
percent per year. NMAC stated further that since most AIDS service nonprofits do not 
have a “profit margin” of more than 3 or 5 percent of revenue, this additional cost 
could claim anywhere between 20 and 33 percent of this profit revenue (Dozier, 2004, 
p.1).  
For nonprofits receiving CDC funding, the resources to administer programs 
like PEMS must either come from their CDC grants for HIV prevention services, or 
(since maintaining service levels is an important priority) from other sources of 
funding organizations might have, such as donations or foundation grants. These non-
government sources of funding are often less restrictive and therefore can be used for, 
among other things, political or advocacy work. However, they are more likely to be 
used for data collection requirements, which help them maintain the CDC grants that 
often make up the bulk of their funding.  
 And so as organizational budgets have grown leaner and state agencies have 
increased pressure on them to achieve various service delivery and data collection 
targets, these organizations have felt pressure to train and professionalize their staffs 
(Evetts, 2003). Certainly, for organizations to implement PEMS their staff must have 
higher levels of skill and training to negotiate the manual and required variable 
collection. This more professionalized and research-oriented data collection practice, 
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in turn, has the potential to diminish the rapport with the populations PEMS-impacted 
nonprofits serve (Gilden, 2005) by requiring organizations to hire and train more 
skilled outreach workers (who might have less of a connection to the communities 
they serve). All of this has raised concerns (CHAMP, 2005; Feldman, 2006) that in 
becoming so form-driven, PEMS actually resembles behavioral research more than 
simple program monitoring (collecting the information for PEMS becomes the 
intervention).  
Given the complexity of PEMS and the resistance to it (described above) by 
charitable nonprofits, its full implementation across CDC-funded agencies has been 
repeatedly delayed (S. Barry, 2006a). According to the PERB official (Interview, 12 
December 2007), starting January 1, 2008, the CDC began collecting a subset of 
PEMS variables—agency type, budget, plans for programs, etc—which are one-time 
data entry items. Counseling and testing data will also have to be collected and 
reported to the CDC through PEMS starting January 2008 and submitted by the 
middle of year because grant agreements currently indicate data requirements are due 
every quarter. When charitable nonprofits must begin reporting client-level data (the 
bulk of the data) through PEMS is yet to be determined. According to the PERB 
official (Telephone Interview, 12 December 2007), the number of client-level 
variables was recently reduced by half; those that remain are (for the most part) 
already collected by CBOs and health departments. The PERB official estimated that 
“Maybe one-third of the original variable list is now required from community-based 
nonprofit organizations. Health departments have a few more reporting requirements, 
but they are very much reduced overall. We don’t think it will be burdensome for 
agency that knows how to use computer.” Later chapters will therefore consider how 
burdensome CAL-PEP and the SJI’s experience with PEMS (as well as with other 
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funding agencies’ data requirements) has been to date, and whether and how this has 
detracted resources and professionalized their staff. 
PART III: Circumventing constraints? 
In general, nonprofits have emerged and expanded in tandem with increased state 
support for their efforts. As such, their capacity to mobilize and advocate for the 
communities they serve is very much shaped by various conditions imposed on them 
by government agencies. Indeed, section 501c3 of the IRC and data collection 
requirements operate as two potential restrictions on their capacity to mobilize the 
populations they serve, advocate for their constituents, and challenge policy. So what 
might charitable nonprofits born of protest movements (like CAL-PEP and the SJI) do 
to continue with their advocacy efforts? Similar to the previous sections, the following 
pages will discuss generally the benefits and disadvantages of various strategies 
charitable nonprofits might employ (as outlined in the small but growing literature on 
the nonprofit sector and political activity) within the nonprofit institutional context to 
circumvent the vectors of political constraint and continue their advocacy efforts. 
These strategies include the “flip side” of professionalization, engagement in electoral 
politics, and permitted lobbying through the H-election.  
The “flip side” of professionalization  
The previous pages discussed how grassroots nonprofits (like CAL-PEP and the SJI) 
will require staff members to have higher skill levels in the face of increasingly 
complex and costly data collection requirements. In essence, data collection 
requirements potentially “professionalize” these organizations. But while this might be 
the case, it is also important to consider how “professionalization” can be used to help 
these organizations continue making radical political statements. Namely, as noted in 
Chapter One, professionalization can be used strategically by nonprofits to empower 
members of the communities they serve that are typically blamed for the spread of 
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HIV/AIDS by involving them in health service delivery and organizational operations. 
 Generally, the concept of “professionalization” is not associated with inclusion 
(or radical/oppositional politics, for that matter). As scholars (see for example Evetts, 
2003) have documented, professionalization has operated in many respects as a 
control mechanism by closely regulating the behaviors and actions of individuals99. 
Consequently, as a means of inclusion, professionalization must be regarded with 
caution. However, professionalization can also operate as a means of inclusion for 
community-based nonprofits like CAL-PEP and the SJI by allowing them to hire 
marginalized persons often blamed for the spread of HIV/AIDS to work within their 
organizations. This involvement is possible because of how these persons are hired-- 
as trained, credentialed AIDS service providers, as opposed to as “prostitutes” (or 
“drug users,” to name another example)100. This hiring practice makes a radical 
political statement in and of itself, especially in organizations that hire sex workers in 
the United States (the only western industrialized nation that continues to criminalize 
prostitution). Moreover, once involved in these organizations (even if it is mainly in 
this credentialed capacity), these marginalized populations (sex workers and others) 
are, undeniably, provided with a sense of community and exposure to the discourse 
                                                
99 As noted in Chapter One, many medical professionals have thus operated in an exclusionary fashion, 
using their credentials to exclude various individuals/groups from their field of service provision and, 
subsequently, from being knowledgeable and active participants in their own health care. The women’s 
health clinics described in Chapter One provided one such example of a community-based response to 
and rejection of this exclusion (Morgen, 1990, 1995, 2002; Ruzek & Becker, 1999; Ruzek, Clarke, & 
Olesen, 1997). 
100 Today, participation in AIDS prevention and education outreach often requires state certification and 
training. For example, in California (where CAL-PEP and the SJI are located), the Statewide Treatment 
and Education Program (CSTEP), and its predecessor, the Treatment Education Certification Program 
(TECP), provides training on medical and behavioral aspects of HIV to non-medical service providers 
through a four-part program (Wingfield, Leahy, & Dalton, 2002). “Training A”, a two-day program, 
introduces basic concepts and terms related to HIV/AIDS in preparation for “Training B”, a three-day 
session with a certification component geared towards persons in daily contact with HIV-positive 
individuals; this and covers the basics of HIV treatment education. “Training C”, geared towards HIV 
treatment advocates (who help individuals navigate and negotiate the health care system regarding HIV) 
and educators, is a five-day program focusing on advanced treatment issues. Finally, “Training D” is a 
series of trainings covering new and emerging HIV treatment issues. 
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and mission of organizations supportive of broader issues of prostitutes rights (among 
others), all of which might motivate their own individual political involvement. 
 As well, hiring from marginalized communities in this professional capacity 
can promote political activity by bringing previously excluded groups into the realm 
of AIDS service politics. Indeed, the immediacy of the AIDS epidemic forced AIDS 
service nonprofits to prioritize service provision over broader political activism 
against homophobia, sexism and universal health care (among other relevant issues). 
And to obtain and continue funding this, many of these organizations (such as GMHC, 
described in Chapter 1), succumbed to pressures to distance themselves from their 
grassroots in order to attain “credibility” and “respectability” by presenting themselves 
as professional service agencies serving the public. However, these efforts (and 
compromises) helped place AIDS on the radar of major governmental major health 
service organizations and brought a previously excluded and stigmatized group—gay 
men—into the realm of not only health service provision, but also health service 
politics. Similarly, for sex workers, it was their gathering as persons concerned with 
HIV prevention that has brought them into partnerships with state agencies such as 
local health departments and the CDC. 
Engagement in electoral politics 
Electoral politics also provide charitable nonprofits with an arena to advocate for 
issues that are important to their community, even though charitable nonprofits, as 
described earlier, are limited here. For these organizations, the IRS indicates that 
approved election-related activities must be largely non-partisan. Such activities might 
include creating or distributing a voter guide that does not indicate a preference 
towards a particular candidate; conducting unbiased and non-partisan public forums or 
meetings where candidates from both sides can speak or debate; holding voter 
registration and get-out-the-vote drives that do not indicate a preference for a 
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particular candidate; and selling or renting facilities or goods to a political campaign 
as long as this sale is not biased towards a party or candidate and is also available to 
the general public (IRS, 2007a). Under IRC Section 4995, any expenditure made for 
these campaign activities may also be subject to an excise tax if it is determined to be 
in violation of these rules, or, if severe enough, the organization could lose its tax 
exempt status altogether101. 
 Although section 501c3 quite explicitly prohibits charitable nonprofits from 
supporting particular candidates or causes directly, strategies for circumventing this 
(and therefore supporting a candidate or cause) do exist. Nicole Marwell’s study 
(2004) considers the political campaign possibilities for charitable nonprofits. She 
argues broadly that these organizations are in a structural position to fill the gap left by 
defunct political party organizations in poor neighborhoods because they work so 
closely with members of the community, especially since resources under their control 
have expanded with welfare state privatization. In essence, she proposes a system of 
exchange where the charitable nonprofit serves as the fulcrum through which 
patronage resources (i.e. grants and contracts) are distributed and clients of the 
charitable nonprofit are organized as voters. Here, by engaging in electoral organizing 
and producing reliable voting constituencies (charitable nonprofit clients) through 
permitted campaign activities (like get-out-the-vote drives, and educating clients in 
general about where the money for the charitable nonprofit comes from), charitable 
nonprofits can (indirectly) pressure these political actors to make favorable contract 
allocations.  
                                                
101 Lunder notes that if the expenditure is small and the violation is deemed unintentional, the tax could 
be issues in lieu of loss of exempt status. The tax, if issued, will equal 10 percent of the expenditure, 
and another 2.5 percent tax on the expenditure may be imposed on the organization’s manager (up to 
$5,000). If the expenditure is not recovered and timely measures are not taken to correct the mistake, an 
additional 100 percent tax on the expenditure will be levied, and an additional tax equal to 50 percent of 
the expenditure may also be levied on the manager, limited to $10,000 (IRS FS-2006-17, p.7).  
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 Given that government contracting to nonprofits for health and other social 
service delivery is a reality in the neo-liberal era, Marwell’s proposal is very 
pragmatic; however, it is not necessarily a feasible political action for all charitable 
nonprofits. Many charitable nonprofits do not want to draw IRS attention for 
appearing to participate in unacceptable campaign activity, especially since the IRS 
has recently heightened its scrutiny of political activity by charitable nonprofits. The 
2006 study “Political Activities Compliance Initiative” (IRS, 2006b) found that 
although charities are precluded from intervening in political campaigns, “the IRS has 
seen a growth in the number and variety of allegations of such behavior by 501c3 
organizations during elections cycles” (p.2). In response, the IRS took a two-part 
approach, conducting an educational campaign to inform charities about the 
regulations of political activities and about the “fast-track process” the IRS developed 
to evaluate reports and allegations of potential prohibited political activity. Of the 132 
organizations included in the study, only three lost their tax-exempt status, and 55 
received letters of warning. Overall, the study noted the following major violations by 
charities, including churches102:  distributing voting materials encouraging constituents 
to vote for a preferred candidate; criticizing or supporting a candidate through a 
website or linked website; disseminating improper voter guides or candidate ratings; 
placing signs on the property in support of a particular candidate; giving improperly 
preferential treatment to candidates speaking at events; and, making cash contributions 
to a candidate’s political campaign. While these violations might seem obvious or 
avoidable, this investigative action by the IRS was to alarm charitable nonprofits their 
activities were being monitored closely, which could severely deter any campaign 
activity on their part (including that of the legal variety Marwell describes).  
                                                
102 Fewer than half the organizations investigated were churches. All of the church cases went through 
the specific procedures of IRC section 7611, which require a church tax inquiry prior to the opening of 
a church tax examination. 
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Permitted lobbying 
Permitted participation in electoral politics is not the only way charitable nonprofits 
might circumvent the vectors of political constraint. As the following pages describe, 
charitable nonprofits can employ various political advocacy strategies without 
compromising their nonprofit status or data collection duties. The most direct strategy, 
which is possible for well-funded charitable nonprofits, is to create separate advocacy 
organizations under section 501c4 of the IRC. For example, Planned Parenthood 
clinics (or “affiliate organizations”) are registered under section 501c3 (with its 
attendant restrictions on political activity) and their focus is on offering reproductive 
health services, whereas the Planned Parenthood Action Fund is registered under 
section 501c4, which allows it to “[e]ngage in educational and electoral activity 
including public education campaigns, grassroots organizing and legislative activity” 
(www.ppaction.org).  
For charitable nonprofits that do not have the resources to create a 501c4 
organization (and for all 501c organizations in general), however, they may engage 
instead in public policy advocacy if it is done in a largely educational and unbiased 
manner. Such permitted activities might include (but are not limited to) providing 
testimony on an issue in response to a request a legislative body; contacting executive, 
judicial and administrative bodies on matters not related to legislation; conducting, 
publishing and disseminating non-partisan issue research and analysis; discussing 
broad social issues as long as specific legislation is not discussed; and contacting 
legislative bodies about legislation relating to the organization’s existence (Internal 
Revenue Service, 2007; Lunder, 2006).  
However, the most direct, inexpensive (and risk-free) strategy for nonprofits of 
any size to engage in policy advocacy is to make the “H-election” under section 501h 
of the IRC. Enacted in 1976, as part of the Tax Reform Act (also known as the “Lobby 
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Law”), Congress enacted the provision IRC 501h to allow electing organizations to 
measure their lobbying activities against the numerical limits established by the 
coordinating taxing provision IRC 4911 (specified below)103. Section 501h and Section 
4911 of the IRC (described below) were passed largely in response to the growth of 
the non-profit sector and increasing public criticism of the lobbying limitation, namely 
that these organizations provided services but had no say in the policy process104.   
 But it took nearly 14 years to complete the regulations needed to implement 
the provisions of IRC 501h and 4911, and the reasons for this delay have never been 
fully explained by anyone, including the IRS (Berry & Arons, 2003). There was little 
pressure on the IRS to do anything, especially since a major Supreme Court case in 
1983, Regan v. Taxation without Representation, ruled that the limits on lobbying by 
charitable nonprofits were constitutional and did not deny free speech rights105. 
                                                
103 Also enacted was IRC 504, which prevents organizations denied 501c3 status because of excessive 
expenditures for lobbying under IRC 4911from subsequently qualifying under IRC 501c4 for tax 
exempt status (IRS, 1980; Kindell & Francis-Reilly, 1997).  
104 In 1973, in response to these concerns, John D. Rockefeller and friends funded business leader John 
H. Filer to chair The Filer Commission, which reported on American philanthropy. The final report, 
“Giving in America” was critical of the limitations on legislative activities by charitable nonprofits, and 
this was also considered the impetus for passing the H election (Kindell & Francis-Reilly, 1997). The 
Joint Committee on Taxation, in its general explanation of the Tax Reform Act also concurred, stating 
that since 1934, “neither the Treasury regulations no court decisions gave enough detailed meaning to 
the statutory language to permit most charitable organizations to know approximately where the limits 
were… The Act is designed to set relatively specific expenditure limits to replace uncertain standards” 
(1976). 
105 According to the Supreme Court’s case summary, “Taxation With Representation of Washington 
(TWR) is a nonprofit corporation organized to promote its view of the "public interest" in the area of 
federal taxation; it was formed to take over the operation of two other nonprofit organizations, one of 
which had tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) and the other under § 501(c)(4). The Internal Revenue 
Service denied TWR's application for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) because it appeared that a 
substantial part of TWR's activities would consist of attempting to influence legislation. TWR then 
brought suit in Federal District Court against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Secretary of 
the Treasury, and the United States, claiming that § 501(c)(3)'s prohibition against substantial lobbying 
is unconstitutional under the First Amendment by imposing an "unconstitutional burden" on the receipt 
of tax-deductible contributions, and is also unconstitutional under the equal protection component of the 
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the Code permits taxpayers to deduct contributions to 
veterans' organizations that.qualify for tax exemption under § 501(c)(19). The District Court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 501(c)(3) does 
not violate the First Amendment, but does violate the Fifth Amendment.” ("Regan v. Taxation without 
Representation", 1983) 
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However, when the IRS finally issued the regulations in 1986, controversy ensued. 
The nonprofit community was effectively mobilized under the umbrella organization 
The Independent Sector (now the Center for Lobbying in the Public Interest [CLPI]), 
sending tens of thousands of letters to the IRS in protest that regulations were overly 
restrictive and would have a “chilling effect” on charities’ involvement in the policy 
process, namely because certain kinds of communications were defined as grassroots 
lobbying (Berry & Arons, 2003; Kindell & Francis-Reilly, 1997). House Ways and 
Means chairman Dan Rostenkowski also requested the proposed regulations be 
withdrawn, representing the view from many members of Congress that they were too 
ambiguous (Kindell & Francis-Reilly, 1997). While the IRS did not withdraw the 
requirements, it publicly stated in an information release IR-87-49 (April 9,1987) that 
it would reconsider key portions of the regulations (i.e. section 4911) and held two 
days of public consultations in 1987.The IRS established the Commissioner’s Exempt 
Organization’s Advisory Group, ultimately issuing a set of regulations published in 
1990 that were highly satisfactory to nonprofits (Berry & Arons, 2003; Kindell & 
Francis-Reilly, 1997; Smucker, 1999). 
Today, making the “H election” under section 501h of the IRC represents a 
major gain for nonprofits because, as described below, it provides institutional 
guidelines for charitable nonprofits to conduct advocacy on behalf of their constituents 
in the political area by helping them avoid the ambiguities inherent in the “no 
substantial part” test 106(although, as elaborated below, few do make this election). 
Section 501h “Expenditures by public charities to influence legislation”, states  
                                                
106 When a charitable nonprofit organization does not make the H-election and the IRS suspects it is 
engaging in a prohibited lobbying activity, the IRS determines whether they have conducted a 
substantial amount of lobbying based on the facts of each case. Although case law suggests that “no 
substantial part” of the organization’s expenditures for lobbying (i.e. the amount the organization can 
spend without penalty) is between 5 and 20 percent of the organization’s expenditures, there is no clear 
line or test. Instead, the determination is made by looking at the broad context of the purpose and 
activities, such as how important lobbying is to the organization’s purpose, the amount spent on the 
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(1) General rule 
In the case of an organization to which this subsection applies, exemption from 
taxation under subsection (a) shall be denied because a substantial part of the 
activities of such organization consists of carrying on propaganda, or otherwise 
attempting, to influence legislation, but only if such organization normally-- (A) 
makes lobbying expenditures in excess of the lobbying  
ceiling amount for such organization for each taxable year, or (B) makes grass roots 
expenditures in excess of the grassroots ceiling amount for such organization for each 
taxable year. 
 (2) Definition:  For purposes of this subsection-- 
(A) Lobbying expenditures: The term ``lobbying expenditures'' means expenditures 
for the purpose of influencing legislation (as defined in section 4911(d)).  
(B) Lobbying ceiling amount: The lobbying ceiling amount for any organization for 
any taxable year is 150 percent of the lobbying nontaxable amount for such 
organization for such taxable year, determined under section 4911. 
(C) Grassroots expenditures: The term ``grass roots expenditures'' means expenditures 
for the purpose of influencing legislation (as defined in section 4911(d) without 
regard to paragraph (1)(B) thereof). 
(D) Grass roots ceiling amount: The grass roots ceiling amount for any organization 
for any taxable year is 150 percent of the grass roots nontaxable amount for such 
organization for such taxable year, determined under section 4911. 
(3) Organizations to which this subsection applies: This subsection shall apply to any 
organization which has elected (in such manner and at such time as the Secretary may 
prescribe) to have the provisions of this subsection apply to such organization and 
which, for the taxable year which includes the date the election is made, is described 
in subsection (c)(3) 
To make the H election, all a 501c3 organization is required to do is sign and submit 
the one-page IRS Form 5768, the “Election/Revocation of Election by an Eligible 
Section 501c3 Organizations to Make Expenditures to Influence Legislation”. 
Section 4911 “Tax on excess expenditures to influence legislation” specifies 
the lobbying and grassroots expenditures and for H-electing organizations, and is 
summarized as follows in Table 5.2, “IRC Section 4911: Lobbying Allowances”: 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
alleged lobbying activity, etc. Should a non-H electing charitable nonprofit be found guilty of lobbying 
and lose its tax exempt status, it is subject to a 5 percent excise tax on the lobbying expenditures 
(Lunder, 2006).  
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Table 5.2: IRC Section 4911: Lobbying Allowances 
If the tax-exempt purpose 
expenditures of the 
organization are 
Then the total direct lobbying 
expenditure amounts allowed 
are 
Then the total grassroots 
lobbying expenditures allowed 
are 
Up to $500,000 20% of exempt purpose 
expenditures up to $100,000 
¼ of total direct lobbying 
expenditure ceiling 
$500,000- $1 million $100,000 + 15% of excess over 
$500,000 
$35,000 + 3.75% of excess over 
$500,000 
$1million - $1.5 million $175,000 + 10% of excess over 
$1 million 
$43,750 + 2.5% of excess over 
$1 million 
$1.5 million - $17 million $225,000 + 5% of excess over 
$1.5 million 
$56,350 + 1.25% of excess over 
$1.5 million 
Over $17 million $1 million $250,000 
Source: Title 26 IRC Subtitle D, Chapter 41, Section 4911  
If expenditures exceed the allowable amounts for both direct and grassroots lobbying, 
an excise tax will be imposed on excess lobbying expenditures, and if lobbying 
expenditures exceed both permitted and total lobbying and grassroots amounts, the 
IRC excise tax is imposed on whatever excess (for direct or grassroots lobbying) is 
greater.  
Although the H election provides an opportunity for charitable nonprofits to 
circumvent the restrictions on their political advocacy activities, only 2.5 percent of all 
charitable nonprofits filed with the IRS chose to make the H election (Berry & Arons, 
2003, p.57). Understanding the disincentives at play that keep charitable nonprofits 
from making this election is important to consider because lobbying is a reality of the 
American political system: groups and constituencies engaged in political activities 
affect what public officials hear, which in turn contributes to what gets done in the 
legislative arena (Reid, 1999).  
Berry and Arons (2003) provide one of the only (and most current) studies of 
how lobbying laws impact charitable nonprofit’s capacities for political advocacy. As 
part of their study, Berry and Arons (2003) also compared the political activities of 
charitable nonprofit service providers who made the H election with those that did not 
(neither group surveyed had more or less reason to lobby government, as both groups 
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received similar government funding). They found that non-H electors knew less 
about and did less lobbying and advocacy. As a consequence, those receiving services 
from H electors received more representation in the political process and benefited 
from a politically astute leadership committed to changing the system for the better. 
However, this advocacy was not without restraint.  
Given the apparent benefits to and gains made by H-electing charitable 
nonprofits, questions arise as to why more charitable nonprofits do not make this 
election. Since making the H-election is a political choice, the first factor preventing 
many charitable nonprofits from doing this is a lack of knowledge about their options. 
In Berry & Arons’ study (2003, p.59), only 54% of nonprofits surveyed knew they 
could make the H election, and only 32% knew they could opt for the H-election and 
lobby even if they received federal grants107. Barry and Arons note, however, that this 
ignorance is understandable: government relations are commonly an afterthought in 
non-profit design, and the H-election is not even mentioned when an organization 
registers as a charitable nonprofit through IRS Form 990. Furthermore, they add, since 
the IRS has issued such an “illogical patchwork of policies” (2003, p.53)-- 
communicated through a range of statutory provisions, regulations, OMB circulars and 
IRS rulings-- it is a wonder even 2.5 percent of charitable nonprofits have made the H 
election.  
 The second factor preventing most charitable nonprofits from making the H-
election is that do not want draw the IRS’s attention and trigger an audit (DiConsiglio, 
2003; Smucker, 1999). This belief is very understandable, especially for organizations 
serving politically unpopular constituencies (like sex workers). However, the IRS has 
stated clearly that the H election does not provide the basis for initiating an audit, and 
                                                
107 In this case, they could use other non-federal monies (such as foundation grants and individual 
donations) for lobbying, if these other sources permitted it.   
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that they in fact encourage all charitable nonprofits to make this election because it 
clearly enumerates what they can spend for lobbying activities (IRS, 2000) 
A third major deterrent to the H election is a lack “lobby-able” resources: 
many charitable nonprofits receive grants from federal agencies, and although the IRS 
states that it is not a matter of federal tax law, federal grants cannot be earmarked for 
lobbying unless they are authorized to do so by the granting agency (IRS, 2000). 
Charitable nonprofits like CAL-PEP and the SJI receive the majority of their funding 
from the CDC, directly or through grants to state and local health departments that 
subcontract with them. Grant agreements directly with the CDC strictly limit any 
political or lobbying activity by the recipient nonprofit. According to the CDC’s 
cooperative agreement U65/CCU923903-02 (CDC, 2004) for the CDC and 
organization conducting HIV/AID prevention activities, a major qualification for these 
grants is stated as follows: 
 
Does your community-based organization have a valid Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) 501(c) (3) tax-exempt status or state proof of incorporation as a non-profit 
organization?  If you answer yes, you must attach a copy of the letter from the IRS or 
a copy of your state proof of incorporation. If you answer no, you are not eligible to 
apply for funding under this program announcement. 
As noted above, an organization incorporated under section 501c3 (i.e.. as a 
charitable nonprofit) is automatically prohibited from most lobbying and 
campaign activities. Furthermore, the grant agreement states that CBOs must 
also stating the CBO must also 
 
Not be a 501(c) (4) organization.  Note: Title 2 of the United States Code section 
1611 states that an organization described in section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue 
Code that engages in lobbying activities is not eligible to receive federal funds 
constituting an award, grant, or loan. 
Federal (and other government) agency grants like this comprise a large portion of the 
budgets of many charitable nonprofits’ in the health service sector (this exact grant 
provides approximately 80 percent of CAL-PEP’s funding, for example). As a result, 
these organizations often have little in the way of “unrestricted” funds from other 
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sources (foundations, individual donations, etc) that can be used at the organization’s 
discretion for activities like lobbying. Indeed, smaller nonprofits can reduce costs and 
lobby inexpensively under the H-election by, for example, including advocacy and 
lobbying messages in emails, writing letters to a legislator, or asking questions at town 
hall meetings (DiConsiglio, 2003). But even these activities take time and effort from 
service provision, particularly in nonprofits with small staffs.  
Conclusion 
The decline of the radical social movements of the late 1960s and the rise of neo-
liberal politics in the 1970s has created political opportunities for activists in the 
nonprofit health services sector. But does this shift from activism to service provision-
- in partnership with the state-- necessarily preclude political advocacy by these 
nonprofit organizations? Drawing from the literature regarding the relationships of 
organizations (namely civic associations) to government, particularly Rathgeb-Smith 
& Gronbjerg’s neo-institutional theory, this chapter has discussed broadly the 
exogenous factors shaping the capacity of nonprofits to engage in oppositional 
politics. This chapter has demonstrated that despite their local, community-based 
nature and the service gaps they fill for the state, many of these HIV/AIDS service 
nonprofits (of which CAL-PEP and the SJI are an example) are not exempt from 
federal regulation and control. Instead, this federal regulation and control illustrates 
more broadly, as Larner (2000) argues, that while neo-liberalism might mean “less 
government” (particularly when it comes to health and social service provision), “it 
does not follow that there is less governance [italics added]” (p.12).  
 In particular, charitable nonprofits like CAL-PEP and the SJI must negotiate 
two major forms of governance—the vectors of political constraint: registration as a 
charitable nonprofit under IRC section 501c3, and data collection requirements from 
their major funding source, the CDC. Certainly, registering as a charitable nonprofit 
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under IRC section 501c3 can effectively strip incorporated organizations of the ability 
to lobby or participate in political campaigns, and funding from the CDC (which 
requires incorporation as a charitable nonprofit under Section 501c3) also imposes 
heavy data collection requirements, which can detract resources from the organization 
and professionalize staff. At the same time, relationship to and engagement with the 
state is often a dynamic process: various strategies for circumventing these vectors 
also exist, which potentially allow nonprofits like CAL-PEP and the SJI to continue 
engaging in advocacy on behalf of their constituency, even as their main focus is on 
maintaining service provision. 
 Previous chapters about CAL-PEP and the SJI provided an opportunity to see 
how two particular nonprofit organizations reflect and complicate the vectors of 
political constraint and employ various strategies of circumvention. Certainly, as it 
was shown, these charitable nonprofits know their constituency’s needs and could be 
their best advocates; they also provide a base from which a stigmatized and politically 
marginalized community that lacks few resources or allies could gather and organize 
to act politically to make claims on the state. However, since they are serving a high-
needs clientele (many of the sex workers they serve are poor, criminalized, uninsured 
and members of sexual and racial minorities), their organizational survival also 
remains a priority, even at the expense of seeking long-term legal policy and legal 
changes.  
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CHAPTER 6 
RADICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SEX 
WORKER RIGHTS 
Since the political protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s faded from view, many 
activists have transitioned to the realm of nonprofit service provision, aided by state 
incentives. This thesis has provided a case study of a marginal social movement’s 
evolution. Formed by activists involved in the COYOTE-led prostitutes’ rights 
movement, the California Prevention and Education Project (CAL-PEP) and the St. 
James Infirmary (SJI) are two small nonprofit organizations located in the San 
Francisco Bay Area that hire sex workers (and other street-based populations, in CAL-
PEP’s case) to provide free, non-judgmental health and social services to their peers.  
 Even as they are small, highly localized case studies, CAL-PEP and the SJI’s 
experiences illustrate much for scholars and activists alike interested in social 
movements and the evolution of political organizing more broadly. In essence, despite 
being variously funded by federal, state and local health authorities in an era of neo-
liberal politics, these organizations demonstrate what has been termed “radical 
institutionalization”: they have implemented practices (in this case, of non-judgmental 
sex worker-led health service provision) directly at odds with the dominant political 
and moral order that regulates prostitution today. Overall, these findings indicate that 
activists do not always lose their radical commitments when they create formal 
organizations and engage with the state, thus challenging Piven and Cloward’s 
enduring conclusion that “[o]rganizations endure by abandoning their oppositional 
politics” (1977, p.xxi).  
Instead, CAL-PEP and the SJI provide a counter-model to the co-optive 
associational politics assumed in the neo-liberal era, and the subtleties and nuances of 
how their radical commitments are maintained (and constrained) are best discerned by 
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fine-grained qualitative case studies of these organizations. To guide future analyses 
of these and other small, activist service nonprofits in the pantheon of nonprofit 
organizations, this chapter reviews this thesis’ findings with regards to the following: 
political context and opportunities, organizational strategies and operations, and 
political and policy outcomes. Indeed, this is not a definitive list of evaluative criteria, 
but it provides guidelines for considering, as their own cases, how activist service 
nonprofits might also maintain radical commitments even as they partner with state 
agencies in an era of neo-liberal politics.  
Political Context & Opportunities 
Define the political environment 
Even as the focus of this study has been on the particular activities and strategies of 
two small, nonprofit health service organizations, the findings presented in this thesis 
make clear that understanding the broader political-economic context in which they 
emerged and currently operate is important for understanding their past decisions and 
future prospects. Here, literature on the broader political opportunity structure (POS)-- 
the basic premise of which is “that exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for 
mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for 
particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect 
mainstream institutional politics and policy” (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, p.1457)—helps 
set the stage for understanding the context in which grassroots activists serve hard-to-
reach groups. 
Indeed, prostitution is a very marginalized activity in the United States (as is 
the movement for prostitutes’ rights), and nonprofit organizations like CAL-PEP and 
the SJI that serve and involve sex workers in service delivery and organizational 
management are very marginal players in the health service sector. Moreover, they are 
located in the San Francisco Bay Area, which is not “like” most the United States, 
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particularly with regards to sexual politics and the tendency for public authorities to 
adopt non-mainstream approaches to health and social service delivery. Given all of 
this, one might conclude there is little to learn from these organizations—particularly 
within the context of social movements/organizing-- as they appear so “extreme”. 
However, this thesis has demonstrated that, even in the Bay Area, predominant 
features of the POS for COYOTE’s daughters affect many other activists and political 
actors: namely, the advent of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the ascent of neo-liberal 
politics (defined by, among other things, the devolution of social service provision to a 
network and private and/or nonprofit service providers and the implementation of 
market-based urban renewal projects), and social conservatism reflected in the 
development of hyper-punitive crime policies. Understanding this context was and is 
important for analyzing activist decisions and organizational outcomes: the advent of 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the early 1980s further limited support for prostitutes’ 
rights and also posed immediate health and safety threats to sex workers, and state and 
federal crime policies employed in California and the San Francisco Bay Area since 
the 1980s have further reinforced and heightened the seemingly hegemonic character 
of prostitution as an immoral, criminal activity at the local level.  
Therefore, much like the women’s health advocates and gay activists that 
formed the women’s health clinics and Gay Men’s Health Crisis, respectively 
(described in Chapter One), sex worker activists entered the realm of nonprofit health 
service provision in the early 1980s by forming CAL-PEP, and in the 1990s the SJI. 
Taken together, in this context the SJI and CAL-PEP can be understood as cases of 
activists capitalizing on grant opportunities created by various health (and other 
governmental) authorities for local, community-based health service provision that 
involves the target community (in this case, sex workers) as health service 
professionals. 
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 But what of the SJI and CAL-PEP’s capacity to advocate for and promote sex 
worker rights in the broader legislative arena? Was this maintained as COYOTE 
members transitioned to nonprofit health service provision? In response, when I began 
my research, I envisioned sex workers at CAL-PEP and the SJI getting up in arms, 
mobilizing, and making challenges to unfair laws that criminalized their activities. In 
reality, however, a much more complicated picture emerged that was neither one of 
complete abandonment of radical goals nor one of pure maintenance of a commitment 
to them. To understand this picture, considering only macro-structural factors (i.e. a 
purely POS-oriented analysis) was not sufficient, and so this thesis indicates that 
attending to the stories of grassroots activists and the organizations they form is also 
important for understanding how they responded to the broader context in which they 
exist. For CAL-PEP, the SJI and other nonprofits, it is therefore important to examine 
them closely and account for the dilemmas, ideas, perspectives and experiences of 
activists forming and shaping them today. The remaining guidelines below sketch 
briefly framework for doing this. 
Organization 
Specify the range of organizations in which the case studies fit. 
When analyzing the activities of individual nonprofits formed by activists in any 
context, it is important to place them first within a range of “like” or “sister” 
organizations, as this provides an immediate context for understanding the other 
options activists might have exercised, and thus helps to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of protest movements and activist choices. To illustrate, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 1, this study has placed the organizations that emerged from 
the COYOTE-led prostitutes’ rights movement along a range defined by whether they 
have maintained a commitment to prostitutes’ rights, and whether they express this 
commitment (or lack thereof) through advocacy or service provision. Doing this made 
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clear immediately that even if one is to accuse CAL-PEP and the SJI of abandoning 
protest politics, a closer look reveals that among the formal organizations created by 
COYOTE activists, CAL-PEP and the SJI have not gone the way of their nonprofit 
“sister”, SAGE, even though they are limited in their capacity to advance a 
commitment to prostitutes’ rights beyond their organizations. Although SAGE was 
developed and is run by a former sex worker and COYOTE activist, it has fully 
absorbed and invested itself in status quo state policy: it refuses to acknowledge 
prostitution as work, takes money from places like the federal Department of Justice, 
and works closely with the police to develop anti-prostitution initiatives, such as the 
johns’ school.  All of this indicates that when it comes to maintaining more radical 
commitments, formal organizations created from protest movements may vary in this 
regard.  
Make an internal/external distinction 
Once the organizations have been situated in a range, it is important to next make an 
“internal-external” distinction regarding the degrees to which they maintain their 
radical commitments. In essence, it is important to discern if what they do “on the 
inside” relates to what they do “on the outside”. Considering this internal-external 
distinction is important because, with the protest movements of the 1960s long over, it 
is easy to assume that as members of once-radical protest groups form service 
organizations (or become part of mainstream governing structures), their protest 
politics and radical claims disappear with them. Instead, this thesis signals to political 
scientists interested in political protest—particularly within the context of neo-liberal 
welfare state devolution—that it is important to also look for protest as/put into 
practice, particularly for and by groups with few other political opportunities. 
To make this internal/external distinction, multi-method qualitative research is 
key: conversations with activists, organizational leaders, and time observing their 
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operations and reading their literature is the only way to truly understand whether they 
have maintained any of their radical commitments and how. In my cases, CAL-PEP 
and the SJI have clearly maintained a strong commitment to prostitutes’ rights 
internally by explicitly acknowledging that prostitution (and other forms of sex work) 
are employment choices as opposed to criminal and/or immoral activities. They put 
this radical philosophy intro practice by hiring populations (prostitutes and other 
street-based persons) commonly blamed for the spread of HIV and other STIs.  
However, time spent at both of these organizations and conversations with 
their leaders and staff revealed that advocacy for prostitutes’ rights externally, in the 
broader political realm, has been limited for CAL-PEP and the SJI. Both CAL-PEP 
and the SJI encounter two vectors of political constraint-- section 501c3 of the IRC, 
and data collection requirements imposed on them by various granting agencies. As 
demonstrated, these vectors severely curtail their organizational capacities to mobilize 
those they serve and engage in broader political advocacy by restricting their lobbying 
and campaign activities (Section 501c3) and by consuming any extra resources and 
limiting their capacity to hire from and engage their grassroots (data collection). As a 
result, even though these organizations are staffed by sex workers, they in many ways 
have followed the path of similar nonprofits formed by activists, such as GMHC and 
the WHC: they face staffing and funding challenges; they focus mainly on maintaining 
service provision; and aside from their mission statements, seem far removed in their 
daily activities from the radical activism from which they were born.  
 But all of this is not to say that CAL-PEP and the SJI have entirely abandoned 
supporting prostitutes’ rights. At CAL-PEP, the organization has completed and 
presented numerous research and demonstration projects to health and governmental 
officials world-wide that have make clear the efficacy of nonjudgmental, non-
criminalizing approaches to sex worker health and safety, while also engaging in 
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advocacy for broader AIDS education and prevention funding. At the SJI, sex workers 
are exposed to pro-sex worker rights discourse through posters and educational 
materials at the clinic, and management is planning to make the H-election (under 
section 501h of the IRC), which would allow them to engage in advocacy/lobbying 
work without compromising their tax status. And by publishing and presenting 
research, the SJI also demonstrates the value of nonjudgmental approaches to sex 
worker health and safety. Indeed, despite focusing on service provision, all of this 
shows that by promoting sex worker rights within the realm of (nonprofit) health 
service provision, both organizations employ various strategies to avoid complete de-
radicalization by their encounters with the vectors of political constraint. 
Specify dynamics 
When studying organizational operations closely within their particular context, it is 
often easy to see what constrains them, but it is often more difficult to specify the 
conditions under which they might also circumvent these constraints. For this reason, 
it is crucial to remember that the interaction of (nonprofit) organizational priorities and 
activist strategies with the state must be understood dynamically (see for example 
Frances Fox Piven (1985) as an early example, and Sandra Morgen (2002) more 
recently). Here, while nonprofits founded by activists holding a commitment to a 
radical cause are limited in the broader political arena, this limitation is not total. And 
so while much of the nonprofit sector literature points (correctly) to the limited 
political capacities of these organizations, closer case studies like mine raise questions 
about the dynamics of de-radicalization: how might nonprofit organizations 
(particularly those that emerged from protest movements) become absorbed, to a 
degree, by the state, but also how might they resist this, and under what conditions? 
My cases show that although section 501c3 of the IRC and data collection 
requirements imposed by granting agencies do limit CAL-PEP and the SJI’s advocacy 
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for prostitutes’ rights in the broader political and legislative realm, strategies of 
circumvention also exist and are employed in response to restrictions placed on these 
organizations through their interaction with the state (such as hiring sex workers for 
service delivery and having a mission statement that says prostitutes are workers, 
discussed above). However, not all nonprofit organizations employ these or similar 
strategies, and so specifying the conditions under which they do this is important.  
In my cases, two conditions were key to implementing various strategies of 
circumvention. First, “localism” referred broadly to how the decentralized nature of 
the American (welfare) state fostered the provision of social services by local-level 
agencies, particularly in the 1980s in the field of HIV/AIDS prevention. Here welfare 
state devolution meant health and social service provision was increasingly funded by 
federal block grants to state and local governments, which, in turn, subcontracted to 
local community-based organizations (CBO). Certainly, localism has meant health 
service delivery in the United States has been incomplete, regionally varied, and 
precariously funded; however, it has also provided opportunities for groups to create 
health service projects that meet their own community’s needs in ways state agencies 
may never be able to and, by extension, provided an opportunity for the continuation 
of more radical projects.  
Second, alongside localism, “professionalism” also created conditions under 
which marginalized groups might develop and maintain radical service projects, 
despite receiving funding from state sources. For the purposes of this thesis, 
professionalism was broadly defined as the possession of a qualification or credential 
demonstrating the possession of a special form of knowledge used to serve others 
(Cruess, Cruess, & Johnston, 2000). And it can also be understood administratively, as 
the demonstration of an individual and/or organizational ability to deliver services 
efficiently and effectively. While requirements for professionalism may not initially 
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appear conducive to fostering the maintenance of radical commitments by an 
organization, this thesis has shown that this does not only foster exclusions. For 
stigmatized and marginalized groups, such as persons with AIDS and sex workers, it 
has facilitated their involvement in their own care by allowing organizations serving 
them, like CAL-PEP and the SJI, to engage in the more radical project hiring them for 
service delivery. 
Outcomes 
Consider the impact on those served and involved in these organizations 
Even as CAL-PEP and the SJI are limited as advocates in the legislative arena, their 
capacity to gather and provide a safe space for a criminalized and marginalized 
population cannot go without note. And so when studying such nonprofit 
organizations it is important to give voice to those they serve to understand how their 
involvement with these organizations impacts their own lives and their political 
capacities and experiences.  Future projects will focus more closely on the experiences 
of individuals at these organizations and how this has increased their feelings of 
personal and political efficacy, and the following pages sketch how this might be 
done. 
Work by Suzanne Mettler and Joe Soss provides a potentially useful frame for 
such a project because it engages with the American politics literature on political 
participation, but goes beyond the usual “who participates and why” questions to look 
at how specific policies can encourage/discourage participation in civic and political 
life. In short, Mettler and Soss put “the people in the policy”, engaging with both the 
policy texts and debates and the lives and experiences of the people impacted by the 
policies.  To (grossly) summarize the main message from Mettler and Soss, then, they 
show that large, nationalized and smoothly administered programs and policies are 
more likely to constitute citizens who are see themselves as politically efficacious and 
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therefore active in political and civic life than those who participate in particularistic, 
variable, state-level policies. Overall, Mettler (1998) writes, “the manner in which 
citizens are included in a polity…depends on the institutional framework within which 
their subsequent participation occurs and influences the choice of political goals and 
strategies they pursue” 108(p.221). Similar themes are apparent in Soss’s work on 
welfare (Schram & Soss, 1998; Soss, 1999, 2000). In his work comparing Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security Disability 
Income (SSDI) recipients, he shows how those experiencing the casework-oriented 
AFDC were more likely to feel that the government would not respond “to people like 
them” and thus were less willing to voice their grievances to the relevant agencies as 
than those in the universal SSDI program.  
In an era of neo-liberal politics and the HIV/AIDS epidemic, where various 
devolutionary policies facilitated community-based nonprofit health and social service 
provision, are these nonprofits encouraging their clients to engage in the political 
process and advocate for their interests and those of the nonprofits serving them? 
Initial evidence (presented in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis) demonstrates that 
although tax status and data collection discourages them from promoting political 
activity directly, many sex workers at the SJI and CAL-PEP commented that being at 
these organizations encouraged them to become more involved in various political 
causes, whether this meant advocating for continued funding for the organizations 
they use, for sex worker rights, or for other issues important to them, such as 
                                                
108 For example, in Mettler’s “Divided Citizens” (1998) she examines how the structural arrangements 
through which policies are administered shape the character and experience of citizenship for those 
covered by the policies. As a result New Deal policies that applied mostly to men were centralized and 
unitarily administered, creating a nationalized citizen, while those that applied to women were 
discretionary and variably administered at the state level, thus leading to a particularized politics of 
place for women. As well, in Mettler’s study of the GI Bill (Mettler, 2005), we see again that as a 
broad-based, well-administered program, the GI Bill constituted (male) citizens who became active in 
civic and political life. 
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HIV/AIDS or transgender rights. However, this sentiment was not uniform across 
clients of these organizations: in many cases, despite their own involvement in the sex 
industry and CAL-PEP and the SJI, they opposed sex worker rights, feeling it was 
dangerous and demeaning work. Further study could therefore probe these initial 
findings more closely in order to understand how nonprofit service involvement has 
promoted (and discouraged) individuals’ broader political involvement. 
Policy outcomes: consider NGO-ization 
If we accept that CAL-PEP and the SJI represent a case of activist engagement with 
the state through the nonprofit sector, it is important to also draw conclusions about 
their impact on public policy. Indeed, prostitution remains criminalized despite over 
thirty years of activism by COYOTE and it’s daughters, but what implications might 
CAL-PEP and the SJI’s work have on public policy? The incorporation of sex workers 
into the realm of nonprofit health service provision and their impact on policy can be 
analyzed from the “NGO-ization” perspective. Here authors such as Sonia Alvarez 
(1999) have noted (about feminist NGOs in Latin America, for example) that NGOs in 
general are often used by states to pick up after the fallout of welfare state downsizing 
by evaluating and administering self-help, social service and training programs for the 
poor (Alvarez, 1999). Indeed, this NGO-ization process provides a seat at the table for 
many groups previously excluded from policy development and implementation 
processes. But through this process of inclusion, however, NGOs risk becoming 
experts for governments and losing their position as critical outsiders who advocate 
for their peers and challenge state responses to their claims.  
Applying this concept of NGO-ization to sex workers and policy development, 
it is clear that prostitutes have always occupied an extremely marginal (if not the most 
marginal) place in the American political process, and so it is no surprise that their 
protest efforts have yet to succeed and change prostitution laws. However, by taking at 
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seat at the table of nonprofit health service provision, possibilities arise for prostitutes 
to change—albeit incrementally—how government officials perceive their community 
(and its health and safety needs). We see CAL-PEP and the SJI taking a seat at this 
table through their presence at AIDS conferences and on various state, federal and 
local health service committees, where they frequently present research and inform 
these bodies about sex workers’ health and safety needs. All of this indicates that 
CAL-PEP and the SJI have had some impact, as NGOs, on policy.  
Indeed the CDC’s (and other state agencies’) use of NGOs (nonprofits) for 
health and social service provision is a common feature of the American welfare state, 
particularly in the HIV prevention field. So one could argue that NGOs serving 
marginalized populations thus operate as policy laboratories (see for example Volden, 
2003) for testing new and innovative service provision models, while keeping the 
federal government abreast of their constituency’s needs. Here CAL-PEP and the SJI 
are delivering health services to sex workers in a way that is very distinctive in the US 
and highly contradicts historical precedent: sex workers are actually involved in 
providing health services to their peers and are not required to leave the sex industry 
as a condition of receiving services. Moreover, CAL-PEP and the SJI receive funds 
from state, local and federal agencies, and the government agencies funding them 
know they hire sex workers for the outreach efforts. Indeed, government agencies are 
not funding prostitution, per se, but they are supporting organizations that support 
prostitutes’ occupational health and safety. Now, one might argue that such an 
outcome is possible for CAL-PEP and the SJI because their “laboratory” is the Bay 
Area, but given the moral outrage prostitution still generates among policymakers 
today (even in the Bay Area), this outcome remains very surprising, especially 
considering how few concessions CAL-PEP and the SJI’s foremother, COYOTE, was 
able to gain from the government.  
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Yet while CAL-PEP and the SJI might seem like radical policy 
implementation experiments, what they are doing through their daily operations is 
simply harm reduction work, this time with sex workers. As such, CAL-PEP and the 
SJI’s efforts are similar to policy efforts such as needle exchanges, where people are 
not demonized for using needles but instead provided with assistance to use them 
safely, in a way that will not, hopefully, transmit HIV and other STIs. This strategy 
has been acknowledged worldwide (less openly in the US, of course!) as a sound and 
efficacious way of keeping the public healthy. With regards to the sex trade, 
prostitution is the “oldest profession” and shows no sign of subsiding: abolishing it (as 
SAGE desires) or decriminalizing it (as COYOTE desired) are not realistic options 
right now. Therefore, what CAL-PEP and the SJI do, from a policy perspective is 
provide the most pragmatic way for keeping sex workers safe and healthy, and in so 
doing provide a model that might be replicated in other jurisdictions. All of this shows 
that those doing illegal activities (namely prostitutes) might actually be supported in 
maintaining their health and safety when this is done in a way (through policy) that 
separates discussions of morality (i.e. whether prostitution is right or wrong) from 
discussions of public health. 
Propose Activist Strategies 
Scholars studying activist service nonprofits are generally not involved in their day-to-
day operations, and thus have the time and analytic space to step back and make 
recommendations about how these organizations might continue engaging in the 
original struggles from which they were born. Indeed, for nonprofit organizations like 
CAL-PEP and the SJI, expecting them to engage in political activities of any sort that 
might compromise their nonprofit status is unrealistic and, speaking normatively, 
undesirable: in a political climate where prostitutes are criminalized and free, 
nonjudgmental health services for them are few and far between, the SJI and CAL-
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PEP cannot risk losing their capacity to provide services to a marginalized, 
stigmatized population.  
At the same time, CAL-PEP and the SJI—with their knowledge of and 
connection to the sex worker community—are in many ways ideal advocates for 
prostitutes’ rights, and so for this very reason it is important to make recommendations 
about what might be possible for them as more than service providers. To advocate for 
changes to prostitution (and any other) legislation without compromising their 
nonprofit status then, CAL-PEP and the SJI have two options: make the H-election 
under section 501h of the IRC and/or form separate advocacy organizations (as 
GMHC did) under section 501c4 of the IRC. As noted previously, the H-election 
(which the SJI is currently considering) would allow them to devote certain 
percentages of their tax-exempt income to lobbying activities without risking the loss 
of their nonprofit (and, hence, fundraising) status, while a 501c4 advocacy 
organization would operate as a separate advocacy organization focused solely on 
lobbying.  
 However, employing these strategies costs money that the SJI and CAL-PEP 
would have difficulty finding. Although it costs nothing to make the H-election (the 
organization only needs to sign and submit to the IRS the one-page form 5768), 
engaging in lobbying requires unrestricted funds (i.e. funds not designated for a 
specific purpose). Certainly, there are low-cost methods of lobbying, as Berry & 
Arons (2003) indicate, such as emailing politicians, or engaging in letter writing 
campaigns. However, more intensive lobbying efforts cost more money. For example, 
devoting three or four hours per week of a staff member’s time to meetings with state 
and local officials would require the organization to pay not only this individuals’ 
salary, but that of the person replacing them to continue providing services. 
Establishing a 501c4 lobbying organization requires even greater resources, as the 
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organization would need to pay incorporation fees, as well as raise funds to cover any 
of the operational costs related to running this separate organization (office supplies, 
staff salaries, etc). 
Given their support for sex worker rights, CAL-PEP and the SJI have a limited 
universe of donors that would provide them with the unrestricted funds they might 
devote to lobbying or establishing an advocacy organization. Instead, the majority of 
their funds are from various federal, state and local health authorities and can only be 
used for specific purposes, namely HIV prevention and testing activities. Furthermore, 
it is difficult to fathom how-- given the resources they must devote to day-to-day 
service provision and grant compliance activities—they might develop their capacity 
for such additional fundraising.  
At the same time, despite these barriers, both CAL-PEP and the SJI can 
continue to indirectly encourage their clientele to support sex worker (and other street-
based populations’) rights by exposing them to language (such as the term “sex 
worker”) and by involving them in organizational operations and management. All of 
this might potentially empower and politicize sex workers gathered at CAL-PEP and 
the SJI by changing their own views of their activities and increasing awareness about 
the rights and recognition they might demand from state and societal actors. 
 For COYOTE’s daughters that remain focused on protest and advocacy (such 
as SWOP), this thesis has demonstrated that sex workers advocating non-criminalizing 
approaches to prostitution often have more influence on and access to policy-makers 
when they enter the realm of health service provision, particularly as the broader 
political climate (especially at the federal level) is dominated by activists and political 
officials opposing sex worker rights. But this is not to say SWOP et al should abandon 
their activities altogether. Given that prostitution laws (with the exception of 
trafficking legislation) are made at the state level and enforced locally, activists should 
 253 
continue targeting these levels of government, as SWOP did with Proposition K in 
2008 (described in Chapter Two). Although this ballot measure was defeated, the 
emphasis by advocates that Proposition K would help protect the rights of adults to 
engage in private, consensual sexual behavior usefully emphasized that they were not 
advocating for child prostitution or human trafficking. 
 However, it is clear that sex worker rights activists face major barriers to 
organization: prostitution remains criminalized, which makes it difficult for them to 
organize openly; and resources are difficult to obtain, as there are few individuals and 
organizations willing to openly support such a cause. Therefore, to overcome these 
barriers, it would be worthwhile for organizations like SWOP to continue developing 
partnerships with and obtaining support from organizations like the American Civil 
Liberties Union, which, while not exclusively focused on prostitutes’ rights, supports 
such endeavors because they touch on such issues as privacy and individual choice.  
Moreover, in these current economic times when many state and local governments 
are revisiting the high costs of incarceration and law enforcement (see for a recent 
example Steinhauer, 2009), organizations like SWOP would be well advised to 
continually emphasize the high economic costs the enforcement of prostitution laws 
impose on state and local governments. 
Future Research & Concluding Thoughts 
This chapter has reviewed findings about CAL-PEP and the SJI in terms of the 
broader political context in which they operate, their organizational strategies and 
activities, and their policy and activist outcomes. In so doing, the goal here has been to 
promote multi-method qualitative research projects with small, activist service 
nonprofit organizations. Using the guidelines sketched above, I hope scholars will 
seek to understand whether the radical impulses and claims-making capacities of other 
grassroots organizations serving marginalized populations are similarly maintained 
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and constrained when they are institutionalized into service provision organizations 
and partner with state agencies in different political contexts. 
Future research in my case, then, will consider the development of comparative 
perspectives on political activism, nonprofits and engagement with the state through 
studies of sex workers’ nonprofit peer-based health service organizations in other 
jurisdictions. The organizations I am considering include Maggie’s Toronto Prostitutes 
Community Service Project; the Prostitution Alternatives Counseling and Education 
Society in Vancouver; the Scottish Prostitutes’ Education Project in Edinburgh; and 
the Working Men Project in London. Like CAL-PEP and the SJI, these organizations 
were formed by sex worker activists in urban centers in English-speaking, 
industrialized nations with mature (although arguably more comprehensive) welfare 
states. Unlike the United States, though, these nations do not criminalize prostitution 
to the same degree and, arguably, provide less sex-negative political environments. It 
will therefore be interesting to see how the activists that created these organizations 
maintain a commitment to sex worker rights within these varied contexts. 
In the meantime, I will conclude by noting that since writing this thesis, CAL-
PEP and the SJI have continued to face challenges. Although it goes without saying 
that prostitutes rights is not yet a popular political cause in the United States, the 
recent election of President Obama may (one might speculate) signal a more sex 
positive federal administration and, hence, more funding for organizations like CAL-
PEP and the SJI that employ harm-reduction philosophies. However, the economic 
downturn in the nation has limited federal, state and local budgets, even in wealthier 
jurisdictions like the Bay Area. As a result, the SJI has laid off staff and reduced its 
service offerings due to cuts to the city budget (St. James Infirmary, 2009), and at 
CAL-PEP both Gloria Lockett, the Executive Director, and Carla Dillard Smith, the 
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Deputy Director, have reduced their workdays (and, hence, paychecks) to compensate 
for a decline in funding (Email correspondence, Gloria Lockett, January 2009). 
Certainly, one might assume that with fewer resources for even basic service 
provision and operations CAL-PEP and the SJI’s political capacities will be further 
limited. At the same time, since their inception CAL-PEP and the SJI have proven 
remarkably resilient in the face of many challenges. And so their continued existence 
in the face of current adversities does not merely signal that they have become co-
opted as service providers, which various state agencies depend on. Instead, their 
presence indicates an enduring commitment to those they serve—sex workers—and to 
the radical political struggle for sex work rights from which they were born.
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APPENDIX  
 
 
 
 
Would you like to talk about your experiences with [insert 
name of program under study]? 
 
 
If you answered “yes” to this question, a Cornell University 
Researcher invites you to participate in a study of [insert name 
of program] and others like it!  
 
 
Confidentiality is GUARANTEED: NO NAMES ASKED. 
 
Eligibility: 
 
You must be at least 18 years old 
You’ve exchanged sexual services for cash 
You’ve used the services at [insert program name] 
 
Requirements: 
  
Complete an interview with a female researcher at the [insert 
name of program] or in a location of your choice 
 
IF YOU ARE INTERESTED, PLEASE CONTACT 
SAMANTHA MAJIC at [PHONE NUMBER TBA] or 
sam232@cornell.edu 
 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY IS GUARANTEED 
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Dancing with Deviance? Examining Sex Worker- Run Outreach Programs 
and their Relationship to the State  
Oral Consent Form 
You are invited to participate in a research study of outreach programs that 
are developed and run by sex workers for sex workers in three states. The 
purpose of this study is to examine how these programs work, how they are 
funded, and how they shape the (political) lives and experiences of those who 
run them and participate in them. We ask that you read this form and ask any 
questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study. 
Procedures: If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to participate in 
an interview with the researcher—Samantha Majic—for no more than two 
hours.   
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: 
Voluntary Nature of Participation: Your participation is voluntary, and you 
may refuse to participate before the study begins, discontinue at any time, 
or skip any questions that may make you feel uncomfortable. Your decision 
whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with 
Cornell University. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any 
time without affecting those relationships.  
While we do not anticipate any risks for you participating in this study, other 
than those encountered in day-to-day life, there is always a risk that someone 
might overhear this interview. Because of this risk, this interview is taking 
place in a location you agree is safe. 
There are no direct benefits to participating in this study. However, you will 
indirectly benefit from participating by contributing to knowledge about sex 
workers and the regulation of commercial sex work, which will ultimately 
inform policymakers and help them design better policies. 
Confidentiality: The records of this study will be kept private and we will take 
the following steps to ensure your identity is secure: 
a) You will be assigned a code number known only to Samantha Majic; 
b) You will choose a pseudonym to be used in any published material; and 
c) Any information you provide that might identify you or other people will 
be altered in any written report to conceal your identity or that of other 
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people. 
Research records (such as notes taken during the interview) will be kept in a 
locked file; only the researcher will have access to the records.  
If you choose to have your interview recorded, the recording will be kept on a 
restricted-access CD/ROM in a locked cabinet that only Samantha Majic will 
be able to access. These recordings will be kept in perpetuity, and Samantha 
Majic will be the only person to view the transcripts. 
Contacts and Questions: The researcher conducting this study is Samantha 
Majic. Please ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, 
you may contact her at 1502 King St W. Toronto, ON M6K1J5 CANADA 
sam232@cornell.edu 416-792-0417; 607-280-4818 (cell) 
You can also contact her dissertation supervisor, Professor Mary Katzenstein, 
at the Department of Government, Cornell University, 319 White Hall, Ithaca, 
NY, 14853 or at mfk2@cornell.edu (607-255-8965)   
 If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in 
this study, you may contact the University Committee on Human Subjects 
(UCHS) at 607-255-5138, or access their website at 
http://www.osp.cornell.edu/Compliance/UCHS/homepageUCHS.htm. 
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records. 
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received 
answers to any questions I asked. I consent to participate in the study. 
Please state if you are willing to have this interview recorded on digital 
audiotape. You may still participate in this study if you are not willing to 
have the interview recorded. If you are willing to have the interview 
recorded, you can stop the taping at any time. 
Statement of consent to tape interview: I have read the above information, 
and have received answers to any questions I asked. I consent to have this 
interview recorded on tape. 
 
** YOU WILL RECEIVE A COPY OF THIS CONSENT FORM ** 
This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years 
beyond the end of the study and was approved by the UCHS on 18 May 2006. 
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Dancing with Deviance? Examining Sex Worker- Run Outreach Programs 
and their Relationship to the State  
Signed Consent Form 
You are invited to participate in a research study of outreach programs that 
are developed and run by sex workers for sex workers in three states. The 
purpose of this study is to examine how these programs work, how they are 
funded, and how they shape the (political) lives and experiences of those who 
run them and participate in them. We ask that you read this form and ask any 
questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study. 
Procedures: If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to participate in 
an interview with the researcher—Samantha Majic—for no more than two 
hours.   
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: 
Voluntary Nature of Participation: Your participation is voluntary, and you 
may refuse to participate before the study begins, discontinue at any time, 
or skip any questions that may make you feel uncomfortable. Your decision 
whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with 
Cornell University. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any 
time without affecting those relationships.  
We do not anticipate any risks or any direct benefits to you for participating in 
this study. However, you will indirectly benefit from participating by contributing 
to knowledge about sex workers and the regulation of commercial sex work, 
which will ultimately inform policymakers and help them design better laws and 
policies. 
Confidentiality: Unless you sign below to give us permission to use your 
name, we will take the following steps to ensure your confidentiality: 
d) You will be assigned a code number known only to Samantha Majic 
e) A pseudonym will be used to protect your identity, and any information 
that might identify you will be removed in any report of any kind.  
In all cases, research records (such as notes taken during the interview) will 
be kept in a locked file; only the researcher will have access to the records.  
If you choose to have your interview recorded, the recording will be kept on 
restricted-access CD/ROM in a locked cabinet that only Samantha Majic will 
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be able to access. These recordings will be kept in perpetuity, and Samantha 
Majic will be the only person to view the transcripts. 
Contacts and Questions: The researcher conducting this study is Samantha 
Majic Please ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, 
you may contact her at the following: 
Samantha Majic: 1502 King St W. Toronto, ON M6K1J5 CANADA 
sam232@cornell.edu 416-792-0417; 607-280-4818 (cell) 
You can also contact her dissertation supervisor, Professor Mary Katzenstein, 
at the Department of Government, Cornell University, 319 White Hall, Ithaca, 
NY, 14853 or at mfk2@cornell.edu (607-255-8965)   
If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this 
study, you may contact the University Committee on Human Subjects (UCHS) 
at 607-255-5138, or access their website at 
http://www.osp.cornell.edu/Compliance/UCHS/homepageUCHS.htm. 
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records. 
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received 
answers to any questions I asked. I consent to participate in the study. 
Signed: ___________________________________  
Date: ________________________ 
Please sign below if you are willing to have this interview recorded on 
digital audiotape. You may still participate in this study if you are not 
willing to have the interview recorded. If you are willing to have the 
interview recorded, you can stop the taping at any time. 
I am willing to have this interview recorded on tape: 
Signed: ____________________________________ 
Date:________________________ 
 
Please sign below if you are willing to have your name used. 
Signed:          
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Date:           
    
 
** YOU WILL RECEIVE A COPY OF THIS CONSENT FORM ** 
This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years 
beyond the end of the study and was approved by the UCHS on 28 May 2006. 
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